Shaping the new Syria: The role of Neo-Ottomanism
Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has sought to promote the uniqueness of Turkish identity, its exceptionalism and the highs and lows of the Ottoman era, helping him rally nationalist support. Historically, Ottomanism emerged in the 19th century through the Tanzimat reforms, which aimed to create a tolerant, multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire. Later, Kemalist Republicans tried to build a new form of Turkish identity, devoid of religion and distant from Ottomanism.
After the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), interest in the Ottoman era grew significantly, although it had already begun during the presidency of Turgut Özal (1989–1993). The AKP sought to balance the Kemalist westernized identity with a broader Ottoman historical identity, reminding the Turkish public that their nation once ruled areas in the Balkans, Middle East and North Africa. Neo-Ottomanism, therefore, is an idea that affects the Middle East, Balkans and Caucasus, where Turkish or Turkic groups live.
Neo-Ottomanism is a contested concept among scholars. Some, like Ömer Taşpınar, define it not as an expansionist ideology but as a set of political, economic and cultural policies designed to promote Türkiye’s role in former Ottoman territories in the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. Politically, it seeks greater engagement, using Türkiye’s geographic location to become a regional power and solidify ties with former Ottoman territories. Economically, it aims to build bridges between East and West, particularly through financial ties with former Ottoman territories. The cultural aspect, or “soft power,” is central, as the AKP embraces the Islamic world, promotes multiculturalist ideas and leverages shared heritage and common history between groups to promote its policies.
In his book, Nostalgia for Empire, Hakan Yavuz defines Neo-Ottomanism as a conservative, identity-based worldview that rose to prominence after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in an effort to make Türkiye “great once again” and expand influence into former imperial territories. In this sense, Neo-Ottomanism is a tool used by political elites to instill historical sentiment in populations of former Ottoman territories.
Others emphasize Islam in defining Neo-Ottomanism, seeing it as an endeavor by the AKP to achieve economic and political prestige within the Muslim world. Some analysts even divide the concept into emotional and tactical components, combinating nostalgia for a glorious past with the goal of building a “New Türkiye” guided by Islamist and conservative ideas.
Regarding its neighbors, Ankara has sought to influence them and promote Ottoman identity and culture. In Syria, bilateral relations have encompassed economic, political and cultural cooperation. Relations improved after the 1998 Adana Accords, which supported further cooperation, but deteriorated after the 2011 Syrian protests that were part of the Arab Spring. These tensions also affected Türkiye’s foreign policy, which was based on the principle of “zero problems with neighbors.” The Syrian crisis forced Ankara to choose between continuing the Syrian–Turkish friendship or adopting a more hostile posture.
Ankara also proceeded to invade Northern Syria to create a “safe zone.” Türkiye’s political influence expanded further in 2019 when the United States withdrew from the region. The Turkish operation targeted Kurdish forces, which Ankara considers terrorist insurgents affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
Türkiye supported Turkmen groups in the region, motivated by historical and cultural ties and a desire to act as the “big brother.” These Turkmen minorities established youth movements funded and supported by Türkiye. Another Turkish-backed militant group has been the Free Syrian Army, created by Ankara to remove the Assad regime from power. This army encompassed multiple factions serving the Turkish government in northern Syria. After Türkiye’s first invasion in 2016, these militias expanded under the direction of Turkish Intelligence, which effectively controlled these proxy forces. In Idlib, Türkiye instituted an autonomous authority that governs local affairs under Ankara’s influence. In towns such as Afrin, Ankara directly managed local bureaucracies, assigning governors responsible for paying military and police personnel and issuing identity papers and property deeds.
Türkiye’s economic influence in northern Syria has grown since the beginning of its occupation. Various areas adopted the Turkish lira due to its relative stability compared with the Syrian currency, weakened by civil war and U.S. sanctions. Türkiye also paid the salaries of militants who operate in the service of Ankara, as well as those of the police, teachers, counselors and civil servants.
