How would the Israel-Iran war impact Armenia’s security?
Regional dimensions of the war
On June 13, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the launch of Operation Rising Lion, aimed at striking Iran’s nuclear facilities and missile capabilities. On the first day of the conflict, Israel targeted Iranian nuclear scientists, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officials and later, energy infrastructure and residential areas. In response, Iran launched Operation True Promise-3, sending a missile barrage targeting key infrastructure in Israeli cities, mainly Tel Aviv and Haifa.
It is worth mentioning that the Israeli operation took place just two days before the American and Iranian sides planned to hold their sixth round of nuclear talks. By striking first, Israel has blocked the door to diplomacy and now hopes to drag the United States into another regional war, as if the horrors of the 2003 Iraq invasion haven’t disappeared from the Middle East’s collective memory.
Why the Israeli military operation now?
There are several possible strategic, political and ideological reasons why Netanyahu took this risky decision. First, he has long argued that Iran’s nuclear ambitions pose an existential threat to Israel. Second, he wanted to undermine any possible American-Iranian rapprochement. A decade ago, he even opposed the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal between the U.S. and Iran. Third, he hopes to continue shaping the new regional balance of power by eliminating Iran’s military capabilities.
Finally, Netanyahu has often used security threats to galvanize domestic support in Israeli society and distract the people from corruption trials and mass protests. He needs perpetual wars to survive and stay in power. But he cannot destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities alone—to prolong his stay, Netanyahu has to drag the Americans into a long war of attrition.
What are the possible scenarios for U.S. involvement?
All indicators hint that it is a matter of time, but eventually, U.S. decision-making is centralized on a single person’s political mood. President Donald Trump has a long history of overriding institutional mechanisms. U.S. involvement in this war would be significant in terms of regional and global repercussions.
Several realistic scenarios could lead to such a confrontation:
- A major attack on American assets by groups affiliated with the IRGC, false flag operations against U.S. bases, or terror attacks on American citizens at embassies could compel Washington to respond militarily under the banner of self-defense.
- The closure or disruption of the Strait of Hormuz through mining or attacking Western navies would threaten global oil supplies as well as the national security interests of China and India. Twenty percent of global oil flow passes through the strait. The U.S. would be forced to intervene to open the strait at the request of its regional allies.
- In an Iranian nuclear breakout, Iran may openly threaten to assemble a nuclear weapon.
U.S. involvement has its risks. Weakening Iran and forcibly changing the regime would create a power vacuum, which separatist or radical movements could take advantage of. The Iraqi scenario is still fresh in Middle Eastern memory. This would not only threaten Iran’s multicultural fabric but also destabilize the region and open the way for new intrastate wars. Most importantly, vulnerable neighboring states would be directly affected.
Implications for Armenia
This war could shape developments in the South Caucasus and further expose Armenia’s vulnerability. While Armenia condemned Israel’s military strikes on June 13 and called for an end to military action, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister had a phone call with his Iranian counterpart, emphasizing that under no circumstances will Baku allow its airspace or territory to be used by Israelis against Iran. This came amid speculation and reports that Israel and its intelligence agencies have conducted operations against Iran from neighboring countries.
Armenia’s situation is precarious. As Iran is engaged in a war with Israel and possibly soon with the U.S., and the latter distracted, Yerevan may face the risk of a military offensive by Azerbaijan. Armenian experts warn that Azerbaijan may exploit regional chaos to pursue territorial aims that further destabilize and isolate Armenia.
A policy brief by APRI Armenia identified two direct intertwined threats for Armenia if the war expands:
Security implications
First, Iran has long played a pivotal role in preserving Armenia’s territorial integrity and preventing the establishment of the “Zangezur Corridor,” forwarded by Azerbaijan and Turkey. Even Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan once said that “difficulties connected with the Zangezur Corridor are not related to Armenia, but Iran.”
Moreover, on many occasions, Iran has mobilized its troops and conducted military drills near its border with Armenia and Azerbaijan, to prevent the latter from conducting further incursions into Armenia’s territory.
