Those who do not take Baku’s attempt to occupy Armenian land and resettle it with 300,000 Azerbaijanis in a fictitious Western Azerbaijan seriously would do well to consult the historical record. Azerbaijan has a long history of irredentist land claims against all of its neighbors, except Turkey. The current, and easiest, target may be Armenia, but it is worth remembering that Azerbaijanis also covet land in the Kakheti district of Georgia, particularly the historically significant Georgian Davit Gareji Monastery Complex.1Miro Popkhadze, “Georgia and Azerbaijan’s David Gareji Monastery Conundrum,” Foreign Policy Research Institute (June 14, 2019). Some Azerbaijani scholars and nationalists also claim that the city of Derbent and surroundings in the Dagestan Republic of Russia are part of “historical” Azerbaijan.2Geghard Scientific Analytic Foundation, “Azerbaijanis consider Derbent to be an Azerbaijani city, but the reality is different” (Nov. 6, 2024).
Until recently, however, the main target of Baku’s aggressive land claims has been the Islamic Republic of Iran. Baku sponsors the separatist South Azerbaijan Awakening Movement (SANAM), which advocates for the “self-determination” of Iranian Azerbaijanis living in what they call “Southern Azerbaijan.”3The South Azerbaijan South Azerbaijan National Liberation Movement (SANAM) website (https://southazerbaijan.info; accessed: July 22, 2026).
The claims of “Southern Azerbaijan” are also Baku’s longest-standing and most well-developed attempt to enlarge itself at its neighbors’ expense. It began during the World War II occupation of Iran by the Soviet Union and Great Britain in 1941.4Louise Fawcett, “Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946” (London: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Ostensibly, the joint invasion of Iran was intended to prevent the Nazis from gaining too much influence with the Shah, while also ensuring the unimpeded flow of Western aid to Stalin as he battled his former ally, Hitler.
Reza Shah Pahlavi was removed, replaced by his young son, Mohammed Reza, who was forced to acquiesce to the trampling of Iranian sovereignty. The agreement between the Soviet Union and Great Britain stipulated that all foreign forces would be withdrawn from the country within six months of the defeat of Nazi Germany. The British withdrew their troops but Stalin lingered.5Louise Fawcett, “Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946” (London: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
Instead of leaving Iran by the end of 1945, Stalin created two separatist state entities in Northern Iran to pressure Tehran into making concessions. One entity was the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, the other the Azerbaijan People’s Government based in Tabriz.6Douglas Eagleton, “The Kurdish Republic of 1946” (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). Both collapsed in 1946 when Stalin decided to withdraw Soviet support. But this short-lived attempt to expand the borders of Azerbaijan, even if intended for Stalin’s benefit, resonated deeply in Baku and would be resurrected after the Soviet collapse.7Hamid Ahmadi, “The Clash of Nationalisms: Iranian Response to Baku’s Irredentism,” in Kamrava, Mehran (ed.) “The Great Game in West Asia: Turkey, Iran and the South Caucasus” (London: Oxford University Press, 2016).
As Azerbaijan gained independence, Baku became the hub for the “Southern Azerbaijan National Liberation Movement,” and its offshoot the “Southern Azerbaijan National Awakening Movement.”8Hamid Ahmadi, “The Clash of Nationalisms: Iranian Response to Baku’s Irredentism,” in Kamrava, Mehran (ed.) “The Great Game in West Asia: Turkey, Iran and the South Caucasus” (London: Oxford University Press, 2016). It created an entire infrastructure to promote the concept of “Southern Azerbaijan,” which is used as the model for “Western Azerbaijan.”
Thus, Baku has had several decades of experience refining its irredentist strategic communications apparatus. We are now seeing it fully deployed against Armenia. This is a sophisticated state-sponsored information warfare strategy intended to disorient Armenians, keep them on the defensive while also reducing support for Armenia in the international community and increasing its isolation.
Reeling from the defeat of the 44-day war, Armenians were grappling with existential crises and trying to understand their new situation. Azerbaijan leveraged its military victory over Artsakh to take advantage of Armenian disorientation. They ramped up their anti-Armenian rhetoric by framing the victory over Artsakh as just the beginning of full “liberation of historical Azerbaijani lands.”
Baku simultaneously blockaded Artsakh ostensibly over environmental concerns. Azerbaijan’s false claims of environmental protection were intended for a Western audience to distract from their real genocidal intentions.
Baku has had several decades of experience refining its irredentist strategic communications apparatus. We are now seeing it fully deployed against Armenia.
In the aftermath of the successful ethnic cleansing of Artsakh and the complete lack of international accountability, Baku has dusted off its South Azerbaijan playbook in a classic case of obfuscation and redirection. Despite abundant evidence to the contrary, Baku is claiming that Azerbaijanis are an ancient people who were the indigenous inhabitants of not only Azerbaijan, but also large parts of Armenia and Iran, along with smaller areas of Georgia and Russia. For example, the false Azerbaijani claims of “ancient roots” and direct descent from Caucasian Albanians have been deployed against the Armenians of Artsakh in an attempt to shift the narrative and justify the complete eradication of all evidence of Artsakh Armenian history and culture.
The real key to Azerbaijani success, however, is not the sophistication of the campaign but rather the reinforcement of Azerbaijani claims by the Armenian government.
It is not only the lack of response to this psychological warfare campaign from the current regime in Armenia that has allowed these false Azerbaijani narratives to gain traction. In many instances, Yerevan has parroted the propaganda of Baku, thus reinforcing the sense of Armenian defeat and hopelessness.
Emboldened by Yerevan’s official complicity, Baku has built on these early successes to steadily increase the pressure on Armenia. Azerbaijani psychological warfare against Armenia and Armenians is only going to grow and encompass more and more areas of Armenian life. Baku’s Western Azerbaijan narrative should be viewed as another form of aggression against Armenia, so that effective countermeasures can be developed and deployed. It is not too late but time is not on Armenia’s side.
The real key to Azerbaijani success, however, is not the sophistication of the campaign but rather the reinforcement of Azerbaijani claims by the Armenian government.
