YEREVAN—Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan declared that the draft peace treaty with Azerbaijan is finalized, marking the culmination of nearly four years of negotiations. “I’m ready to put my signature under the agreed draft,” Pashinyan stated in a March 19 post on his official Facebook page.
According to Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry, Armenia and Azerbaijan have agreed on the non-deployment of third-party forces along the border and the withdrawal of legal claims from international courts. Armenia’s MFA confirmed that Armenia accepted the final two points of the treaty and proposed issuing a joint statement, but Azerbaijan opted for a unilateral statement instead. The Armenian MFA added that Armenia is prepared to implement the agreement, once the timing and location of the signing are agreed upon.
Negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan began after the 2020 war, which ended with a trilateral ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia. However, mediation efforts stalled, and in September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a blitzkrieg attack, taking control of the entire Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh region and leading to the ethnic cleansing of over 100,000 Armenians.
However, the announcement has been overshadowed by a series of accusations, new demands and mounting opposition within Armenia, raising questions about the agreement’s long-term viability and the concessions made by the Armenian government.
Azerbaijan’s accusations and military escalation
In a disturbing continuation of misinformation, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) has once again accused the Armenian Armed Forces of firing on Azerbaijani positions along the border, marking the fourth consecutive day of such allegations. Despite Armenia’s repeated rejections of these claims, including offers to conduct joint investigations, Azerbaijan has refused to engage in transparent cooperation.
The Armenian MoD reaffirmed its commitment to thoroughly investigating any ceasefire violations, contingent upon Azerbaijan providing the necessary evidence—a step that has not yet been taken. Moreover, Armenia’s Foreign Ministry noted that Baku has yet to respond to Armenia’s proposal for a joint ceasefire monitoring mechanism, presented in June 2024.
The growing volume of false accusations, alongside Azerbaijan’s military activities, has raised concerns about the potential for further escalation. Experts suggest that these actions are part of a strategy to justify a potential military escalation while portraying Armenia as the aggressor on the international arena.
Azerbaijan’s unyielding demands
Amid these tensions, Azerbaijan has remained resolute in its demands for constitutional amendments in Armenia and the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group, which it has labeled “obsolete and ineffective.” Ayhan Hajizade, a spokesperson for Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accused Armenia of “distorting” the facts on the ground and warned that Armenia’s failure to amend its constitution would undermine the peace process. “The Armenian side, instead of demonstrating goodwill and refraining from such provocations, proposes baseless and practically impossible initiatives,” Hajizade said on March 18.
Azerbaijan’s insistence on these constitutional changes, particularly regarding the removal of references to the unification of Armenia and Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh), has long been a sticking point. This demand touches on deeply sensitive issues of national identity and sovereignty for Armenia, complicating negotiations.
Growing opposition in Armenia
As news of the finalized draft treaty spreads, opposition lawmakers in Armenia have criticized the government’s approach, accusing it of capitulating to Azerbaijan’s demands. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) strongly condemned the negotiations, asserting that the agreements reached do not reflect a genuine peace process. While supporting the goal of lasting peace, the party rejects terms imposed through threats and concessions.
“The agreements do not clarify the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, do not ensure the withdrawal of Azerbaijani armed forces from Armenia’s sovereign territories, do not prevent further Azerbaijani aggression, nor do they address the rights of Artsakh and the people of Artsakh,” the ARF stated in a public release. “Moreover, it does not resolve the issue of returning Armenian prisoners of war held in Azerbaijan.”
The party expressed deep concerns over the proposed corridor through Armenian territory, a key point in the negotiations, as well as Azerbaijan’s demands for constitutional changes and settlement of Azerbaijanis in Armenia. “This agreement essentially legitimizes Azerbaijan’s demands without offering meaningful solutions to these pressing issues,” the ARF declared, vowing to reject any agreement that compromises Armenia’s national interests.
ARF MP Arthur Khachatryan further criticized the deal, pointing out that Azerbaijan’s terms were imposed without meaningful compromise. “Each concession made by this government only emboldens Azerbaijan’s appetite for more,” Khachatryan said in a March 15 interview. He also speculated that Armenia may be pressured into accepting constitutional changes in exchange for a temporary deal, fearing that these would pave the way for more extensive concessions later. “This agreement is essentially a one-sided submission to Azerbaijan’s demands,” he added.
Member of Parliament from the “Hayastan” faction, Kristine Vardanyan, said that the Armenian authorities have agreed to a deal that reflects Azerbaijan’s key demands. “You’ve received an agreement that reflects all of Azerbaijan’s conditions. How is this a compromise on Azerbaijan’s part?” Vardanyan said during a parliamentary meeting on March 14.
She highlighted several contentious points, including Azerbaijan’s public demands for Armenia to amend its constitution and extradite Armenian citizens. “Azerbaijan has seized 200 square kilometers of our land as a result of your negotiations. Is this how they respect our territorial integrity?” she said.
