ColumnsTashjian's Take

Is Iran making a comeback to the South Caucasus?

Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan meets with his Iranian counterpart Hossein Amirabdollahian during his official visit to Iran (Photo: Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oct. 4, 2021)

In one of my previous articles “Iran and the Second Artsakh War: Has Tehran lost its leverage over the South Caucasus?” I argued that from a geopolitical and geo-economic point of view, Iran lost its influence in the region after the 2020 war. I also raised the following questions: “How can Iran change its loss to a benefit? What is clear is that as Tehran lost its leverage over the region during the war, it may feel pressured to consolidate its relations with Armenia to contain Pan-Turkist influence in the north; however, under the current circumstances, will Iran antagonize Turkey? Iran’s new calculations may be dependent on the future geopolitical shifts in the region and how Russia reacts to them. For now, Iran would be favoring the current status quo with certain amendments that can serve its interests in the region.” Today, a year after the Artsakh War, Iran realizes that it has to respond to Baku’s provocations.

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Yeghia Tashjian

Yeghia Tashjian is the Issam Fares Institute Public Policy and International Affairs-American University of Beirut’s Regional and International Affairs Cluster Coordinator. He holds a master’s degree in Public Policy and International Affairs from the American University of Beirut and completed the "Strategic Leadership in Global Societal Security Program" at the Swedish Defense University in 2022. He earned his bachelor’s degree in political science from Haigazian University in 2013 and has worked in the university's Armenian Diaspora Research Center between 2016-2017. Yeghia's master’s thesis focused on China's geopolitical and energy security interests in Iran and the Persian Gulf. Currently, Tashjian is engaged in research on the phenomenon of Turkish-Russian 'co-opetition' in the MENA+ Caucasus region and Russia's involvement in the International North-South Transport Corridor. He contributes to various local and regional newspapers, has presented various topics from minority rights to regional security issues, and is a part-time instructor in the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration at the American University of Beirut.

4 Comments

  1. Great Article. “friendship and ally” are usually based on mutual benefits. It’s perfectly clear why Turkey, Azerbaijan and Israel want Syunik. This will not only cut off Iran but will also cut off Armenia, making it totally dependent on Georgia as an outside link, who historically has been hostile towards Armenia. Make no mistake, losing Syunik is a double win for Israel and the Turks. A close Armenia – Iran relationship, is far better for Armenia. Hopefully Pashinyan, who in my opinion sabotaged the war effort, doesn’t totally sell out Armenia, as his actions border on treason. Further, beside Iran providing a reliable trade route, a possible future oil gas pipeline route from Iran through Armenia would be a fantastic bonanza bringing much needed money and clout to Armenia. But this scenario would not only alarm Armenia’s enemies, but would alarm Russia too, as this would compete with Russian oil and would threaten Russia’s grip on Armenia by making it less dependent. Armenia needs to start directly coordinating with Iran, especially with its military by installing the Khordad-3 air defense system if it truly is effective against drones. It shouldn’t rely upon Russian military alone as the last war made clear of Russia’s useless indifference as it sat on the sidelines and watched 4k Armenians being murdered by a coordinated Turkish, Azeri and Israeli effort. The key to all this is Pashinyan. Unfortunately he is a proven loser and a totally useless, clueless incompetent. And worse a traitor to boot. Iran is a much better play for Armenia’s future, its that simple. Hopefully Armenia understands this.

  2. Fantastic article. It is certainly a topic I hope you will continue to research and write more about… As was pointed out, Iran, Armenia (and Russia) have much to lose if a weakened Armenia cedes its borders with Iran. Not only would the North South Transport corridor be curtailed, but also from a military standpoint, Russia ( and Iran) will be further encircled by NATO and its Allies. Articles I have read online seem to suggest that while Iran may have woken up to these perceived threats, Russia is still fast asleep. See, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/466752/3-3-format-on-Karabakh-The-best-way-forward. This area of conflict may have more geo-Political implications (and significance) than many people are aware. As a neutral observer, I am curious to learn what comes next.

  3. I would never underestimate the strength of ties between Armenia and Iran. What is more valuable than our lives. Visit the graveyards of Armenians who sacrificed their lives in defence of their fatherland (Iran) between 1981 -1989 and Back in history all the way to the Achaemenians era. Iranians (from all ethnicities, Kurds, Azeris, Persians, Arabs, Georgians, Armenians, Balochis, Gilaks, Mazanis, etc.) will proudly put all on the line for defence of Armenia and Armenians (our brothers and sister) to deter a disillusioned poppet (Aliyev) from causing trouble for Azeris and Armenians.

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