For these reasons, Baku and Ankara view Tehran’s weakness as a window of opportunity to exert pressure on a regionally isolated Armenia. It is not a coincidence that, on June 14, Hikmet Hajiyev, assistant to President Ilham Aliyev, stated that Baku expects “concrete actions from Armenia” regarding the opening of a corridor as it “holds strategic importance for the entire region.”
Furthermore, Azerbaijan, backed by Turkey, may support separatist movements in the Azeri-populated areas of northeast Iran. In addition to an Azeri minority, Kurds would also be encouraged to challenge the centralized Iranian state, prompting Turkey to intervene to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish political entity on its southeastern border. While the fragmentation of Iran and the establishment of a “Southern Azerbaijan” may serve Azerbaijan and Israel’s interests in the short run, the formation of ethnic-based mini-states would destabilize Turkey’s border. As seen in Syria and Iraq, Turkey has viewed the emergence of pro-PKK Kurdish political entities as a security threat.
In any case, the fragmentation of Iran and the establishment of an Azerbaijani-led autonomous entity would be a direct national security threat for Armenia, potentially surrounding it with Turkic nations on three sides.
Also, Yerevan is not ready to absorb huge numbers of refugees, which would further destabilize the fabric of Syunik province. Finally, prolonged instability in Iran could prevent the flow of Indian weapons to Armenia via land or Iranian airspace.
Economic implications
Armenia is already facing challenges with both the export and import of goods. Economy Minister Gevorg Papoyan stated that some Armenian cargo has been stranded at the port of Bandar Abbas and on certain roads in Iran. A prolonged war and possible U.S. involvement would also threaten the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).
As Israel continues to bomb Iranian infrastructure, regional actors may seek other reliable routes for trade. Bandar Abbas is the primary maritime entry point for Indian goods, whereas Chabahar—a port developed with Indian support as an alternative to Pakistan’s Gwadar—is a key logistical hub connecting Russian goods to the Persian Gulf. The war may disrupt the supply chain of this corridor.
If Iran blocks the Strait of Hormuz, this would be disastrous for the INSTC. Indian goods would no longer reach the Persian Gulf and Russian markets. India also would not be able to trade with Central Asia. The mere possibility of a blockade would increase insurance costs and compel shipping firms to leave the route, eroding confidence in the corridor as a reliable logistical option. In this scenario, India would be forced to enhance its cooperation with Gulf states and Israel within the context of the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC), but this is not sustainable due Iran’s bombing of the Port of Haifa.
Meanwhile, Russia, which heavily relies on Iran’s southern ports and Caspian infrastructure, would likewise be forced to prepare for possible disruptions. This would make the Turkey-backed Middle Corridor connecting the West to the East the most important regional corridor—and all eyes would turn towards the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
Pressure on Armenia may increase to connect with Asian markets and give Baku and Ankara an extraterritorial corridor. This reminds us of the 2008 scenario, when the closure of the border between Georgia and Russia due to the August War disrupted Armenia’s trade with Europe and forced former President Serzh Sargsyan to attempt a “normalization” process with Turkey, aiming to opening the border from the Turkish side and ease Armenia’s economic isolation.
Reflection
Amid these pressures, Yerevan needs to take certain measures to minimize risks for its national security. First, it should not place hopes in normalization attempts with Turkey, as Ankara is coordinating its steps with Baku and conditioning any deal on an Armenia-Azerbaijan “peace” treaty. Azerbaijan’s strategic and political value for Turkey is much higher compared to what Armenia can offer to Ankara.
Second, there needs to be a restoration of good relations with Russia. If Armenia is approaching Ankara with the logic of minimizing tensions with neighbors, then what is the logic behind increasing tensions with Moscow? International relations are not based on enmities or friendships, but interests, and it is in Armenia’s interest to have good relations with Moscow to prevent Yerevan’s isolation in the South Caucasus.
