Who takes responsibility for Yerevan’s diplomatic missteps? 

The article seeks to attribute Armenia’s diplomatic difficulties almost exclusively to the current government. That is an incomplete reading of events.
Prior to 2018, Armenia was governed for nearly two decades by political forces associated with the former Republican Party establishment. During that period, corruption, weak rule of law and concentrated political power were persistent concerns identified by international observers. Transparency International and other governance monitors repeatedly highlighted corruption as a systemic challenge in Armenia. 
Even Freedom House notes that Armenia’s democratic transition after 2018 was aimed at addressing “systemic corruption, opaque policymaking, a flawed electoral system, and weak rule of law”, problems that predated the current administration. 
If responsibility is being assigned for Armenia’s present vulnerabilities, it cannot begin in 2018. It must also include the political leadership that shaped the state’s institutions during the preceding two decades.
Many opposition figures condemn negotiations with Azerbaijan while simultaneously failing to present a viable alternative strategy.
Armenia’s military, economic and demographic realities have changed significantly since the 2020 war and the 2023 loss of Nagorno-Karabakh. International observers have noted that the principal opposition movements emerged largely in reaction to concessions and peace negotiations but have struggled to articulate a broadly supported governing alternative. 
The largest protest movement of 2024, led by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, mobilised significant numbers yet ultimately failed to force political change, illustrating the gap between protest and governing capacity. 
Criticism alone is not a foreign policy.
One of the article’s implicit assumptions is that Armenia’s closer alignment with Russia represented a successful strategy that should have been maintained.
The facts suggest otherwise.
Freedom House explicitly noted growing Armenian dissatisfaction due to “the failure of the Russian peacekeepers deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh” and Russia’s inability or unwillingness to prevent Azerbaijan’s military actions. 
Multiple analyses documenting Armenia’s growing estrangement from Moscow point to the same reality: Russian peacekeepers did not prevent the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh, did not prevent the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive and did not provide the level of security Armenians had expected from a strategic ally. 
Armenia subsequently froze participation in the CSTO and began pursuing broader international partnerships because confidence in Russia as sole security guarantor had been severely undermined. 
Therefore, portraying diversification as reckless ignores the failure of the previous security model.
The article portrays criticism of the Armenian Apostolic Church as an attack on religion itself. That framing is misleading.
Respect for the Church and scrutiny of political activism are not mutually exclusive.
The 2024 anti-government protest movement was led by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan and openly supported by opposition parties seeking Prime Minister Pashinyan’s removal. Numerous reports document the direct participation of clergy in political mobilisation and leadership of opposition demonstrations. 
Even analysts generally sympathetic to the Church acknowledge that it has evolved into one of the principal centres of organised political opposition to the government. 
Once senior clergy become political actors, calls for accountability cannot automatically be dismissed as religious persecution.
Political polarisation in Armenia has deepened considerably in recent years.
Freedom House specifically identifies increasing polarisation between the ruling party and opposition forces as a major challenge affecting democratic governance. 
The opposition has frequently framed negotiations, border delimitation efforts and diplomatic engagement as acts of betrayal. Protest movements have demanded the government’s removal while offering limited consensus proposals capable of commanding broad public support. 
The Church’s involvement in these movements has often reinforced political divisions rather than serving as a neutral national institution. 
The article implies that Armenia is abandoning democracy.
The evidence is more nuanced.
Freedom House continues to classify Armenia as “Partly Free” and notes that the country has made significant democratic progress since the 2018 transition, even while acknowledging concerns regarding governance and institutional checks and balances. 
Freedom House’s criticisms focus on executive concentration of power and transparency concerns rather than describing Armenia as an authoritarian state. 
Reasonable people can debate the government’s performance. However, it is inaccurate to present Armenia as having abandoned democratic governance altogether.
The article’s biggest flaw is not that it raises difficult questions. It is that it selectively allocates blame.
The pre-2018 political elite helped create structural weaknesses that international organisations had been documenting for years. 
Russia failed to deliver the security guarantees on which Armenian strategy had long depended. 
The opposition has often prioritised resistance over realistic policy alternatives. 
Senior clergy moved beyond spiritual leadership into direct political mobilisation and opposition leadership. 
Any serious discussion of responsibility must acknowledge all of these factors. Blaming only the current government may be politically convenient, but it is not an honest assessment of how Armenia arrived at its present circumstances.