Vardanyan concluded by criticizing the government’s handling of the negotiations. “Just an hour after you claimed everything was finalized, Azerbaijan introduced two new preconditions,” Vardanyan said, questioning the reliability of the negotiations and the government’s ability to protect Armenia’s interests.
Ishkhan Saghatelyan, representative of the ARF Supreme Council of Armenia, expressed concerns about the negotiation process. “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has not engaged in any direct negotiations with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and as a result, the agreements reached thus far cannot ensure peace or stability,” he wrote in a Facebook post on March 13.
Saghatelyan argued that the agreements have not secured any substantial benefits for Armenia, noting that they “fail to clarify the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, do not guarantee the withdrawal of Azerbaijani forces from Armenia’s occupied territories, do not prevent further aggression by Azerbaijan and do not address the right of return for ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh as outlined in the November 9 trilateral ceasefire agreement.”
Human rights and international legal concerns
Saghatelyan also pointed out that the agreements “do not resolve the issue of Armenian prisoners of war held in Azerbaijan,” despite repeated calls from international bodies for their release.
Former Ombudsman of Armenia Arman Tatoyan highlighted the ongoing human rights violations, including the “show trials” of Armenian prisoners, which are being used by Azerbaijan to create a false narrative of legality and legitimacy around its actions. “These trials are nothing more than a tool for Azerbaijan to create an illusion of legitimacy for its actions,” Tatoyan said.
Tensions around military activities are also rising, with Azerbaijan’s large-scale military drills raising fears of a renewed conflict. Azerbaijan’s MoD recently announced the recruitment of additional personnel for contract service, which analysts believe could be a precursor to further military escalation. “Azerbaijan’s actions, including its crackdown on individuals posting videos of military convoys, suggest the potential for provocation, or even open aggression, against Armenia,” Tatoyan warned.
Tatoyan also voiced concerns over Azerbaijan’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric, particularly the demand for the return of “Western Azerbaijanis,” the establishment of the Zangezur Corridor and constitutional changes in Armenia.
“The Armenian authorities have been hiding these crucial demands from the public,” Tatoyan asserted. “They are presenting the peace agreement as something that serves Armenia’s interests, but the truth is far from that. These demands are destructive and Armenia’s leadership must confront this reality.”
PM Pashinyan’s position and international reactions
Speaking with reporters on March 13, PM Pashinyan provided further details on the draft agreement. Initially, Armenia proposed that European Union observers be withdrawn only from demarcated sections of the border, with a full withdrawal contingent on the completion of the border demarcation process.
Pashinyan later clarified that the agreement stipulates the withdrawal of third-party forces from the entire common border. Regarding Armenia’s shift in position, Pashinyan explained that the government had not altered its original stance but rather, adjusted its understanding based on the analysis of the text. “We have no secrets from our people. Each article has been made available,” Pashinyan stated. However, public demands for the complete text of the agreement continue to surface.
Regarding potential constitutional amendments, Pashinyan explained that there have been no discussions between Armenia and Azerbaijan on this matter. He reiterated that following the Constitutional Court’s ruling last year, Armenia’s constitution no longer includes territorial claims against Azerbaijan. However, Pashinyan acknowledged that Azerbaijan’s constitution still contains territorial claims against Armenia, adding that the treaty should resolve these concerns.
The Zangezur Corridor remains one of the most contentious aspects of the negotiations, with Azerbaijan continuing to press for a transportation route through southern Armenia, connecting Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhichevan. When asked if Armenia would provide a corridor through Meghri or any other territory to Azerbaijan, Pashinyan initially referred to his “Crossroads of Peace” project and ongoing discussions regarding the unblocking of transportation routes. However, under further questioning, he answered unequivocally: “Yes, we will provide the road.”
In the wake of announcements from Yerevan and Baku regarding the completion of negotiations, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev stated during a speech on March 13 that trust in Armenia is “close to zero.” He reiterated Azerbaijan’s demand for changes to Armenia’s constitution and the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group. He also accused the French government of exacerbating regional tensions by supplying weapons to Armenia, accusing the latter of “preparing for a new war.”
In a March 14 interview, Azerbaijan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Elnur Mammadov stated that once the treaty is signed, both Armenia and Azerbaijan will withdraw mutual claims in international courts. Mammadov added that the next steps depend on Armenia’s actions and confirmed that no immediate meeting between the foreign ministers is planned.
On March 14, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan confirmed that Armenia and Azerbaijan will simultaneously withdraw their international claims once the treaty comes into force. “Now, when the treaty will take effect, when the sides will withdraw the lawsuits, at the same time, the two sides will assume obligation to not file lawsuits against each other in the future around the issues that had existed between the sides prior to signing the treaty. It is assumed that in all disputes that we now have, the sides must reconcile,” said Mirzoyan.
In response to Azerbaijani calls for the abolition of the OSCE Minsk Group, FM Mirzoyan has suggested that its dissolution could be a natural outcome of the treaty, which would officially end the conflict and make further international mediation unnecessary.
