The Middle East burns…
When on November 24, a U.S.-mediated ceasefire was brokered between Lebanon and Israel, many did not imagine that within days the Turkish-backed Syrian rebel factions would storm Aleppo and capture the city in less than 36 hours. There are a lot of questions about the preparation and readiness of the Syrian army. However, it was clear that the current status quo under President Bashar al-Assad would not be preserved for a long time, as the country was fragmented and in need of conflict resolution, not conflict management. Since the same regional actors involved in the South Caucasus — Iran, Russia and Turkey — are also in Syria supporting opposite sides, there are concerns that the fire may expand beyond the Middle East.
On November 29, the former al-Qaida associated group currently branded as ‘Hai’at Tahrir al-Sham’ (HTS) along with armed factions from the Turkish-backed ‘Syrian National Army’ (some of whom fought as mercenaries against Armenians in the 2020 war in Artsakh) and some mercenaries from Central Asia and the Caucasus entered the second largest city of Syria. In different neighborhoods, clashes were reported between opposition factions and the U.S.-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which withdrew from the city under pressure from the opposition. The opposition factions imposed a partial curfew and promised to respect the lives of the city’s Christian communities, including the large Armenian population.
Why did the attack take place at this particular moment? During the trilateral meetings (December 2022 and April 2023 in Moscow) between Syrian and Turkish officials facilitated by Russia, the Turkish side asked for certain concessions from Damascus in return for reconciliation. Turkey has pushed for the return of Syrian refugees in its country to safe areas in Syria and a joint front against Kurdish forces in the north. President Assad, in turn, has insisted on Turkish military withdrawal without any preconditions. Turkey realized that the Astana Process (established in 2017 between Russia, Iran and Turkey to resolve the Syrian crisis) has failed to convince the Syrian president. The timing of this offensive also seems tied to the possibility of a U.S. withdrawal from northern Syria under Trump’s administration. This would leave Turkey alone to fill the power vacuum to prevent the emergence of a solidified Kurdish entity near its borders.
Russia and Iran, the main allies of the Syrian government, pledged their support to Damascus in its fight with the rebels. Hundreds of pro-Iranian militias crossed the Iraqi-Syrian border to support the Syrian army, while Russian jets continued bombing rebel areas in Idlib and Aleppo. The involvement of Russia, Iran and Turkey on opposite sides of the battle may also endanger the status quo in the South Caucasus.
Possible spillover to South Caucasus?
Could the intensification in the region and the potential clash between Iran and Israel as well as Iran and Turkey via their proxies affect the South Caucasus? Can this conflict be managed to avert such a spillover effect?
In August 2024, when a close aide of the Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian informed the Daily Telegraph that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps could strike Israeli assets in Azerbaijan and Iraqi Kurdistan, Russia engaged in diplomatic meetings to prevent any possible clashes in the South Caucasus. This is why certain observers argue that Russia’s Secretary of the Security Council Sergei Shoigu’s visit to Tehran and later Baku in August aimed at easing tensions and preventing Iran from initiating any strikes on Israeli assets in the region that could jeopardize the INSTC (International North-South Transport Corridor). Tehran has occasionally raised concerns over the Israeli security and intelligence presence in Azerbaijan and views Turkey and Azerbaijan’s support of the “Zangezur Corridor” project as an Israeli objective to encircle Iran and incite pan-Turkic aspirations on its northern border.
The ongoing battles in Syria and the sudden fall of Aleppo to the Hai’at Tahrir al-Sham (the Levant Liberation Front, formerly known as the Nusra Front) and the Syrian National Army may jeopardize Russia and Iran’s designs in Syria and lead to the fall of the Astana Process. In January 2017, Russia, Turkey and Iran launched the Astana Process to convene formal negotiations and convince the Syrian government to engage with the opposition. However, while this format preserved the post-2017 status quo to some extent, it failed to bring about conflict resolution given the non-compromising attitude of the forces on the ground.
Each regional actor has its own ambitions. Turkey wanted to contain the Kurdish military presence, prevent the emergence of any Kurdish political entity on its southern border, and facilitate the return of Syrian refugees. Iran wanted to preserve the land routes connecting Iran to Syria and Lebanon used to transfer arms to its allies and proxies and maintain the centralized state in Damascus. Russia’s stated aim was to resolve the Syrian conflict, but it didn’t have the leverage to pressure President Assad to accept a compromise. Assad tried to balance among the three actors to consolidate his rule.
The attempt to establish a 3+3 regional format in the South Caucasus can be seen as a replication of the Astana Process in Syria. For now, this format has prevented any spillover effect in the South Caucasus. The 3+3 regional format, which involves Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia, Turkey and Iran, is a non-institutionalized format for regional multilateral cooperation modelled on the Astana format, according to the Polish Institute of International Affairs. As Russia has occasionally repeated, the goal of this format in the South Caucasus is not just limited to peace and stability but also development and unblocking of trade routes. Turkey and Russia also view this format as a means to engage with Iran on regional issues. A possible peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan under the umbrella of this format would further facilitate regional integration.
The crisis in the Middle East could push regional actors to compartmentalize their differences and prevent a spillover effect in the South Caucasus, or we may witness the opening of a new front against Iran triggered by an Armenian-Azerbaijani clash over Syunik amid the Turkish-Azerbaijani narrative on the “Zangezur Corridor.”
Reflection
On December 2, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and Iran’s President Pezeshkian had a telephone conversation in which both sides expressed their “unconditional support” for the Syrian government’s actions to “restore constitutional order and territorial integrity.” Both leaders also emphasized that the conflict in Syria should be resolved through the Astana format with the participation of Turkey. Meanwhile, the U.S. and UAE have discussed the possibility of lifting sanctions on Syria if President Assad distances himself from Iran and halts arms transfers from Iran to Lebanon’s Hezbollah via his territories. This means that until the inauguration of U.S. president-elect Donald Trump on January 20, 2025, we may witness growing pressure on Damascus. If Assad bets on Iranian aid for a counteroffensive, the battle over Aleppo will take longer, and the rebel forces may consolidate their grip on Syria’s second largest city. On the other hand, the shift in the balance of power and Turkey’s growing influence at the expense of Iran, amid Russia’s war in Ukraine, may lead to the fall of the Astana process and trigger a spillover effect of the conflict on the South Caucasus. Turkey’s political rise will have geopolitical implications for the fragile status quo of the region.
Moreover, despite the uneasy progress in Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations, the issue of opening transportation routes in the South Caucasus — particularly Azerbaijan’s access to its exclave Nakhichevan — remains unresolved. In the past days, Azerbaijani government-affiliated media have published reports claiming that Armenia is “preparing for war” and deploying offensive weapons near the border. This could be another pretext for a possible future clash. The opening of this route carries international, regional and local implications, as the region sits at the crossroads of major north-south and east-west transit routes, amid global power competition between the U.S. and China and increasing pressure on Russia and Iran.
Yeghia Tashjian
Latest posts by Yeghia Tashjian (see all)
- Turkey’s ‘golden era’ in Central Asia and the future of the Organization of Turkic States - December 31, 2024
- Will the fire of the Middle East expand to the South Caucasus? - December 4, 2024
- A long war of attrition may await Lebanon - October 15, 2024
Be the first to comment