When it comes to economic investments, Ankara built new branches of the Türkiye post office, providing logistical, monetary and mail services and renovated public buildings, infrastructure and institutions. It established universities, hospitals, schools and training centers, becoming the de facto protector of local residents. AKP officials consistently say that the goal of the Turkish presence was, and is, to create a sustainable economic zone extending beyond Türkiye’s borders.
From a cultural standpoint, Türkiye first entered Syrian life through Arabic-dubbed television series, which received positive feedback from Syrian audiences and later other Arab states. A primary Turkish policy in northern Syria has been establishing educational institutions. In 2020, 45,000 students in Afrin followed a curriculum that included both Arabic and Turkish as mandatory subjects. Turkish-funded Islamic studies institutions also opened, and Ankara established a cultural center in north Aleppo. Most official signage is also bilingual, in Arabic and Turkish. Turkish officials continuously emphasize that while they do not seek to Turkify the areas, they aim to cultivate a pro-Türkiye society.
From 2020 onward, Türkiye deepened its military and political engagement in northern Syria, especially in Idlib, even as it continued to host millions of Syrian refugees. Ankara’s stance toward Damascus also evolved. Over time, Erdoğan signaled willingness to restore formal relations, conditioned on progress in counterterrorism and refugee repatriation. Since 2023, Erdoğan’s foreign policy has become increasingly transactional. Ankara normalized ties with key Arab capitals: it raised diplomatic ties with Egypt to the ambassadorial level in 2023, and signed major economic and defense cooperation agreements with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This shift marks a move away from purely ideological Neo-Ottoman posturing toward pragmatic regional reintegration.
At the same time, Türkiye maintained an ambiguous but increasingly cooperative relationship with Hayʾat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Though officially designating HTS as a terrorist group, Turkish intelligence (MIT) reportedly shared information, logistics and arms. These ties deepened over time, culminating in what HTS leaders perceived as a strategic partnership, laying the groundwork for their role in the offensive that eventually unseated Assad at the end of 2024. After the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Türkiye began emphasizing Syria’s territorial integrity and political transition, supporting the new Damascus administration under Ahmed al-Sharaa while pushing for national reconciliation. At the same time, Ankara remains wary of Kurdish-led forces and has called for their disarmament and integration into the new Syrian regime.
Türkiye’s role is not limited to military influence; it also seeks a central role in Syria’s reconstruction.
In short, Türkiye’s involvement in Syria shows how history, identity and strategy are deeply intertwined. By promoting Ottoman heritage at home and projecting influence across northern Syria, Ankara has tried to position itself as a regional power while navigating a complex web of local actors, neighbors and Gulf partners. From supporting militias and rebuilding schools to engaging political leaders, Türkiye combines soft and hard power to shape the region in line with its vision. This reflects a broader effort to turn historical prestige into tangible influence, revealing both the possibilities and challenges of pursuing Neo-Ottoman ambitions in a fractured and unpredictable Middle East.
The remaining Armenians who have endured 13 years of civil war and are still stuck in Syria, need to flee that country ASAP. The vast majority of the Armenians fled that country for good, either to the West or to Armenia, when the Syrian Civil War started in 2011. Once Assad was deposed and the Sunni Islamists came to power, the persecutions and massacres of Alawite Muslims (the liberal sect to which the Assads belong to), Christians (including Armenians) and Druze by the Sunni Islamists, started immediately and still occurs on-and-off. There is no future for Armenians, Christians, Alawites, Druze, secularists and democrats, in a Syria run by Islamists and which is effectively a puppet state of Turkey. And in this highly problematic country (and region), another bloody and devastating civil war is always a possibility.
