The U.S.-Armenia Strategic Partnership Charter: What to expect next?

On January 14, 2025, as U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration breathed its last days, Armenia and the United States signed a Strategic Partnership Charter in Washington, D.C. The document was signed by Armenia’s Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

This article will highlight the key points of the agreement and present a reflection and analysis on how Armenia can benefit from the Charter to pursue its foreign policy goals, amid the regional reaction and the Azerbaijani president’s recent threats against Yerevan. 

Key points of the Charter

As per the agreement, both countries affirm the importance of their relationship as “friends and strategic partners.” They emphasize that this cooperation is based on “shared values and common interests,” which include democracy, economic freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity. They also aim to collaborate on innovation and technological advances, bolster energy security and strengthen their relationship in the fields of education, science, culture, rule of law, defense and security. 

The Charter encompasses five areas: principles of partnership; economic, trade, transport and energy cooperation; defense and security; democracy, justice and inclusion; and people-to-people and cultural exchanges. 

It is worth mentioning that after the signing of the document, FM Mirzoyan announced that Armenia is joining the Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State (ISIS). 

Principles of partnership

Both countries express support for each other’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. They acknowledge their shared commitment to democratic values, peace and stability in the South Caucasus. The U.S. welcomes Armenia’s efforts to deepen its ties with the Euro-Atlantic states and supports the “peace process” between Baku and Yerevan, including the “border delimitation process based upon the Alma Ata Declaration of 1991.” The U.S. also supports the normalization of relations between Armenia and its neighbors and the unblocking of regional communications, based on full respect for territorial integrity.

Economic, trade, transport and energy cooperation

The U.S. affirms its support for economic and market reform in Armenia and transport connectivity. Armenia and the U.S. intend to explore opportunities to diversify Armenia’s energy production and supply. This includes the “development of a civil nuclear power program with the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and nonproliferation,” as well as “measures to increase Armenia’s energy connectivity to regional and European markets.” The U.S. will support Armenia’s agricultural trade, integration into regional transport networks and the “Crossroads of Peace” project.

Defense and security

This section is important in that it opens the door for future military cooperation between the U.S. and Armenia. The countries intend to expand the scope of their defense and security cooperation programs, “including through establishing bilateral defense consultations within the next year and assisting the Armenian military through professional military assistance training.” The U.S. hails Armenia’s peacekeeping missions and calls for “deepening Armenia’s integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.” The United States will support the capacity building of the Armenian Border Guard Service and State Revenue Committee and Armenia’s efforts to modernize the Ministry of Interior. 

Strengthening democracy, justice and inclusion

This section relates to the respect of the rule of law and judicial reforms. It calls for cooperation in tackling issues such as terrorism, organized crime, trafficking, money laundering and cybercrime. The U.S. and Armenia plan to cooperate on anti-corruption and anti-discrimination reforms, good governance, electoral reforms and the development of political parties, think tanks and NGOs. Most importantly, the U.S. plans to “continue to support Armenia as it provides assistance to displaced persons and refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh.”

Increasing people-to-people and cultural exchanges

This section touches on the American-Armenian community and recognizes the importance of increased people-to-people interaction on issues related to culture, education, science and similar programs. It also calls for strengthening academic interaction and joint initiatives for the preservation of cultural heritage in Armenia. 

Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken sign a Strategic Partnership Charter (Photo: Armenian Foreign Ministry, January 14, 2025)

Russian, Iranian and Azerbaijani reactions

Russian officials responded cautiously to the signing. As Kremlin spokesperson Dimitry Peskov mentioned, it is the “sovereign right” of Armenia to develop foreign relations, and Russia values its relationship with Armenia and intends to develop it further. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warned that Yerevan may come under U.S. pressure to take action against Russia and join Western sanctions. Victor Sobolev, a member of the Russian State Duma Committee on Defense, criticized this agreement, arguing that it “threatens Russia’s interests in Transcaucasia” and exaggerating that soon “NATO bases will be stationed in Armenia, while [Russian] troops will be withdrawn from there.”

Iran’s reaction was low-profile. The conservative Kayhan newspaper argued that Azerbaijan opened the door for Israeli penetration into the region, and now Armenia is expanding U.S. influence, and Yerevan’s policies will “not only increase tensions in the region but also damage Armenia’s traditional relations with major countries such as Iran and Russia.” 

Azerbaijani experts also sent mixed signals. Akbar Novruz wrote in AzerNews that this partnership is a “calculated effort to secure Armenia’s geopolitical standing amidst shifting alliances in the South Caucasus… [and] without any doubt, a notable achievement for Armenia.” Novruz argued that this should not be viewed as an isolated event but part of a broader geopolitical shift, as it took place days before U.S. President Donald Trump’s inauguration and the signing of the Russian-Iranian strategic partnership treaty. 

Meanwhile, Natig Jafarli, the chairman of the Azerbaijani opposition Republican Alternative party, argued that the agreement is not directed against Azerbaijan but aimed at Russia and Iran. “If the Armenia-US agreement angers Russia and Moscow decides to act, our key stance should be complete non-interference—let them handle it themselves,” Jafarli said.

Reflections

Although the agreement appears very positive, certain points need to be clarified. On the day of the signing, there was a lot of euphoria on social media, as some thought that this is a formal alliance, which is not the case. It categorizes Armenia as a strategic partner, not as an ally. The United States has signed similar agreements with Georgia (2009), Afghanistan (2012), Kazakhstan (2024) and other countries. 

