For nearly a decade, Armenians have been subjected to a political communication strategy that follows a recognizable and deeply damaging pattern: first, emphatic denial; second, ridicule of concern; third, gradual normalization of the previously denied possibility; and finally, acceptance of the very outcome once dismissed as impossible. This pattern has repeated itself across issue after issue: Artsakh, territorial concessions, constitutional changes, relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, the so-called “corridor” and now discussions surrounding the settlement of Azerbaijanis in Armenia.
The danger of this strategy is not merely political. It is psychological. Understanding this distinction is critical because one of the most persistent false equivalencies in Armenian public discourse today is the claim that both the ruling regime and the opposition are simply engaged in competing forms of fearmongering or “gaslighting.” They are not.




This dystopian nightmare can become a reality if the archtraitor Pashinyan stays in power and continues to appease both the Azerbaijani and Turkish enemies. Armenia has not been under such peril since 1915-1921. I think most of us could not have predicted that Armenia, which has always been vulnerable even after winning the First Artsakh War, would fall into such a dire and dangerous situation. While Azerbaijan constantly makes these outrageous, provocative irredentist statements, the Armenian (Pashinyan) government conspicuously, embarrassingly and shamefully remains silent. How much longer will this go on?
Armenia lost and defeat has consequences it’s as simple as that.
It’s taken a long time for this publication and posters to acknowledge that Azerbaijan is plotting settlement of Azeris reportedly descendants of those who left 1988 -91 in Armenia and the continued agitation for return to Arktash was ignoring this prospect which Azerbaijan has been clear would be conditional to it plans for Azeris in Armenia and how the insularity and lack of context has led to this.
The article presents a sweeping narrative that Armenia’s government is deliberately “conditioning” the population into surrender through psychological manipulation. But this framing collapses under careful scrutiny because it relies on selective interpretation, assumed intent, and retrospective certainty, rather than a balanced assessment of Armenia’s current geopolitical constraints and the complexity of state decision‑making.
1. The article treats geopolitical constraints as psychological manipulation
The author claims that the government follows a four‑step pattern—“denial, ridicule, normalization, acceptance”—and uses this to argue that Armenia is being “conditioned” into concessions. Yet this pattern is not evidence of manipulation; it is a post‑hoc narrative imposed on events that were shaped by military defeat, regional power asymmetry, and the collapse of Armenia’s security architecture.
For example, the article states:
“There was no corridor issue. Then there was.” armenianweek…
This is presented as deception, but the reality is that the “corridor” issue emerged because Azerbaijan escalated demands after the 2020 war, not because the Armenian government secretly planned it.
A government responding to shifting external pressure is not “gaslighting”, it is navigating a deteriorating security environment.
2. The article assumes intent without evidence
The author repeatedly attributes intentional psychological strategy to the government:
“The objective is to exhaust the public’s confidence in its own memory.” armenianweek…
This is a serious accusation, but the article provides no evidence of deliberate intent,
no internal documents, no statements, no strategic directives.
It replaces evidence with interpretation.
A government making unpopular or reactive decisions under duress is not proof of a coordinated psychological operation.
Armenia’s leadership may be criticized for strategic errors, communication failures, or misjudgments, but equating these with a deliberate plan to “condition surrender” is analytical overreach.
3. The article collapses complex realities into a single villain narrative
The author frames every development, Artsakh’s fall, border demarcation, constitutional debates, economic concerns,
as part of one unified strategy of manipulation. But these issues have different origins, different timelines, and different drivers.
For example:
• Artsakh’s fall was the result of military defeat and Russian withdrawal, not domestic psychological conditioning.
• Constitutional reform debates predate the current crisis and involve legal alignment with international norms, not capitulation.
• Economic asymmetry with Turkey is a structural reality, not a government‑engineered trap.
By merging unrelated developments into a single narrative, the article oversimplifies and misattributes causality.
4. The article treats public fear as proof of government wrongdoing
The author writes:
“Many Armenians feel psychologically manipulated.” armenianweek…
Public fear is real and must be respected.
But fear is not evidence of manipulation.
Fear is the natural consequence of:
• a devastating military defeat
• the ethnic cleansing of Artsakh
• Azerbaijan’s maximalist rhetoric
• the collapse of Armenia’s traditional security guarantees
The article misinterprets trauma as proof of conspiracy.
5. The article selectively cites Azerbaijani rhetoric to imply inevitability
The article highlights Azerbaijani statements about “Western Azerbaijan” and settlement plans:
“Azerbaijani officials openly discuss ‘Western Azerbaijan’… approximately 300,000 people.” armenianweek…
These statements are dangerous and must be taken seriously.
But the article uses them to imply that Armenia’s government is preparing to accept these demands, without presenting any evidence that Yerevan has agreed to or is negotiating such settlement.
Azerbaijan’s rhetoric is a threat, but the
article treats it as a foregone conclusion, reinforcing fear rather than informing strategy.
6. The article mischaracterizes economic arguments
The author argues that opening borders will lead to “economic absorption” because Turkish goods are cheaper:
“Turkish agricultural products are 10 to 50% cheaper.” armenianweek…
This is true, but the conclusion that Armenia is being “conditioned” into economic dependency is speculative.
Every small economy bordering a larger one faces similar asymmetries.
The question is not whether asymmetry exists, but how Armenia can negotiate safeguards, transition periods, and industrial policy.
The article presents a structural economic challenge as evidence of a psychological operation, which weakens its credibility.
7. The article’s framing risks disempowering Armenians
Ironically, by insisting that Armenians are being “conditioned,” the article does exactly what it accuses the government of doing:
it undermines public agency.
If every development is part of a master plan, then:
• citizens are victims, not actors
• institutions are puppets, not decision‑makers
• outcomes are predetermined, not influenceable
This framing is emotionally powerful but strategically harmful.
A more grounded interpretation
Armenia is not experiencing a government‑engineered psychological operation.
It is experiencing:
• the consequences of military defeat
• the collapse of its security umbrella
• aggressive demands from a stronger adversary
• internal political fragmentation
• a painful national reckoning
These are structural realities, not manufactured illusions.
Criticism of the government is legitimate and necessary.
But attributing every development to a coordinated plan to “condition surrender” replaces analysis with narrative—and risks deepening societal despair rather than strengthening national resilience.
Excellent analysis and so true. Unfortunately, dollars buy many “governors” not true heads of states who do the bidding of their masters and Pash is one of those governors, the governor of Armenia.