Why are Armenian authors using the name “Türkiye” for Turkey in Armenian Weekly articles? This name change was imposed by Turkish dictator Erdogan in 2021, who insists that the “international community” uses the Turkish name for the country in international communiqués and that the foreign media uses it too. This name change is purely an ideological propagandistic motive by Erdogan, and foreigners, and annoyingly even Armenians are using it in Armenian communiqués and in Armenian media. The ideological aspect of the usage of the Turkish name is obvious, and one can even easily guess in Turkey, who is an Erdogan supporter and who is not, because Erdogan supporters always use “Türkiye” in other languages, whereas Erdogan opponents definitely do not. Armenians should also not use the Turkish name for Turkey, for this reason.
Erdogan, the supreme ruler of Turkey, made his plans to rebuild the glory days of The Ottoman Empire very clear, on 10 February 10, during a ceremony marking the centenary of the death of Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II held at The Yildiz Palace in Istanbul.
Sultan Erdogan proudly declared:“The Republic of Turkey, just like our previous states that are a continuation of one another, is also a continuation of the Ottomans…Of course, the borders have changed. Forms of government have changed… But the essence is the same, soul is the same, even many institutions are the same.”
Sultan Erdogan continued his diatribe against “bigoted” secular Western democracies, that often referred to Abdulahamid II as “The Red Sultan”, by insisting that Abdulhamid II, who slaughtered more than 200.000 Armenians (Hamidian Massacres), was one of the “…most important, most visionary and most strategic minded” ruler that left indelible marks on the political landscape of Turkey for the last 150 years.
Sultan Erdogan concluded his speech by adding the following statement: “Some people insistently try to start this country’s history from 1923. Some unrelentingly try to break us from our roots and ancient values…We take pride in our history without making discrimination.”
The centenary celebrations of 2018 made it very clear that Sultan Erdogan was determined to emulate the greatness of “The Red Sultan”. If Abdulhamid believed that, the best method to solve “The Minorities Problem” within his empire was total extermination of all minorities, Sultan Erdogan was ready to annihilate the minorities such as the Kurds, currently backstabbing Turkey the way Armenians did during the reign of Abdulhamid II.
If Abdulhamid II pilfered the wealth of The Ottoman Bank by building extravagant palaces that reflected the glory of his regime, Sultan Erdogan without any qualms sent the Turkish economy on a downhill trip to complete the construction, on the outskirts of Ankara, of a “a new presidential palace complex, with 1,100 rooms and an official price tag of $615 million — although critics suggest both figures are probably higher.” Sultan Erdogan’s humble “shopaholic” wife Emine Erdogan is well known in many European capitals for single purchases of luxury goods ranging from $20.000 to $50.000 per purchase.
If The Red Sultan was silencing the opponents of his regime by imposing long prison sentences and building a large network of corrupt spies and minions, Sultan Erdogan adopted the same blue print in dealing with those who refused to echoe his own vain views of his own achievements. Full of adoration for Abdulhamid II, Sultan Erdogan “… crafted a novel and potent ideology made up of elements of Islamism, nationalism, unswerving loyalty to a one-man cult and state-sanctioned corruption.”
Sultan Erdogan also assigned a critical importance to Islamism and nationalism in laying the foundations of his foreign policy in The Middle East in general and The Caucasus in particular. In many countries such as Syria and Lebanon, his plan of acquiring new markets protected by a Turkish military presence, or the threat of a military intervention was very simple.
https://artsakhtheinadequateresponse.blogspot.com/2021/08/sultan-erdogan-pm-pashinyan-and-forging.html
In 2024, Turkey’s Ministry of National Education has unveiled significant changes to its history curriculum, replacing the phrase “Central Asia” with “Turkestan.” Many scholars and academics argued that the move is designed to instill in the Turkish population a new spirit of nationalism shaped and coloured by a desire to revive the glory days of The Ottoman Empire, when Ottoman Sultans dominated Turkestan until Russian Tzars occupied the region and reversed the name to “Central Asia.”
Ironically, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, is obsessively pursuing a plan to “Normalize” relations with Turkey, and on several occasions shook the hands of his mentor Sultan Erdogan, a Neo-Ottoman ruler determined to turn Armenia into the newest Villayet of Turkey named Ermenistan.