The following comment is attributed to President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan conjecturing on the possibility of Artsakh achieving local autonomy when it is returned to Baku’s jurisdiction. “It may take a year, maybe 10 years, maybe 100 years, or it will never be possible. Time will tell.” That mindset that Karabagh will revert to Azerbaijani control is given credence by the continuing pressure by the Minsk Group representing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for Armenia to accept another nuanced Madrid Proposal as the basis for negotiating a resolution of the Karabagh conflict. To accept these principles places the burden on the Armenian negotiators, effectively precluding our brothers and sisters in Artsakh from ever achieving a peaceful de jure independence.
Given that rather ominous outlook, the leadership in Yerevan remains hell-bent on implementing an ill-conceived policy that seeks to normalize relations with a government in Ankara that continues a decades-long national policy of denial, obfuscation, and revisionism with respect to the genocide of the Armenian nation that began on April 24, 1915. It should come as no revelation that the Turkish leaders have no intention of normalizing relations with Yerevan until the Karabagh conflict is resolved. The Turkish solution is simple: The liberated districts must revert to Azeri control and Karabagh’s ultimate status to be determined by a vote under conditions and at an indefinite time in the future. While Armenia seeks to appease Ankara on its western border, for what purpose one might ask, it is being outflanked on its eastern border.
These ongoing negotiations to achieve normalization are part of a well-conceived Turkish diplomatic offensive that seeks to force Yerevan into accepting compromises that are inimical to its political viability and future security. The soccer invitation by Armenian President Serge Sarkisian to Turkish President Abdullah Gul was part and parcel of this shrewd Turkish offensive. The invitation was anything but spontaneous by the Armenian president. The hesitancy by the Turkish president in accepting was part of the drama that set the stage for the current negotiations. Unwary Yerevan—better that said than to say they were party to this subterfuge—has little if anything substantive to gain from these negotiations. Yerevan has yet to produce any objective evidence as to how normalization will promote its present political-economic situation or long-term national security interests. An analysis of the limited and conflicting information that is available indicates that whatever gains may be anticipated will come at an exorbitant cost to Armenia.
If this is not sufficient reason to end negotiations, perhaps a more compelling reason is the need for Yerevan to reorient its priorities and view Artsakh’s independence rather than normalization as the key to its future. The loss of Artsakh would seriously weaken Yerevan’s position within the south Caucasus and would likely result in the disaffection of a significant number of diasporan Armenians. Yerevan must develop and enunciate a stratagem supported by the major political parties in tandem with Stepanakert that will maintain and strengthen the de facto independence of Artsakh as this coalition works toward its recognition as a free and independent political entity. Failure to develop a broadly supported stratagem creates a vacuum that facilitates the ongoing campaign by Ankara and Baku of comments from their leaders that seek to create the illusion that negotiations are progressing satisfactorily. This causes what they expect: confusion and consternation on the part of the Armenian political parties not privy to the negotiations, and an erosion of Armenia’s position in the negotiations. The lack of an effective response by Yerevan makes its leaders appear to be the intransigent neighbor while Turkey assumes the role of the cooperative negotiator. It is a shrewd gambit by Ankara that seems to be resonating with the principal players—the Minsk Group representing the OSCE, of which Russia and the United States serve as co-chairs with France, and by Russia and the United States as separate entities apart from their participation in the Minsk Group—as they continue to pressure Armenia to make compromises.
These nations want an open border—seemingly at Armenia’s expense—and a peaceful resolution of the Karabagh conflict—at Karabagh’s expense—ostensibly to bring political and economic stability to the region. Political and economic stability in the south Caucasus is a legitimate objective. However, nowhere are provisions suggested to be implemented that would improve the economy of Armenia, its active participation in the ongoing economic development programs and projects in the south Caucasus, guarantees of free access to Black Sea ports in Georgia and Turkey or to address the various issues that are an outgrowth of the Armenian Genocide. Rather, both Armenia’s and Karabagh’s vital interests are being ignored in preference to those of Turkey and Azerbaijan. There is everything to suggest, based on the available evidence, that if the present set of circumstances prevail, Armenia and Karabagh will be relegated to political and economic servitude, their potential forever circumscribed by the interests of Ankara and Baku (see “The Roadmap to Normalization is a Roadmap to Oblivion for Armenia,” The Armenian Weekly, May 23, 2009).
