Turkey, Armenia and the limits of transport-route diversification

Armenia is a landlocked country with a population of around 3 million. Two of its four land borders are closed: Azerbaijan to the east and Turkey to the west. Those borders have been closed since the 1990s, leaving its borders with Georgia to the north and Iran to the south as its only operational land borders. The Georgian route, however, carries the bulk of Russian-Armenian trade and serves as a key transit route toward Europe. The Armenian government has repeatedly pointed to progress in overcoming the country’s transport isolation,including new rail access through Georgia and Turkey. However, the reality remains mixed: Armenian exporters continue to incur significant losses because of transit delays in Georgia, while the Turkish land border remains closed despite the lifting of certain trade restrictions. In May 2026, Turkey announced that it had completed bureaucratic preparations for direct trade with Armenia, allowing goods transported through a third country to list Turkey or Armenia as their final destination or point of origin. The Armenian Foreign Ministry welcomed the decision, saying it was significant for “expanding trade and ties between the business circles of the two countries, promoting economic connectivity and ensuring peace and prosperity in the region.” By September, CivilNet was describing the trade restrictions as lifted, but the land crossing remained closed. The change concerns trade and customs arrangements rather than the opening of border crossings; trucks still cannot cross the Armenia-Turkey border directly. This means that the principal overland freight route between Armenia and Turkey continues to pass through Georgia, adding costs and potential delays. Turkey lifted its ban on direct air cargo transportation with Armenia in January 2023, but air freight remains limited in volume and unsuitable for many categories of goods. The 2022 Armenian State University of Economics study confirms that Armenian-Turkish trade had been conducted largely through third countries, especially Georgia. It estimated mediated imports from Turkey at $133 million in 2013, while imports mediated through Georgia exceeded $414 million that year. In 2020, the complementarity coefficient between Armenia’s import structure and Turkey’s export structure was 64%, significantly higher than the corresponding figure for Russia, 44.3%. This figure measures the degree of correspondence between the two structures and supports an argument about trade complementarity. It does not, by itself, establish structural dependence on Turkish goods; additional evidence on import shares, alternative suppliers and long-term trends would be required to sustain a stronger dependence claim. In May 2026, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan also announced that the Akhalkalaki-Kars railway between Georgia and Turkey was open to Armenian exports and imports. The described the development as part of a gradual easing of the blockade, saying, “I want to draw attention to the fact that the blockade is gradually being overcome step by step,” and the railway network, and Georgian transit remains. The route allows Armenian cargo to reach Turkey through Georgia without directly crossing the closed Armenia-Turkey border. However, Armenia still lacks direct access to Turkey's railway network, and Georgian transit remains essential. Official statements about “overcoming the blockade step by step” contrast with problems reported by Armenian businesses. Delays on routes through Georgia in 2025 and 2026, the continued closure of the Turkish land border and the limitations of the Iranian route leave businesses bearing much of the transit risk. The Iranian route, while open, is limited to trucking and constrained by international sanctions, infrastructure deficiencies and regional instability. Moreover, up to 25% of Armenia's foreign trade passes through Iranian territory. Armenia may diversify its export markets, but its goods still depend on a small number of transport routes. The key factor determining Turkey’s position remains political rather than logistical. Turkey’s official position is that the normalization process with Armenia proceeds without preconditions; its Foreign Ministry also says the process should advance “in tandem with regional developments.” At the same time, Turkish and Azerbaijani officials have linked further progress, particularly the opening of the land border, to the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process. The Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement, initialed on Aug. 8, 2025, has not been formally signed. Thus, the prospect of direct land access for Armenian exports to Turkey remains tied in practice to a broader political settlement. September 2026 illustrated the continuing tensions. On Sept. 11-12, Azerbaijan organized a two-day visit to Nagorno-Karabakh for 150 representatives from 58 countries and nine international organizations. On Sept. 15, Azerbaijani President Aliyev accused Armenia of deliberately destroying and desecrating Azerbaijani mosques. Separately, in its March 10, 2022, resolution on the destruction of cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh, the European Parliament said the erasure of Armenian cultural heritage formed part of a “systematic, state-level policy of Armenophobia,” historical revisionism and hatred toward Armenians promoted by Azerbaijani authorities. These political dynamics reinforce the transport bottleneck. Although formal trade restrictions have been eased, the Armenia-Turkey land border remains closed, and the opening of direct routes remains politically linked by Ankara to the formal signing of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement. Armenian exporters therefore face a situation in which market opportunities exist in principle, but reliable and diversified transport routes remain limited.

Turkey, Armenia and the limits of transport-route diversification

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Davo Barseghyan

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This story is FREE for you...

Davo Barseghyan

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