The 2020-23 conflicts in the South Caucasus resulted in devastating military defeats and territorial losses. As a result, Armenia has embarked on an ambitious “pragmatic” strategy of seeking peace with its neighbors. The hope is that peace will quell the Azeri obsession with aggression and bring prosperity to the region.
Armenia has marketed its intentions on the world stage with the “Crossroads of Peace” campaign, designed to promote its regional benefits for Armenia and its neighbors. Peace is a desirable outcome to bring prosperity and influence, and those who oppose it often harbor nefarious intentions. Azerbaijan maintains a contrarian view that peace is an obstacle to its desire to consume Armenian territory within the absurd “western Azerbaijan” lie. If morality was the barometer of peace, then Armenia would have secure borders. In this world of geo-political duplicity and self-interest, a rogue nation like Azerbaijan can violate international law regularly in the absence of global enforcement mechanisms. As a result, Armenia is forced to offer solutions to prevent Azerbaijani hegemony while preserving its own sovereignty. The desire for peace is a noble mission of self-interest for Armenia.
However, the question is not whether peace is desirable, but rather, at what cost. Like freedom, peace is not free, requiring smaller and weaker nations to engage in complex engagements to survive.
Armenia has a long history of prosperity, decline and rebirth. It is no stranger to living on the edge of sovereignty and taking advantage of global or regional dynamics to maintain its national identity. The 1918 republic emerged as a result of a combination of regional voids (the Bolshevik civil war and Turkish defeat) and the will to survive at Sardarabad. The current republic was formed through a combination of the Soviet collapse and a robust movement for freedom in Armenia and Artsakh. Every pivotal moment in our history has required a careful balance of compromise and national will to secure a future.
Today’s national security peace campaign, in that regard, is no different. Armenia must find the “sweet spot” between compromising and maintaining national dignity. How does dignity play into this scenario?
A nation, particularly a democratic one, is comprised of citizens whose opinions formulate the psyche, morale and very will of the nation. While the wheels of international politics turn, the people watch and worry about their future. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s strategy for peace with Azerbaijan is based on concessions that might enable serious adversarial engagement. What remains to be determined is how the people will embrace the end point of this process. At a high and conceptual level, who can oppose peace?
With every obstacle that Azerbaijan presents, Pashinyan has countered with alternatives to address their demands. Initially, the thinking within his administration was that ceding Artsakh and publicly declaring that Armenia accepts it as Azerbaijani territory would entice good faith negotiations. Thus far, it has not satisfied the voracious appetite of Azerbaijan. This past fall, while in Armenia, I found diverse views on this subject, ranging from support to opposition to ambivalence. I think it is fair to say that whether village residents oppose or support the process, they are passionate in their views. The border regions have an obvious vested interest in this matter as they are directly connected to the contentious border territory. Unlike the cafes and university classrooms of Yerevan, the areas under duress are the lands of generations of their families. In their view, Armenia is about the land.
My concern after this last trip is the ambivalence expressed by many. This is especially true in urban areas such as Yerevan, far removed from the delimitation process, but where a substantial segment of the population resides. When citizens express little interest in an important matter of national security, it reflects a certain loss of hope or a (perceived) inability to impact the outcome. A robust debate of pros and cons is a healthy process in a democracy.
Pashinyan’s campaign has been active in responding to Azeri demands. While the results may have been greater if Armenia were dealing with a good faith negotiating party, Azerbaijan has been unreliable and lacks any credibility in this process. Though engaging in public rhetoric about a treaty agreement on all but two articles, they continue to add preconditions in the form of red-flag demands with little room for negotiation. It is difficult, but not impossible, to negotiate in the absence of trust. This is why confidence building measures are critical — a concept apparently not in the Azerbaijani vocabulary. Insisting on a sovereign corridor through Armenia from Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan proper is absurd and insulting. It reflects the “destroy Armenia” approach.
This, combined with the “western Azerbaijan” rhetoric, reflects that Armenia does not have a serious partner in these discussions. These demands are comparable to Armenia insisting that a corridor be established through Azerbaijan for a Caspian Sea port. Obviously, Azerbaijan feels entitled to act in such an irresponsible way, because if these demands are not accepted, they believe they can resort to military means. Armenia understands this and walks the thin line of compromise. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev is so emboldened that he has the audacity to promote his “western Azerbaijan” fantasy and insist that 300,000 Azeris return to Armenia proper. Of course, he forgets to mention the over 300,000 Armenians purged from Baku, Sumgait and elsewhere through murder, pogroms and deportations.