The ultimate independence of Artsakh must be viewed as infinitely more compelling than the normalization of relations with Ankara. Failure to achieve Artsakh’s independence will be the death knell for Hai Tahd, which represents the Armenian nation’s legitimate demand for justice. The first link in that long-sought demand for justice is the recognition of Artsakh as an independent entity. Should that fail, Yerevan has no hope whatsoever that the normalization of relations with Turkey will be either politically or economically beneficial, or that its national security interests can be protected. With a defeat in Artsakh, what is it that normalization can yield? What incentive would there be for Ankara to ever offer no more than token responses to the legitimate Armenian claims of restitution, reparation, recognition (of the genocide), and rectification (of the boundary)? Whatever concessions that were finally made to Armenia would serve solely to burnish Turkey’s image as a nation willing to overcome its past in order to achieve political and economic stability within the south Caucasus. Turkish leaders know that this ploy would play well in the capitals of the European Union and the United States, whose governments are anxious to finally settle the “Armenian Question” redefined in the context of their collective 21st century interests. Does anyone expect the nations that have recognized the Armenian Genocide to support Armenia’s cause under these circumstances?
For Yerevan the issue that must be confronted is not whether Karabagh is part of the negotiation process, but the constant pressure to have the Madrid Proposals serve as the basis for negotiations. No matter how these proposals are nuanced , they are the same proposals that were introduced in 2007 and they still speak to the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. Completely ignored is the principle that supports the inalienable right of an ethnic minority to seek independence from the rule of a despotic government. There is no part of international law that precludes Artsakh from being recognized today as an independent country. If the principle of territorial integrity was so sacrosanct Kosovo could not have been recognized by the United States and Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia could not have occurred (see “Is Artsakh’s Cause Less Than Kosovo’s?” The Armenian Weekly, May 10, 2009).
Even a cursory examination of these principles leaves little doubt that they are skewed against Karabagh’s independence. The first principle requires the withdrawal of the Karabagh Defense Force from the liberated territories that form Karabagh’s security zone. Withdrawal from these lands would cause the Line of Contact (LoC) to contract to the borders of the Karabagh districts. This would make the defense of Karabagh immeasurably more difficult as well as effectively cutting it off from both Armenia and Iran. The Lachin Corridor cannot be viewed as a dependable link to Armenia if the Kashatagh and Lachin districts (Kelbajar) are occupied by Azerbaijan. The Lachin Corridor road under the best of conditions is a fragile link to Armenia and can be easily severed once the security zone is occupied by the Azerbaijan military. An international peacekeeping force under the aegis of the United Nations might be an option. However, their effectiveness judged by the past performances of such peace-keeping forces in similar situations too numerous to mention is not reassuring. They normally have neither the capacity nor the mandate to effectively challenge any military action that the host nation may decide to take. What is the status of the occupied eastern margins of Martakert and Martuni and the district of Shahumian? Will they revert to Karabagh’s control or continue to remain under Azeri occupation?
A second principle speaks to the return of internally displace persons (IDP) to the liberated districts as well as to Karabagh itself. What of the Armenian IDP’s that are in Karabagh who fled from Baku and Sumgait and the districts of Shahumian and the eastern border regions of Martakert and Martuni that are presently occupied by Azeri forces. Then there are those Armenians that left Azerbaijan for Armenia or Russia. These people are the only legitimate refugees of the war to liberate Artsakh, although the term is incorrectly used by Baku to identify their IDP’s.
This requirement to resettle the IDP’s combined with a third principle that suggests a future plebiscite to determine the status of Karabagh all but insures that the people of Karabagh will never achieve independence. When this plebiscite will take place will be determined by whom? When will it be held? What geographic regions will be included? Karabagh only? Or will the voting include all of Azerbaijan as a referendum on whether or not Karabagh should be granted some form of local autonomy? Actually none of these questions are relevant simply because Karabagh’s independence will never be one of the options. Possibly Aliyev’s off repeated threat of a military solution may be the more desirable option (see “The Nagorno Karabagh Conflict Revisited,” The Armenian Weekly, August 16, 2008).
The loss of Artsakh would represent a catastrophic political and psychological setback for Armenia and for the creditability of the ARF. Hai Tahd and the socioeconomic and political reforms that define the ideology of the ARF would have been seriously tarnished. That may be a harsh assessment, but it is closer to the truth than ignoring the consequences of Artsakh’s demise.
Artsakh not only would represent a significant victory in the Armenian nation’s determination to obtain justice, but it strengthens the country’s strategic position athwart the Russian-Iranian north-south axis and the Turkish-Azerbaijani west-east axis. At any moment Russia has the capability to occupy Georgia which is Turkey’s only land connection to Baku and beyond. The neutralization of Armenia and the reversion of Karabagh to Azerbaijan would provide Turkey with an important alternate route. There can be no doubt that Turkey desires to extend its political and economic influence across the Caspian Sea into central Asia and beyond. This is the old pan-Turanian (or Pan-Turkic) dream resurrected.
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s recent charge that the Chinese government was committing genocide in Xingtiang (Sinkiang) against the ethnic Moslem Uighurs speaks to that objective. The United States, Russia, and the European Union should consider that Turkey’s geostrategic interests will ultimately run counter to their respective geostrategic interests. From the Balkans to Chinese Xingtiang and from the south Caucasus to the Gulf of Aden, there is no country within this vast region that can compete on the ground with Turkey. This includes both Israel and Iran.
