Aliyev needs a clear reminder!

If President Aliyev, the dictator of Azerbaijan, moved any slower in concluding a peace treaty with Armenia, he would be in reverse. It seems reasonable to assume that he has commitment issues when it comes to formalizing real peace with Armenia. Behind the obligatory rhetoric, particularly on a global stage with third parties such as the United States, the Azerbaijani-Turkish strategy on peace and normalization has been to demand continuous preconditions to extract maximum concessions. 

There is substantial evidence to doubt Azerbaijan’s good-faith commitment despite obligatory gestures, such as cross-border trading and civil society visits. The victims of Azerbaijani atrocities and violations of Armenia’s sovereignty understand that peace is more substantive than the short-term absence of overt military action. 

Aliyev, with his unbridled attacks on Armenia’s sovereignty and its very existence, demonstrates that he treats the peace process more as an unconditional surrender. For many years, through successive iterations of dialogue, the Turkish alliance of Turkey and Azerbaijan has used unilateral preconditions as a process to extract concessions and introduce infinite delay. 

Normalization with Turkey essentially would establish diplomatic relations and open the border to commerce and travel. The border was closed unilaterally by Turkey during the first Artsakh war with Azerbaijan. Recently, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated that Turkey was ready to normalize relations “under the right conditions.” This is where the Turks introduce demands that are nonnegotiable and, at a minimum, create extensive delays. 

Establishing relations and peace is always about trust. The Turkish-Armenian experience has layers of mistrust that can only be overcome with good-faith dialogue and mutual benefits. Turkey’s strategy is to hide behind Azerbaijani demands as a prerequisite for normalization. In this way, it can publicly advocate for relations but keep the ball in Armenia’s court. 

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While taking advantage of its obvious leverage, Turkey has hardly distinguished itself as a committed party. This essentially limits progress to small token gestures, the value of which is inflated to fit the narrative of progress. While Turkey slow-rolls normalization because of what it refers to as regional issues involving Armenia and Azerbaijan, Aliyev is free to keep the complex preconditions flowing. Aliyev has stated on several occasions that the peace treaty could be signed almost immediately once the current demands are met. This statement has little credibility.

Azerbaijan has a history of always having another issue that prevents signing a treaty. If it were truly committed to a peace deal, it would be more active in facilitating the closure of open items. Instead, there is a clear pattern of making difficult demands and keeping additional items on the table. The current precondition is Azerbaijan’s demand that any reference to the 1990 Declaration of Independence be removed from Armenia’s Constitution, since it interprets the reference as a territorial demand on Azerbaijan. 

Many Armenians view this as meddling in the internal affairs of a sovereign country. Armenia’s Constitutional Court reviewed the case and found no such territorial-demand risk. The Armenian government is pursuing constitutional changes as an internal matter. Azerbaijan is well aware of the complex process of amending the Constitution in a democracy such as Armenia. There is the legislative hurdle requiring two-thirds approval and then a popular referendum. By characterizing it as a nonnegotiable precondition, Azerbaijan ensures that it will take time and internal debate, which favors the Azerbaijanis. 

Creating political tension in Armenia has always been a goal of Azerbaijan. Aliyev is simply trying to buy time while waiting for a shift in the geopolitical environment. With the introduction of the TRIPP project, Aliyev has been blocked temporarily from attacking Armenia. Prior to this agreement last year, Aliyev threatened Armenia to force the opening of an extraterritorial corridor through Syunik connecting Nakhichevan with Azerbaijan. 

Ironically, in his rogue dictatorship of Azerbaijan, the Constitution serves his purpose, and change is far less complicated. While Aliyev argues to protect territorial integrity, he ignores international court rulings and regularly violates the foundation of human rights. 

It is also important to watch the rhetoric of the “right to return” of 300,000 Azerbaijanis to Armenia. While we may emotionally react to the absurdity of his claim, the rhetoric has progressed into state-sponsored programs to document a narrative that is attempting to legitimize his claims. This may become the next precondition in the seemingly never-ending journey of this peace treaty. Aliyev has the audacity to insist on moving 300,000 Azerbaijanis into Armenia while 120,000 Armenians were forced to leave Artsakh. Aliyev’s human rights record is genocidal, and his statements are insulting. 