Finally, though costly, Yerevan has to explore possible new routes to import weapons from India. This will be difficult, as India will face challenges in sending arms to Armenia without Iran. The only options left are either via China-Central Asia-Russia-Georgia or Indian Ocean-Red Sea-Mediterranean-Turkey’s Straits-Black Sea-Georgia. The cost of transportation will be high and risky. This is why Armenia may need to diversify its arms suppliers. Finally, Yerevan needs to adopt a comprehensive refugee policy, as an expanded war could trigger an influx of Iranian refugees—further straining Armenia’s fragile socio-economic infrastructure.
Yeghia Tashjian
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This shows how nations can be affected by the changes within neighbours. If the clerical regime fails it’s also plausible that Azerbaijan importance to Israel will decline in the way Kuwait became less important to the USA after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein of Iraq and the honeymoon started to end. Indeed whilst Israel no friend in the first place it’s attraction to Azerbaijan has been partially driven by its confrontation with Iran and thus Armenia has suffered from a quarrel it didn’t instigate. Russia in turn needs to look after it’s friends better which means strengthening them in the principle of stronger together rather than exploiting their vulnerabilities and it’s try to please everyone ends up pleasing no one policy, Russia has found the difficulties that Armenia has with Turkey and Azerbaijan a boon and wishes to keep it this way. Note out of a too clever by half policy Russia to keep favours with Israel wouldn’t interfere with its strikes on its then ally Syria and against the Iranians there although it would cooperate with them against militants, Iran unlike Armenia was has always been realistic about Russia, also it appears that Putin was again too clever by half in not wanting to supply Syria with better defensive weapons not wanting them to be overcome and the reputation of Russia s more modern equipment being jeopardised as a result however this cynical action in carefully avoiding one scenario meant upon their invasion of Ukraine their successes and losses are all on them. Indeed Armenia will find trade with and via Iran much more awkward with the current conflict there.
One of the most important facts from the Twelve Days War is that not one Muslim country came to the aid of Iran.
Indeed, Iran even attacked a Muslim country when it attacked the American airbase in Qatar.
There is no such thing as a “Muslim Brotherhood” or “Muslim Unity”.
Why is this important for Armenia?
Because it means Armenia can build friendly relations with those Muslims who have suffered at the hands of the Turks, namely, Arabs and Kurds. During the Ottoman Empire, both groups were near the bottom of the Ottoman hierarchy and both have long historical memories of the brutality of the Turks.
We must get away from the belief that becauase someone is Muslim, they will instinctively support the Turks.
We must exploit any opportunity to gain friends and allies. They may not oppose the Turks but they will not support the Turks – and that is what is important.
I do not think we have to worry about the Straits of Hormuz being closed.
The Straits are shared evenly between Iran and Oman, even if Iran closed its side, all that will happen is that international shipping will simply navigate through the Omani side.
If Iran tried to close the Omani side, that would mean war with Oman with the Americans coming to the aid of Oman with their 5th Fleet based in Bahrain.
So it will not happen.
The key to Armenia’s future lies in Armenia’s past.
During the Ottoman Empire, the Empire’s trade with both India and China was dominated by Armenians.
It’s happened before, it can happen again.
Armenia must turn to the East and become a commercial, trading and transit hub for both India and China.
Muslim or Arab brotherhood unity notion (Muslim mob) is a persistent fantasy often given succour by vested interests in the west such as encouragement over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Bosnian civil war for international jihads. Iran is also Shia which is considered a heresy and even not really Muslims by many Sunni majority . Iran didn’t get to implement it’s closure since a ceasefire came into effect before they could attempt to enforce it. Armenia being small mountainous and landlocked is unlikely to be much of an entrepot, although it should continue it’s efforts to improve trade routes with Iran and Georgia being gateway between Europe and Asia. Bulk trade is likely to continue using the sea and double handling is something avoided unless absolutely necessary. The principle of being leery about pan Islamism is valid in turn pan Christianity clash of civilizations is facetious. If so Georgia would be a strong ally and Iran a strong ally of Azerbaijan of course reality is different.