Syria’s second civil war: Turkey and Israel’s strategic contest for influence
The dénouement of Bashar al-Assad’s rule in late 2024 did not mark the end of Syria’s fragmentation. Instead, it ushered in a new cycle of decentralized disorder. Hopes for recovery quickly dissolved as the state’s bureaucratic and security institutions collapsed, exacerbating rather than resolving the country’s communal and military atomization.
What remained of unified political representation splintered into rival constellations of sectarian, militia and international patronage, each operating under its own security logic. In this chaotic vacuum, Turkey and Israel have re-engaged, translating Syria’s power void into a contest of occupied sovereign space, masked by counterterrorism and humanitarian rhetoric.
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The Armenians who still remain in the new Turkish-ruled Islamist Syria, need to get out of there ASAP. There is no future for Armenians and other non-Sunni Muslim and non-Arab minorities in that country, especially when Islamists and their master Erdogan are calling the shots. After the Syrian Civil War started (which was also instigated by Erdogan, among other imperialist players), the large majority of Armenians and Christians fled Syria, likely never to return (just like the large majority of Armenians, Christians and Yazidis, who fled post-Saddam Iraq, when it descended into sectarian violence and civil war conditions). They could soon be joined by the Alawite Muslims (Assads’ sect) and the Druze, who are already attacked and persecuted by the Islamists. And it is always possible that the civil war can reignite in Syria (like it did in post-Ghaddafi Libya, which is now split into two enemy camps, again with Erdogan’s interference). Optimism is a foolishness and optimists are fools in this part of the world, especially when Islamists are in the picture, as well as major powers and regional powers (like Turkey) who interfere and instigate conflicts. The pessimists who fled, survived; the optimists who stayed, often were killed – either intentionally or as “collateral damage”.
The Syrian former polity was created by Anglo-French colonial policies post WW1. It never represented Syrian interests, at most those of a segment (e.g. Allawi). Turkish policy is confiscatory, turning Syrian land into Turkish territory. Not good for Syrians, not for Qurds, not for Yazidis, not for Druze, not for Allawi, not for Armenians, and in the end not good for Sunni. The Israeli policy is support and protection for tribes having long history in place. The rational outcome of the Israeli policy i, s eventual configuration of a neo-Syria based on a Federation of tribal Cantons. Such a Federation could actually work, as its assets would be less squandered on war, the presumed eventual central government’s main objectives to be using politics and funds to keep inter-canton tensions very low. As this would also be in Israel’s interests, Israel would help in any way practical, not merely militarily.