Pashinyan’s election campaign could lead to a split in Armenian society

In the run-up to the parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2026, Armenian political life is entering a crucial phase. The ruling Civil Contract party, led by Nikol Pashinyan, now in its seventh year in power, is preparing for a campaign that will unfold under unique circumstances: for the first time in decades outside the “Karabakh context,” yet amid growing public apathy and internal party friction. This is both a liberation and a challenge. The country must formulate new national priorities at a moment where the old worldview has collapsed and the new one has not yet taken shape.

In this regard, one may assume that a fundamental ideological shift will be a key element of the Civil Contract’s election campaign. Whereas Pashinyan’s dominant theme in previous elections was “preserving Armenian Karabakh and protecting the right of Armenians to self-determination,” the emphasis has now shifted to a “peace agenda,” effectively removing the Karabakh issue from the list of priorities.

This reversal is a direct consequence of the events of autumn 2023, which ended with Azerbaijan regaining control over Nagorno-Karabakh. In recent speeches, Pashinyan has increasingly appealed to the concept of the ‘sovereignty and independence’ of modern Armenia, contrasting it with the ‘imperial ambitions’ of prior years. This theme is being presented as evidence of the chosen policy’s effectiveness.

Based on an analysis of current official statements, Pashinyan will emphasize the slogan, “The state budget is our shared family budget,” in the socio-economic section of the campaign. This metaphor is intended to create a sense of common interests between the government and the people. The key points of this idea can be found in government statements:

• An increase in state budget revenues by 253.4 billion drams (8.9%) in 2026
• Introduction of a universal health-insurance system, with citizens fully exempt from related expenses in 2026
• Allocation of 55 billion drams for housing construction and for solving the problems of compatriots in Karabakh
• Development of a cashless compensation system for pensioners’ expenses, raising the rate to 20% from the current 12%
• Completion of the “300 schools, 500 kindergartens” program in 2026

Particular attention will be paid to the problem of poverty, which Pashinyan himself acknowledges remains high (23%). The reasons cited will be the “dilapidated state of schools” and the deprivation of children’s “right to quality education,” which will lay the groundwork for promises of large-scale educational reforms.

However, despite the prime minister’s confident statements about future victory in the elections, analysis of the current situation reveals deep structural weaknesses in his chosen course. A key drawback causing growing public discontent is the government’s aggressive rhetoric and actions against the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC), compounded by a general decline in trust toward the authorities. Ignoring all moral norms, the government continues to publish materials discrediting the church and, worst of all, is using the defrocked priest, Father Aram Asatryan, to implement a plan to divide the church internally, including speculation about his potential candidacy for Catholicos. 

Moreover, Pashinyan is actively using subordinate administrative resources to put pressure on the opposition. The arrests of Bagrat Galstanyan, Mikael Adzhapakhyan, Samvel Karapetyan, Vardan Gukasyan, as well as the mysterious murder of opposition community leader Volodya Grigoryan in Parakar directly point to the authoritarian nature of the prime minister’s team, which cannot guarantee its party’s victory in the elections by legal means.

Against this backdrop, the policy documents of Civil Contract — which traditionally contain statements about developing close ties with the European Union, commitment to democracy and Armenia’s European integration — appear highly ironic. The Armenian government has already announced the creation of a “Department of European Integration” within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This step signals the intention to make European integration one of the pillars of the election program.

It is noteworthy that European non-governmental organizations are already providing full support to Pashinyan and his team in their bid to boost electoral potential. Armenian media has reported on close cooperation between the government and Equal Rights and Independent Media (ERIM), which considers it necessary to achieve Pashinyan’s “victory” in his confrontation with the AAC. 

Moreover, ERIM organized an informational attack on the church, distributing a recording of a telephone conversation between Archbishop Nathan Hovhannisyan and priest Aghan Yernjakyan through government resources.

Given the recent experience of the election campaign in Moldova — where ERIM actively supported the government of Maia Sandu — one may conclude that a similar scenario awaits the parliamentary elections in Armenia. One of the main arguments of the Moldovan government was that if the party lost its majority in parliament, the country would face security threats from unfriendly countries such as Russia. In the case of Armenia, the prime minister has already begun to voice very similar thoughts, stating that if the Civil Contract party fails in the upcoming elections, the country will face a new round of conflict with Azerbaijan. This is a clear case of fear-mongering and outright blackmail of voters who are tired of conflict.

Another parallel tool is exerting pressure on the opposition by using administrative resources. In Moldova, shortly before the elections, a number of opposition parties were barred from participating, and the number of polling stations was reduced in regions where the ruling party might not have been able to secure the number of votes needed to win. In turn, the Civil Contract party initiated changes to Armenia’s Electoral Code: the threshold for parties was lowered from 5% to 4%, while for two- and three-party alliances, it was raised to 8% and for associations of four or more parties to 10%. These new rules artificially hinder the formation of broad coalitions capable of challenging Civil Contract and push parties to compete in elections individually, making them more vulnerable.

Unfortunately, the Civil Contract party, led by the prime minister and supported by the European Union, continues to divide society. A significant number of Armenian citizens are unwilling to oppose this course — or, even more alarmingly, support it. Meanwhile, another segment of the Armenian population continues to demonstrate its rejection of the new “ideology” — which seeks to sever the link between the concepts of “Armenianness” and faith, freedom and choice, power and security. 

The outcome of the election campaign will determine not only the fate of Pashinyan and his party, but also the future direction of Armenian statehood — its place between the past and the future.