No one questions the fact that Yerevan is not dealing from a position of power. However, President Sargsyan courts disaster if he continues to carry on negotiations without broad based political support and a degree of transparency. Allaying suspicions and the need to engender support from the diaspora is an absolute necessity. The ARF is well positioned to make an important contribution if Yerevan accepts the need not only to reposition itself with respect to its objectives, but to develop a plan of action that speaks, first and foremost, to the de jure independence of Karabagh. If not, then this difficult burden must fall on the ARF to represent the people of Karabagh in their epic struggle to become a free and independent entity.
Michael Mensoian
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I agree with every word of the Mensoian’s article. It should be ‘must read’ for every Armenian parliamentary, diplomatic and military leader, from Serge Sergsian down.
In the past millennium Armenia has shrunk from 300,000 sq. kms to 30,000 kms. Most recently, Stalin sliced two provinces (Nakhichevan and Artsakh) from Armenia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, we managed to take back Artsakh through guts and brains. We have given up on Nakhichevan since the Azeris emptied that province of Armenians. We shouldn’t give up Artsakh for all the reasons Mansoian’s article cites.
Karabakh and territory inside the security belt of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic should never go back to Azerbaijan…Dictator Aliev is playing a political game with Armenians…this newly crowned lifetime president of Azerbaijan, does not need lands back to his territories, those so called “occupied lands” that he always dreamt about it, is an obstacle for his strengths and marks his power over his sheikdom.
Armenia has two choices:
1) To get rid of sheikh Aliev, Armenia must recognize Artsakh as a free republic.
2) If Armenia wants to keep Aliev as president of Azerbaijan, then they must continue and play his political games, such as meetings, OSCE monitoring, Moscow seminars and … until Armenians end up a civil war over Artsakh, and finally Mr. Aliev hopes to win the war, politically, while he is in the office..
To the likes of Allyev, in Brooklyn they say “go fly a kite.” We are fools if we give credence to what he says, or doesn’t say. Artsakh is a part of Armenia. If he doesn’t like it he can either go fly a kite, or he can try to take it back. I am 82, but he’ll be facing me up front. And if he doesn’t wat5ch out, we’ll take Naxijevan also. And Ararat, and Kars and Ardahan, and Trabizond, and Adana also. Hey, Armenian Weekly, don’t be so WEAKLY, don’t be on the defensive, don’t be naive, don’t be apologetic in your articles; what would our youngsters learn from you? Talk tough, and if you can’t, then shut up!
Is Serge Sergsian the best we can do? With all the brilliant, shrewd minds we Armenians have the best we can do is a corrupt, stumbling guy like Sargisian? Please someone correct me if i’m wrong but didn’t the Azeris loose the war? Why do we need to give anything back? A third grader can conclude that a renewed war would only mean no further investments of the billions from the oil trade to Azerbajan as well. Sure, war would hurt the Armenian Nation and no one wants that but it would be political and economic suicide for them as well. Also please tell me in the 500 years of brutal turkish occupation when where they Turks ever cordial, giving, polite, honest, fair? NEVER! What makes anyone think this will change now? WE ARMENIANS, ONCE AND FOR ALL, NEED TO STICK TOGETHER, UNITED IN ONE CAUSE AND STOP PANDERING TO EVERONE ELSE INCLUDING THE AMERICANS, EUROPEANS AND RUSSIANS!
Serge Sargsyan is just as Armenian as we are and is from Artsakh. He would never give up Artsakh. Yes, he has made diplomatic mistakes, but I think he now realizes that and will change his strategy. Quit bringing the ARF into everything. The people of Armenia and Artsakh can handle themselves just fine without the ARF – they have done so for thousands of years before the ARF and did so during 70 years of Communism.
Give some of Armenia’s so-called “leaders” enough money under the table, and they’ll sell out Artsakh in a minute. The US and Russia have more than enough money to do it. Come to think of it, I wonder if, when Armenia’s leaders were negotiating with Turkey in Switzerland on a “roadmap” to set up a historical commission to determine whether a genocide occurred (and if so, which nation was the victim), they also checked on their Swiss bank accounts.
Implementing a new genocide never corrected any past genocide. The only thing more depressing than a tragic history is watching one’s own people repeat the heinous process on another people.
Let Karabakh decide for itself what it wants. The last thing this fragile process needs is a bunch if ignorant nationalists to destory what little chance there remains at peace. If I’m not mistaken, it was a group of ignorant nationalists that hijacked Ottoman policy and implemented the genocide of our people. For a while I entertained the idea that, having undergone such treachery, we Armenians might have learned from it and risen above this sort of racist ultranationalist rhetoric. Reading articles and comments like these makes me realize that we’ve become no better than the criminals who order the murder of our nation 100 years ago.