The polarization of political discourse is a global epidemic, and, unfortunately, Armenia has not escaped the illness. With more people existing at the extreme poles, whether pushed or pulled there, there is little space left for discussion, compromise or consensus solutions. In such contentious times, it is even more critically important to have open and frank discussions about policy.
While it is easy to believe that what divides us is whether or not we support or oppose the political leadership in Armenia, past and present, this focus on leadership rather than policy does a disservice to our people, as it inhibits constructive discussion and the development of consensus solutions.
The most critical issue facing Armenia currently is the agreement with Azerbaijan. Whether Azerbaijan will sign an agreement and the content of such an agreement are at issue. The current regime has signaled that Armenia is ready to sign immediately, whereas Azerbaijan’s leadership continues to voice new requirements. There are many additional state actors throwing their weight behind facilitating or inhibiting the signing of this agreement.
The situation is undeniably complex. The strategy that is deemed to be in Armenia’s best interest hinges on the perceived imminence of an agreement with Azerbaijan.
Those who argue that an agreement is close also posit that everything should be done to facilitate a speedy signing. Essentially, to appease Azerbaijan, Armenia should have no red lines, because at this juncture Armenia has no leverage to impose any requirements.
Conversely, the ARF and many in the diaspora argue that Azerbaijan’s history of moving goalposts suggests that an endless stream of new requirements will follow any concessions made by Armenia. In addition, a vocal opposition can be valuable in the toolkit of skilled negotiators.
The U.S. is actively trying to facilitate the signing of an agreement prior to the November elections. The strategy seems to be multifaceted. The security of the current regime in Armenia has been bolstered by the training of special units of the police force. Second, a wave of political, military and foreign service personnel has been traveling to Armenia, ostensibly to help in every aspect of government. A third approach has been to malign Armenian American advocacy groups that are critical of the Armenian government’s approach to the negotiation process, under the false premise that criticism somehow inhibits negotiations. Lastly, whatever little leverage the U.S. can wield is being applied over Azerbaijan to sign an agreement.
American interests in facilitating a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan are evident, as the U.S. aims to open borders with Turkey and diminish Russia’s economic influence in the South Caucasus. This aligns with Turkish strategic interests, further complicating regional dynamics.
Russia, for its part, is preoccupied with Ukraine, but that does not mean it is ignorant of developments in the Caucasus. Russia seems to support an agreement that would require its security guarantees (e.g. to manage a corridor through Syunik) or, at the very least, a delay in the signing of any agreement until such time, returning Armenia as a hostage to Russia for its security.
In this landscape, Azerbaijan clearly has more diplomatic tools at its disposal than Armenia, especially as the latter has signaled a complete shift toward the West and a reliance on appeasement for security guarantees. Proponents of Armenia’s current approach argue that there are no viable alternatives. However, it is crucial to consider that the present limitations may stem from the very policies that have led us to this precarious position.
The objective of an agreement with Azerbaijan may be desirable, but the ability to achieve that objective highly depends on strategy. If Azerbaijan’s evaluation is that a change in U.S. policy could be imminent after the presidential election this year, which would lead to even more capitulations by Armenia, then what leverage can be applied to compel Azerbaijan to sign now? While the interests of Turkey may diverge from those of Azerbaijan, it is unclear how far Ankara would be willing to go to apply pressure on Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to sign an agreement with Yerevan now.
At this juncture, Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan’s ability to remain in power and his willingness to meet all of Azerbaijan’s demands do not create any urgency for Aliyev to agree to the terms of an agreement now. Thus, it can be argued that a realistic threat to that stability would potentially create urgency. At the very least, an open and candid discussion over the negotiation strategy is needed and could have tangential benefits.
George Aghjayan
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Considering the despot pashinyan, he makes policy like a dictator of an even more perverse and barbaric style then Kim Jung un from North Korea, I think it is fair to say criticizing this turkic bastard is the same thing as criticizing his policies.