The relocation of any number of Azerbaijanis is a dangerous precedent, with or without a reciprocal move. The “Western Azerbaijan” campaign is more than rhetoric. The “right to return” is a first step toward territorial claims. With a population base, one can influence elections and interfere with claims of ethnic protection. Russia used that logic at the start of the Ukraine war. Stalin redrew maps to quell nationalism with strong Russian minorities in the Baltic states. Aliyev usually telegraphs his preconditions, since the public nature is meant to inspire his oppressed citizens. When one preaches systemic hatred, as the Azerbaijani administration has maintained for decades, promising common citizens the opportunity to return “home” buys domestic credibility. That is how dictators survive. Just give the huddled masses enough rhetorical hope at the expense of others. 

We should also internalize Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s comments about “under the right conditions.” He clearly stated that the peace treaty with Azerbaijan must be agreed to and signed, which is a direct reference to Armenia’s Constitution. He also stated that resolving border and transport corridor issues with Armenia is important. 

Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to a parallel process of border demarcation and delimitation that started in Tavush province and has moved very slowly. Fidan’s statement seems to couple the border issues with any normalization, although they do not directly affect the common border with Turkey. There is also a reference to regional transit and corridor progress. The Turks have disrespected Armenians by continuing to refer to the agreed-upon TRIPP as a “corridor” or “Zangezur.” It seems like the Turks and Azerbaijanis have a pipeline of preconditions to serve their delay tactics. Given the current dynamics of U.S. involvement, the Turkish alliance could find itself pressured to remove obstacles as the window of opportunity narrows. This would be in Armenia’s interest, and promoting these reminders as diplomatic initiatives should be encouraged.

The Turks are so outrageous in their human rights and sovereignty violations that they afford Armenians a plethora of opportunities to promote a course correction.

If the delay tactics of the Turkish alliance continue, then the issue may be resolved when the lack of a peace treaty interferes with TRIPP and other geopolitical interests of the United States. Azerbaijan and Turkey’s playbook should be diplomatically exposed to the United States as contrary to U.S. interests, given the chronic precondition delay game. 

A nonnegotiable constitutional change under the duress of external pressure and time constraints adds risk to the process and subjects Armenia to unnecessary political conflict. If the Azerbaijani government is truly committed to its rhetoric of peace when engaged with U.S. officials, then it should offer a good-faith diplomatic gesture to offset the harmful rhetoric of “Western Azerbaijan” and the insulting “300,000 right to return.” 

In the absence of trust and commitment, any peace treaty is simply a piece of paper that can be discarded with political convenience. Aliyev has a long history of ignoring or violating confidence-building measures during the OSCE Minsk process that required any compromise from Azerbaijan. He has willingly ignored violations of international law. With no record of diplomatic integrity, he agreed to a trilateral rapprochement last August in Washington. He needs to be held accountable as a party to the agreement. 

Of course, this is international politics and not a morality game. Unless the other parties pursue a path of accountability, Aliyev’s reckless behavior will continue. Thankfully, there is a powerful third party in the United States, which obviously has an interest in the success of this process. Armenia must demonstrate to the United States that U.S. interests are at risk with the Azerbaijani strategy. 

Azerbaijan has succeeded in decoupling or separating several issues of importance to Armenians from the peace treaty process. The continued incarceration of Armenian hostages in Baku prisons is a disgrace. How can we call it peace when Armenian rights are blatantly violated by the same government that says it wants peace with Armenia? How can there be true peace if the border process, including the illegal occupation of sovereign Armenian territory, moves at a snail’s pace disconnected from the peace process? 

Kicking the can down the road by leaving these issues to an uncertain future process is not in the interests of peace. Aliyev must be reminded in this process that setting preconditions can be viewed negatively and may have consequences. The United States, for a variety of reasons, wants this peace process to support the TRIPP project and be concluded in a timely manner. It is in Armenia’s interest to demonstrate to the U.S. government that border incursions, hostages, internal meddling and “Western Azerbaijan” lies introduce unacceptable risk to the peace objective and its economic benefits.