The politics of Armenian Genocide recognition and regional constraints in the Middle East
The Armenian Genocide of 1915, perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire, constituted the systematic killing of 1.5 million Armenians alongside the displacement of hundreds of thousands more. While recognition campaigns across the globe, particularly in Europe and the Americas, have made significant strides, the Middle East remains largely indifferent to acknowledging the Genocide, doing so only when it serves political interests. This irony is striking, considering that countless survivors sought shelter in Middle Eastern countries, where they went on to create thriving diasporic communities.
A tangled web of historical and contemporary political dynamics frame the issue of recognition. In the Middle East, acknowledgement of the Armenian Genocide is often politically manufactured and effectively restrained by the legacy of Ottoman rule, the rise of nationalist movements, modern alliances with Turkey and Azerbaijan, and the burden of sectarian politics. This article analyzes the role of global and local stakeholders, as well as the antagonistic social, political and economic relations that contribute to a lack of recognition.
Recognition across the region
Lebanon and Syria: acknowledgment amid identity politics and conflict
Lebanon was the first Arab state to offer unwavering support for the recognition of the Armenian Genocide. In 2000, the Lebanese parliament formally recognized the Genocide—made possible through the country’s unique confessional polity, which grants minority ethnic and religious groups some level of political representation. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the largest Armenian political organization in Lebanon, has even secured state recognition of April 24 as a day of commemoration. Armenian media, schools and churches in Lebanon actively sustain the memory of the Genocide.
Syria followed suit in 2015, recognizing the Armenian Genocide against the backdrop of deteriorating Syrian-Turkish relations. Resentment toward Turkey’s support for opposition forces in Syria during the civil war made the political environment more conducive to recognition. Historically, Syria served as a central area for deportations and massacres during the Genocide. Cities like Deir Zor are synonymous with Armenian martyrdom. Therefore, recognition in Syria serves as a political statement and an acknowledgment of this tragic history.
Iran: silent sympathy without formal recognition
Iran has one of the oldest Armenian communities in the region, with institutions dating back centuries. While it has not formally recognized the Armenian Genocide, Iran allows commemorations and provides Armenian schools and churches the space to teach and honor the events of 1915. Some Iranian officials have alluded to the Genocide, usually to encourage interfaith dialogue and promote cultural pluralism.
Iran’s position reflects its complicated balancing act in foreign policy. On the one hand, it tries to present itself as a guardian of religious minorities in its historical relations with the Armenian nation. On the other hand, Iran is heavily restrained by its geopolitical ties with Turkey and Azerbaijan, particularly given the ongoing volatile conflicts in the South Caucasus. Hence, Iran practices muted empathy, allowing for acknowledgement of the Armenian tragedy without any formal diplomatic declarations.
Egypt and the Gulf States: cautious engagement
Egypt has slowly begun to allow public discussions about the Armenian Genocide, due to its diplomatic rift with Turkey after President Mohammed Morsi’s 2013 removal. Government media, along with public intellectuals, has begun referring to the 1915 events as genocide, and leaders from the Armenian community are now able to talk publicly about their history. Still, no official recognition has been given, in terms of a formal statement by parliament or the president.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, notably Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Qatar, have entirely refrained from public discourse. Their lack of comment does not stem from outright denial, but rather, their unique relationship with Turkey and the limited number of Armenians in these countries. With recent shifts in foreign policy and increased independence from Turkish control, there is a chance that such discourse will emerge. However, official recognition is highly unlikely at this time.
Armenian community advocacy in the Middle East
Middle Eastern Armenian communities have historically been active in recognition efforts, though their methods differ sharply depending on the political environment of their host countries. In Lebanon and Syria, where Armenians enjoy political representation and cultural self-governance, the political climate and community infrastructure have sustained these efforts. Many communities have actively sought formal recognition through parliamentary lobbying, public commemorations and marking April 24 as a national day of remembrance. These activities are facilitated by Lebanon’s open political atmosphere and robust communal infrastructure.