While Armenia is under constant threat from its neighbors, this agreement does not provide security guarantees. However, it can be viewed as a positive step to diversify Armenia’s foreign policy, balance between the West and East and contain regional threats. Yerevan should adopt a proactive foreign policy, stabilize relations with Russia and expand its diplomatic missions in Europe, Asia and other key regions. 

A key point in the Charter is cooperation on civil nuclear energy. This would open opportunities to expand to new energy markets and replace the aging Soviet-era nuclear reactors. Moreover, U.S. support for Armenia’s territorial integrity is critical; however, words need to translate into actions, and how the U.S. could protect Armenia’s borders from far away is questionable. 

The Charter mentions that Armenia and the U.S. will engage in defense consultations; however, this phrase is ambiguous and needs further elaboration or clarification. Will the U.S. share intelligence with Yerevan if Baku launches renewed military aggression? Will Washington sell Armenia heavy arms to deter such aggression? Will Armenia’s de jure membership in the CSTO or the military presence of Russia on its territory hinder such a step? Will Washington pressure Baku to prevent a new escalation? Most importantly, would President Trump’s administration respond to such challenges amid a possible rise of tensions even within the Euro-Atlantic community?

When it comes to security, foreign policy expert Suren Sargsyan argued in an interview with 301 that Armenia must “diplomatically reassure” Russia and Iran that this document is not directed against them. The Charter “symbolizes a commitment to expanded cooperation but requires careful diplomacy to manage regional dynamics,” he said. 

Tigran Grigoryan, the head of the Regional Center for Democracy and Security in Yerevan, said that this is “not a document about security guarantees” or “mutual military aid.” If Aliyev decides to embark on some escalation against Armenia, he will hardly look at that document,” he told Azatutyun. 

When it comes to the people-to-people contacts, it is important to see American-Armenian community institutions get involved, irrespective of their political position towards the authorities in Yerevan. Armenia has a soft power surplus that can be deployed in its people-to-people or cultural diplomacy by coordinating and communicating with Diaspora institutions. Such coordination and communication must be two-way — boycotting such contacts only serves Armenia’s opponents. Inviting Americans to Armenia for exchange programs, for example, would create a strong bridge between current and future generations and open the door for advocacy. 

Finally, Armenia needs the United States and the international community to provide humanitarian aid for Armenian refugees from Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh and support their eventual safe and dignified return to their homeland. 

The implementation of this document will take time and is dependent on Trump’s foreign policy toward the region and conflict resolution in Ukraine. If the new U.S. administration adopts harsh measures towards Moscow, Armenia will feel squeezed between its commitments to Russia and the West and turn into a proxy battleground — all while Azerbaijani threats to Armenia’s territorial integrity increase. 

Foreign policy diversification and balance are key steps to ensure Armenia’s security without antagonizing its traditional partners, irrespective of the shifting balance of power. Such documents can turn into future milestones and open up international trade, energy and arms markets, enhancing Armenia’s resilience amid future pressures. 

Yeghia Tashjian

Yeghia Tashjian

Yeghia Tashjian is the Issam Fares Institute Public Policy and International Affairs-American University of Beirut’s Regional and International Affairs Cluster Coordinator. He holds a master’s degree in Public Policy and International Affairs from the American University of Beirut and completed the "Strategic Leadership in Global Societal Security Program" at the Swedish Defense University in 2022. He earned his bachelor’s degree in political science from Haigazian University in 2013 and has worked in the university's Armenian Diaspora Research Center between 2016-2017. Yeghia's master’s thesis focused on China's geopolitical and energy security interests in Iran and the Persian Gulf. Currently, Tashjian is engaged in research on the phenomenon of Turkish-Russian 'co-opetition' in the MENA+ Caucasus region and Russia's involvement in the International North-South Transport Corridor. He contributes to various local and regional newspapers, has presented various topics from minority rights to regional security issues, and is a part-time instructor in the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration at the American University of Beirut.

4 Comments

  1. What to expect next? The loss of Syunik of course! God bless Democracy and Westernization, the gift that keeps giving since 2018!
    Where’s Sir Charlie?

    • @ Gurgen how’s your favourite leader Putin guest Bashar Assad keeping in Moscow? Do remember the fact Putin wouldn’t supply him with defensive weapons leaving him to the pathetic “reserve the right to respond” to Israeli attacks and yes Putin got on just fine with Israel. As we all know this left Assad exposed as an emperor without any clothes. Besides since Azerbaijan has been drawing closer to Russia and Iran it’s likely to put them in less favour than in previous years even Putin and Alyiev mutual friend Netanyahu might have trouble excusing Azerbaijan for daliances with Washington enemies. Besides the agreement was a government one with the support of the incoming Trump administration and not a last hurrah of the previous administration as detractors would like to imply. Indeed from where you live, i believe you will see the changes with the new adminstration of the USA. Don’t be fooled by the propoganda Trump put plenty of sanctions on Russia when the situation in Ukraine was quiet.
      Putin the Turk and Muslim lover will be pleased to gift syunik to Azerbaijan to remedy the actions of the Bolsheviks who assigned it Armenia as they couldn’t be totally biased in favour of the Tartars they had to do the odd sop to keep the Armenians placated at the time.

      I don’t expect to benefit from the UK honours system and thus haven’t been knighted and thus don’t have the title Sir actually.

  2. Putin is a mob boss and Trump is trying to be one. The one thing mob bosses crave is admiration – ‘kissing of the ring’. Providing recognition to them in the form of naming a street or having plaque or statue for each of them may provide some recognition. This is a simple way to mob bosses. And Trump in the narcissist who adores any public display of admiration.

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