The Republic of Armenia is underdeveloped, landlocked and highly vulnerable to outside threats, pressure and manipulation. Given its geographic and demographic disadvantages, alongside the enduring consequences of the Armenian Genocide, Yerevan must use every means at its disposal to ensure the safety and security of its territory and people. What it lacks in military strength, it needs to compensate for with skilled diplomacy. Unfortunately, at present, there are not many signs of Armenian diplomatic success.
Recently, a shameful scene unfolded in Shushi, which was ethnically cleansed by Azerbaijan in 2023. While on a Baku-sponsored propaganda tour, foreign diplomats were seen smiling and laughing as an Azerbaijani propagandist mocked the fact that Armenians were the indigenous inhabitants of the region. Another scene depicts senior U.S. diplomat Amy Carlon dancing during the visit. Neither international nor Armenian diplomacy has shown itself willing to call out such disrespectful acts or demand accountability.
As disgraceful as this is for the foreign diplomats involved, it is also emblematic of the challenges facing Armenian diplomacy. The response from the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the incident in Shushi proved insufficient. By advancing an overly accommodating and often defeatist government agenda on issues related to Artsakh, as well as Armenian sovereignty, security and the foundations of Armenian identity, culture, history and religious heritage, Armenian diplomacy is not seen as protecting or advancing Armenian state interests.
This disappointing reality reflects the deficiencies of the current regime. The diplomatic service of any country carries out the directives of its government, but effective governments also rely on their diplomatic professionals for candid advice in devising policies to advance the interests of the state. In the case of Armenia, however, the ruling elites seem to be confusing their personal, political and economic interests with the national interest. Their actions and inactions are encouraging and enabling the adversaries and enemies of Armenia and its people.
This assessment may seem overly harsh and may discomfort some readers, but Armenia’s move away from democracy is unfolding in real time. Whether it is the jailing of opposition figures on trumped-up charges, the illegal and immoral persecution and prosecution of the Armenian Apostolic Church or heavy-handed attempts to distort and undermine Armenian history, the current regime is acting in ways contrary to democratic principles. However, this negative critique stems from frustration with the Armenian government’s lack of strategic planning, foresight and analysis of international affairs.
Indeed, Armenia has produced many diplomats of the highest caliber, such as the late Armenian ambassadors to the United States Arman Kirakossian and Rouben Shugarian. These and countless other professional diplomats have advanced Armenia’s interests under some of the most challenging circumstances. Today, however, the current situation and the lack of adequate response raise the question of whether the political leadership in Yerevan is allowing Armenian diplomats to do their jobs.
There are many examples of Armenia’s struggling diplomatic efforts. The most troubling include Armenia’s diplomacy before, during and after the 44-day war of 2020; its response 2023 ethnic cleansing of Artsakh; and the ongoing failure to secure the release of Armenian hostages. Another pressing example is Armenia’s diplomatic relationship with Russia, its main trading partner. This vital relationship has all but collapsed and has pushed an already weak Armenian economy into an even deeper crisis.
While trying to distance itself from Russia, Armenia appears not to have developed contingencies for Russia’s predictable and all but inevitable response: closing its markets to Armenia’s exports.
Was there sufficient preparation to mitigate Russia’s trade restrictions on Armenian products? Did the government conduct a cost-benefit analysis before concluding that the European Union could replace the Russian market? Is Armenia’s orientation toward Europe based on a sound understanding of the current international correlation of forces? Does the government believe Armenia has a reasonable chance of European Union membership?
By all means, Armenia should deepen cooperation with various international organizations when its interests demand it, but the costs of such policies need to be clearly understood and addressed. Unless there is a strategic plan firmly in place to extricate Armenia from its dependence on Russia, it seems shortsighted to alienate Moscow. This is not a matter of being pro-Russian or anti-Russian; it is about designing policies that are best for the Republic of Armenia and determining the appropriate timing of those policies.
Armenia’s relations with Russia are not the only issue of concern. Azerbaijan continues to occupy internationally recognized Armenian sovereign territory while Yerevan continues a border demarcation process with Baku that is perceived as unfair. Armenian diplomacy has not forcefully pushed back against Baku’s demand for a revision of Armenia’s constitution to remove all references to Artsakh. In addition, Yerevan’s response to Israel’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide left many scratching their heads in disbelief.
What are we to make of these diplomatic shortcomings? President Harry Truman famously had a plaque on his desk that read, “The buck stops here,” popularizing the notion that leaders must ultimately take responsibility for the actions of their subordinates. In Armenia, responsibility for the country’s struggling diplomacy rests squarely on the shoulders of the current leadership.
Sorry, but the mere photo of the traitor makes me sick to my stomach.
Are we absolutely, positively sure he’s even Armenian?
I’ve heard stories.