In contrast, Armenian advocacy in Iran, Egypt and the Gulf states has been more reserved and cautious. This can be attributed to several overlapping factors: authoritarian political regimes that lack publicly mobilized civic structures, the susceptibility of Armenian communities as religious and ethnic minorities, and limited political influence. In such settings, Armenians have often centered community survival and cultural preservation over visible political action. Community memory is sustained through educational and religious institutions, but its political expression is muted—often constrained by state oversight or the fear of backlash.
The specific domestic or geopolitical context shapes community advocacy. While diasporas in Europe and North America concentrate on public relations and lobbying, Middle Eastern Armenian communities operate within informal political systems and more regionally-oriented memory work. These dynamics reveal the regional disparity in genocide recognition and the effective adaptability of Armenian communities as they seek justice and remembrance tailored to local contexts.
Challenges to recognition
Geopolitical alliances and Ankara’s pressure
The defining barrier to recognition of the Armenian Genocide by Middle Eastern countries is the region’s geopolitical alignment with Turkey. As a NATO member and dominant military and economic force, Turkey possesses considerable economic leverage over its neighbors. Ankara has systematically exercised its monetary and political deal-making influence coupled with diplomatic pressure to prevent recognition. In one way or another, nations subservient to Turkish trade, military aid or political patronage refrain from being too hostile toward Turkey, which could trigger a significant backlash.
Relations with Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan’s influence, next to Turkey, is also increasingly salient in the scope of the Armenia-Azerbaijan war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Iran, for example, has strong economic and cultural relations with Azerbaijan, making any open support of Armenia politically unfavorable. Many Gulf countries that pursue business and political alignment with Azerbaijan also do not adopt positions that could be interpreted as supportive of Armenian narratives.
Islamic solidarity and the Palestinian question
Some Arab and Muslim-majority countries, such as Turkey, have avoided recognizing genocide through the lens of Islamic solidarity and pan-Islamism. Turkey has for a long time framed genocide accusations as Western attacks against the Islamic world, connecting denialism with broader anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist narratives. In areas where the Palestinian cause dominates the political landscape, governments might view the Armenian question as a distraction or politically inconvenient historical baggage.
Minority politics and sectarian equilibrium
In countries with multi-ethnic or multi-religious populations, recognizing the Armenian Genocide may potentially upset the internal political equilibrium. For instance, in the already sectarian and politically fractured Iraq, official acceptance of the genocidal trauma of the Christian minority may inspire similar claims from other groups. In such circumstances, the authorities prefer maintaining an equilibrium that avoids privileging one group’s historical narrative over another.
Historical silence and the educational gap
Finally, yet importantly, there is a lack of research and awareness on the Armenian Genocide. Public discourse is absent, and there is a lack of a coherent educational framework on genocide, particularly in the Middle East. Without actual formal schooling or state approval, grassroots advocacy remains difficult.
This neglect is part of a larger pattern of historical amnesia, in which the events of 1915 are either relegated or wholly removed from social memory. In the absence of formal integration into the national story, generations remain oblivious to the genocidal acts carried out against the Armenian population, depriving society of the means to reflect critically and achieve historical justice. The absence of an organized collective memory impedes efforts at recognition and consolidates perpetrator silence, enabled by the state.
In addition, this amnesia is often deepened by denialism, disinformation and the lack of Armenian presence in the media, scholarly publications and academic circles. Meeting this challenge requires reform in education, intercultural dialogue and rethinking the history taught in schools, as well as the language employed by the media and the government.
Conclusion
The Armenian Genocide is hyper-politicized, with historical memory mixed with political justification and planning, especially in the Middle East. While states like Lebanon and Syria have moved toward recognition, most states prioritize their security alliances, economic stability and domestic peace over historical truth.
The Armenian community is still important in the memory and justice campaign. As new political conditions unfold, chances for broader acceptance of the Genocide may arise—although these chances depend on changing relationships between key players and states coming to terms with harsh historical facts. After all, the recognition struggle in the Middle East is tied up with politics; identity and conflict are equally fundamental components of violence, and violence, in turn, is a response to historical injustices.
Vera Yacoubian
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