The unachieved normalization

The so-called historic visit of Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to Türkiye, and his subsequent meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, might serve as a symbolic means of normalizing the countries’ relationship and achieving regional peace. However, the event’s historic significance is questionable, given that only Pashinyan has consistently pursued peace, while Türkiye was the first to close its borders in 1993. 

Many have labeled the visit ‘historic,’  but the real question that we should pose is—what was the purpose of initiating it? Was it to show the world that Erdoğan supports a peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan, or to pressure the Pashinyan administration into reconciliation without first addressing its own internal political issues? Had Erdoğan explicitly committed to signing a peace treaty with Armenia, the visit could have carried genuine historic weight. However, these big fancy words do not help the case. 

This meeting was not about reconciling Armenian-Turkish relations, but rather, it was Erdoğan’s way of reminding the international community—and Armenia—that Azerbaijan remains a key partner and Armenia must sign peace deals to maintain better relations. Türkiye has long taken a distant and uninterested stance towards Armenia, starting with its 1993 border crossing, siding with Azerbaijan on the Artsakh matter. 

But that action was not simply support for Azerbaijan—it was a message: Türkiye and Azerbaijan could make their way in the region with or without relations with Armenia. This precedent is rarely seen elsewhere. For instance, despite long-standing tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, neither country closed its borders to third-party countries in response.

The challenge goes deeper than foreign policy. Both Pashinyan and Erdoğan are criticized by most of their citizens. Instead of winning the hearts of their people and creating a healthy relationship between the state and citizens first, they have shifted their focus to attempting to finish the so-called normalization process. Neither side has addressed what makes it so difficult for these two countries to remake their relationship on a diplomatic level in the first place. 

Both Pashinyan and Erdoğan are heavily dominated by public opinion, not because they have opponents, but because their terms are in critical stances. For instance, Pashinyan’s commentary on diaspora, church and Artsakh affairs has resulted in receiving less public support and criticism towards his regime; meanwhile, Erdoğan is highlighted for politicizing Türkiye’s economy and eradicating the will of the people in exercising secularism. Massive youth-led protests in Türkiye—particularly in support of opposition figure Ekrem Imamoğlu—signal growing unrest under Erdoğan’s rule. Both leaders have lost public support and arguably no longer represent their people’s values, yet they insist they can broker peace between two historically opposed states.

Some claim this is the first official high-level meeting between the two parties, but it is important to recall the 2008 “football diplomacy,” between then-Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan and Turkish president Abdullah Gül. That exchange also carried symbolic weight, yet progress was limited, perhaps ineffective—largely due to unresolved political and historical tensions. 

What makes this Pashinyan and Erdoğan visit unique is its branding: the Pashinyan administration portrayed Armenia as the initiator of peace, seeking nothing in return. But positioning Armenia as the sole actor willing to reconcile reinforces a pattern of appeasement rather than mutual engagement.

The power dynamic in the region further complicates matters.

One can argue that this so-called normalization process, which was also called into action in 2008, is nothing but a performative gesture, being presented to the public with no legal or political intent.

Importantly, the failure of normalization does not stem from Pan-Turkism, religion or even the historic grievances of both parties—but an attempt at realpolitik. By maintaining a distant relationship with Armenia, Türkiye has successfully framed Armenia’s geopolitical stance as constrained and dependent—trapped between closed borders and unreliable alliances.  

It is naïve to view national development through the lens of obedience or open-border diplomacy. Armenia’s future cannot be dictated by flattering diplomatic language that lacks sustenance or permanence. 

What common political actions do Pashinyan and Erdoğan share? Arresting citizens and political figures for criticizing the government, hindering competition, undermining diversity of opinions, not addressing the issues internally or externally, applying abstract terms, such as normalization, to complex cases like the Armenia-Türkiye relationship, etc. Neither party has addressed what objective or purpose normalization has when Türkiye closed its borders in 1993 and never attempted to reopen them—apart from a brief stint after the 2023 earthquake, to receive aid from Armenia? Why does the current government of Armenia act as if they are breaking new ground, when other Armenian figures like Hrant Dink and Serzh Sargsyan have already paved that path?

Indeed, Armenia may reap the benefits from cooperation with Türkiye, but portraying Armenia’s development and potential growth only in relation to Türkiye and Azerbaijan poses a geopolitical threat. A nation’s development should not be contingent on compliance with regional bullies.

Armenia should first assess its weaknesses and internal capacity for growth. Relying on stronger partners or chasing so-called peace deals will not make Armenia better. As long as Armenians are not the key players in Armenia—and as long as the wishful and unproductive normalization talks are not questioned and addressed—then we will not understand why Armenia is the only country that needs peace, but not the other parties.