The article seeks to attribute Armenia’s diplomatic difficulties almost exclusively to the current government. That is an incomplete reading of events.
Prior to 2018, Armenia was governed for nearly two decades by political forces associated with the former Republican Party establishment. During that period, corruption, weak rule of law and concentrated political power were persistent concerns identified by international observers. Transparency International and other governance monitors repeatedly highlighted corruption as a systemic challenge in Armenia. 
Even Freedom House notes that Armenia’s democratic transition after 2018 was aimed at addressing “systemic corruption, opaque policymaking, a flawed electoral system, and weak rule of law”, problems that predated the current administration. 
If responsibility is being assigned for Armenia’s present vulnerabilities, it cannot begin in 2018. It must also include the political leadership that shaped the state’s institutions during the preceding two decades.
Many opposition figures condemn negotiations with Azerbaijan while simultaneously failing to present a viable alternative strategy.
Armenia’s military, economic and demographic realities have changed significantly since the 2020 war and the 2023 loss of Nagorno-Karabakh. International observers have noted that the principal opposition movements emerged largely in reaction to concessions and peace negotiations but have struggled to articulate a broadly supported governing alternative. 
The largest protest movement of 2024, led by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, mobilised significant numbers yet ultimately failed to force political change, illustrating the gap between protest and governing capacity. 
Criticism alone is not a foreign policy.
One of the article’s implicit assumptions is that Armenia’s closer alignment with Russia represented a successful strategy that should have been maintained.
The facts suggest otherwise.
Freedom House explicitly noted growing Armenian dissatisfaction due to “the failure of the Russian peacekeepers deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh” and Russia’s inability or unwillingness to prevent Azerbaijan’s military actions. 
Multiple analyses documenting Armenia’s growing estrangement from Moscow point to the same reality: Russian peacekeepers did not prevent the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh, did not prevent the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive and did not provide the level of security Armenians had expected from a strategic ally. 
Armenia subsequently froze participation in the CSTO and began pursuing broader international partnerships because confidence in Russia as sole security guarantor had been severely undermined. 
Therefore, portraying diversification as reckless ignores the failure of the previous security model.
The article portrays criticism of the Armenian Apostolic Church as an attack on religion itself. That framing is misleading.
Respect for the Church and scrutiny of political activism are not mutually exclusive.
The 2024 anti-government protest movement was led by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan and openly supported by opposition parties seeking Prime Minister Pashinyan’s removal. Numerous reports document the direct participation of clergy in political mobilisation and leadership of opposition demonstrations. 
Even analysts generally sympathetic to the Church acknowledge that it has evolved into one of the principal centres of organised political opposition to the government. 
Once senior clergy become political actors, calls for accountability cannot automatically be dismissed as religious persecution.
Political polarisation in Armenia has deepened considerably in recent years.
Freedom House specifically identifies increasing polarisation between the ruling party and opposition forces as a major challenge affecting democratic governance. 
The opposition has frequently framed negotiations, border delimitation efforts and diplomatic engagement as acts of betrayal. Protest movements have demanded the government’s removal while offering limited consensus proposals capable of commanding broad public support. 
The Church’s involvement in these movements has often reinforced political divisions rather than serving as a neutral national institution. 
The article implies that Armenia is abandoning democracy.
The evidence is more nuanced.
Freedom House continues to classify Armenia as “Partly Free” and notes that the country has made significant democratic progress since the 2018 transition, even while acknowledging concerns regarding governance and institutional checks and balances. 
Freedom House’s criticisms focus on executive concentration of power and transparency concerns rather than describing Armenia as an authoritarian state. 
Reasonable people can debate the government’s performance. However, it is inaccurate to present Armenia as having abandoned democratic governance altogether.
The article’s biggest flaw is not that it raises difficult questions. It is that it selectively allocates blame.
The pre-2018 political elite helped create structural weaknesses that international organisations had been documenting for years. 
Russia failed to deliver the security guarantees on which Armenian strategy had long depended. 
The opposition has often prioritised resistance over realistic policy alternatives. 
Senior clergy moved beyond spiritual leadership into direct political mobilisation and opposition leadership. 
Any serious discussion of responsibility must acknowledge all of these factors. Blaming only the current government may be politically convenient, but it is not an honest assessment of how Armenia arrived at its present circumstances.
My answer to the question is stating the obvious. It is the citizens of Armenia that takes responsibility for Yerevan’s diplomacy. They did in June 20, 2021, after the halting of the disastrous Second Artsakh war on November 10, 2020. The voting citizens of Armenia did the same on June 7, 2026. Henceforth, it will be again the citizens of Armenia that will take responsibly of Yerevan’s diplomacy either by toppling this government and instituting a new government or electing in June 2031. If not the citizens of Armenia, who then?