Furthermore, Azerbaijan has raised concerns about the presence of the European Union monitoring mission along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. During his speech on March 13, Azerbaijani President Aliyev criticized the mission, accusing it of engaging in intelligence-gathering activities along Azerbaijan’s borders.
“The EU monitoring mission is, in fact, an EU intelligence mission. They stand by our borders day and night, like spies, searching for ways to infiltrate our territory. We also have sufficient intelligence data regarding the selective nature of this observation mission,” Aliyev stated.
Deputy FM Mammadov also alleged that the EU mission is engaged in intelligence activities. Mammadov said that Armenia’s purchase of weapons and the presence of international monitors on the border are key obstacles to achieving lasting peace.
Azerbaijani presidential advisor Hikmet Hajiyev stated on March 13 that if Armenia seeks peace in the region, then it must closely cooperate with the ongoing judicial processes in Baku. Hajiyev emphasized that there are individuals in Armenia who have committed “war crimes against humanity and the Azerbaijani people,” and that they should be held criminally accountable.
In response to Hajiyev’s statement, Pashinyan replied, “There is no provision in the peace agreement draft that pertains solely to the Republic of Armenia and not to Azerbaijan. This is the essence of the agreement, and any situation can be subject to such interpretations. However, I reiterate, there is no provision in the peace agreement draft that concerns only one of the parties.”
Regarding Azerbaijan’s demand for the extradition of individuals involved in the Artsakh conflicts, including those it labels as “war criminals,” Pashinyan stated that there is no extradition clause in the treaty.
Political and military leaders of Artsakh have been illegally detained in Azerbaijan since September 2023, under charges of “terrorism,” “separatism” and “war crimes.” Their trial, held in a military court in Baku, has been closed to journalists, international observers and human rights organizations.
As the finalization of the peace treaty nears, the situation remains fluid, with ongoing opposition to the government’s handling of negotiations and growing concerns about Azerbaijan’s demands. Opposition parties, particularly the ARF, have vowed to reject any agreement that compromises Armenia’s sovereignty. Azerbaijan’s continued military maneuvers, along with its unyielding demands, suggest that the road to peace may be fraught with further challenges, including the risk of military escalation.
This article was updated on March 19, 2025 to reflect new developments.
Hoory Minoyan
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This is another one of Pashinyan’s dirty tricks. The elections are around the corner and by rushing to sign this bilateral “peace treaty” by way of more concessions to the enemy he is trying to score political points at home with his former followers who have turned against him now that they have realized what unpatriotic scoundrel they had elected as the leader of the country. He won’t succeed this time around. They will not forgive him for all the misery that has brought upon the nation. He’s been discovered for all his lies and secret dealings and his time is up. It is the end of the road for him. Furthermore, a bilateral “peace treaty” with a vitriolic enemy, a wolf in sheep’s clothing, with no third-party guarantor and enforcement is meaningless and can be broken at any time. He’s really in dire straits and I smell a rat!
Due to the still valid international protocols (although under growing strain) which upheld the Soviet boundaries as the international ones and the fact that Armenia lost. Yerevan had no real choice but to formally accept the boundaries of Armenia as defined by the Soviet Union . The behaviour post 1994 was much waffling around although proposals were made nothing ever finalised, whilst Azerbaijan was able to build up it’s military and turn the tables in 2020.
What some people fail to comphend is that leaving it to another day hasn’t brought relief and the longer its left it unresolved the harsher any agreement is likely to be.
Nations at peace don’t need to have foreign monitors nor forces.
It will also bring an end to Russian game of “Armenia is surrounded by enemies so has to stick with us”, which has defined nature of the relationship for the last 100 years and perhaps Russia might realise that it’s Byzantine strategy for keeping allies weak so as to better control them actually runs the risk of losing them just like with Syria .
The Zangegur corridor seems to be unclear although apart from Turkey and Israel and maybe Trump’s USA (with its irredentist claims on Canada Greenland and Panama) Azerbaijan won’t be getting much international support for a full control. If the war in Ukraine ends in stalemate Russia will still have it’s own closer to home issues to address and influence on the South Caucasus will be less important with greater priorities within Russia. Things change say if the clerical regime in Iran fails, whilst Armenia will lose a sympathetic neighbour, a major draw that Israel has to Azerbaijan will diminsh after all pre 1979 were quite friendly and Armenia and Azerbaijan were isolated in the Soviet Union, all changes such as the revamped website!
This “peace treaty” will be like opening Pandora’s box, full of nasty surprises and outcomes for Armenia. Armenia is no stranger to capitulation treaties imposed by victors. The last one was the capitulation treaty, called the Treaty of Kars in 1921, which was imposed by Turkey and Soviet Russia on Armenia, and which reduced Armenia to its present size and was robbed of its independence for 70 years. This upcoming “peace treaty” could very well resemble the previous one – a Treaty of Kars 2.0.