While Armenia is focused on engaging Azerbaijan, the “normalization” process continues at a snail’s pace with Turkey. Despite the condescending rhetoric of the Turks, the process is essentially a series of preconditions aligned with Azerbaijan. They insist on no normalization until a peace treaty with Azerbaijan, which would include corridors and resettlement demands. Protecting the dignity of the nation and negotiating with an unreliable party is further complicated by engagement from the west (i.e. the European Union and the United States). After the Azeri aggression in 2022, the European Union conducted a civilian observer mission in Armenia along the eastern border with Azerbaijan. It has grown to over 160 observers from almost all EU member nations. Azerbaijan rejected a similar offer for observers on their territory and has recently connected the removal of these observers to signing a peace treaty. Azerbaijan strongly favors one-to-one negotiations with Armenia and considers any European-based entity biased against Azerbaijan. Pashinyan has stated that he is open to reducing the role of the observers where delimitation has been completed. Armenia has become adept at offering reasonable responses to Azerbaijani demands (e.g. the corridor and constitutional changes) in the hopes of keeping the process alive. Yet, Azerbaijan acts like a party going through the diplomatic motions to justify its aggression. Armenia must give the correct message to the EU, relative to the Azeri demands on observers.
While in Jermuk this past fall, my wife and I had an opportunity to see the EU observers from their hotel locations. Their vehicles with EU colors and designations were clearly visible. Though Armenia has expressed criticism at their absence in other important arenas, they bring credibility and deterrence to the regions they observe. Equally important is the documentation of their observations along the hundreds of kilometers border, which is regularly reported to Brussels and member nations. This is a vital primary source of information to counter the Azeri propaganda machine. The mission serves as another vehicle for enhancing partnership with the EU, and Azeri pressure must play no role in this decision. Linking the observers to the delimitation process might actually increase its impact.
Armenia has an opportunity to distinguish itself through the observer mission and the Georgian political crisis. As Georgia goes through another identity crisis with a slowing of EU integration, Armenia should continue the risky but important path towards integration, by becoming the sole reliable democracy in the southern Caucasus.
When dealing with a rogue adversary, such as Azerbaijan, and an Armenian nation of concerned residents, it is critical to identify the lines in the sands. Armenia has been clear that there will be no foreign corridor through Armenia but advocates for open transportation links that respect Armenia’s sovereignty. Azerbaijan insists on territorial integrity while demanding a sovereign corridor through Armenia. Pashinyan has responded to the Azeri demand of changing the preamble of the Armenian Constitution with a court interpretation that the change is not necessary. Meanwhile, the Azeris illegally occupy about 200 square kilometers of Armenian land on the eastern border.
The purpose of the peace process is not to make the Azeris solid citizens (that seems a tall order under Aliyev), but to provide a legal framework for Armenia’s security. For that reason alone, Armenia has no choice but to exhaust the diplomatic process towards a successful conclusion. If the end result is a sovereign Armenia that reasonably reflects the borders each country recognized in 1991, then we can move forward. While Armenia finds new partners for military hardware and implements reforms in its military, tolerable compromise is a key tool to prevent more bloodshed. True peace will come when Azerbaijan knows that Armenia can defend itself and that military force is not an option. Until then, strong diplomacy and isolating Azerbaijan must serve as deterrents.
Stepan Piligian
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That ‘sweet spot’ depends on whether you live in Massachusetts, under the protection of US Armed Forces, or a land-locked country surrounded by enemies and without a military that is capable of challenging its greatest two threats, as evident by very recent history.
Rather than criticize people for what they would, or should do, please detail what they could do. Pashinyan is playing the only card it can now that Putin has shown his true colors (same as Hungary and Belarus). It’s playing the NATO (Turkey) and EU (Azeri gas) card. It’s playing the non-aggressor to force OTHERS to compromise Azerbaijan and Turkey, because Armenia is absolutely not in any position to do anything else.
Criticizing Pashinyan is the fast food of psuedo-intellectualism. The low hanging fruit of ‘patriotism’ is for the half hearted, and I wonder if Armenians even deserve an independent “Armenia” today with no little effort to build Armenia and so much perpetual self destruction.
I recall “Antranig” that Armenia had secure borders and Artsakh before Pashinyan walked into the Prime Minister’s chair. Azerbaijan attacked in 2016 and was effectively rebuffed by Armenia’s military. It was entirely his idea to sabotage Armenia’s security relationship with Russia to try to make friends with Turkey’s NATO allies. The results were predictable well in advance to everyone except Pashinyan.
Russia was far from the perfect ally, but Armenia has huge interests there. For Pashinyan to act petty and careless with this relationship shows he has no business being in the Prime Minister’s chair or anywhere in government. Armenia desperately needs professional leadership. Expect Armenia only to lose with Nikol, as they have done so far.