Political and Socio-Economic Upheaval in Lebanon

Since independence in 1943, Lebanon has been governed by consent between the political elites. Yet power-sharing arrangements that regulated conflict between the Christian and Muslim communities have been broken several times, such as in 1958, 1975, 2005, 2006 and 2008. Lebanon has consistently experienced internal conflict and political instability when the government has historically failed to maintain neutrality in regional conflicts. Neutrality was a pillar of the National Pact of 1943 according to which Christians were to cease from seeking protection from the West and Muslims were to cease asking for help from Syria and the Arab world. Internally, consensus among the ruling sectarian elites, who shared the spoils of the system, was imperative for maintaining political stability, delivering public goods and achieving socio-economic development. Inter-elite consensus was important to avoid pushing the country over the precipice. Externally, the unstable regional environment in the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Israeli security threat and the divergent interests of Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the United States (US) in Lebanon have all contributed to the paralysis of the power-sharing system. Apparently, regional dynamics cannot be separated from power-sharing in Lebanon. As Brendan O’Leary contends, “external stability is critical if it is to act as a framework for an internal settlement.” Indeed, Lebanon’s ability to survive the turbulent time in the Middle East, particularly after the Arab Spring from late 2010, has much to do with the regional balance between Syria and Iran on the one hand and Saudi Arabia and the US on the other. Among these regional crises, the Syrian insurgency that started in March 2011 and transformed into civil war has the greatest impact on Lebanon and has raised fears that it will trigger violence between the Shi’a and Sunni communities. The Shi’a-Sunni polarization in Lebanon could be interpreted within the context of Iranian-Saudi rivalry and regional power struggle following the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Harriri, an influential Sunni political figure, and the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005. Further, Michael Kerr convincingly states that “what lies ahead for Lebanon remains inextricably linked to the US-Iranian conflict and the Arab Spring.”   

The Lebanese political system is characterized by clientelism, nepotism, favoritism, sectarianism, confessionalism, and most importantly, crony capitalism in a deep state typified by erosion of the rule of law. Most of the political elites, who shared the spoils of the system, have rendered services to their constituencies in return for political loyalty and votes during parliamentary elections. Corruption has been deeply rooted in the system with accountability upheld in rare situations. Attempts to reform the system and provide public employment on an eligibility basis have been blocked. Personal and sectarian interests have superseded the national interest, and loyalty among most of the Lebanese has been to their sectarian leaders rather than the state. For these reasons, state-building and nation-building failed. Currently, it is no exaggeration to label Lebanon as a failing state with no ability to provide public goods, including electricity, clear water, public safety, infrastructure and economic development.