We need surveys to capture the Armenian diaspora’s complexity

Special Issue: 90 — Informing, Connecting, Inspiring
The Armenian Weekly, October 2024

This article focuses on my research of what I call diaspora economics, and more specifically, on the Armenian diaspora survey that I ran earlier this year. 

There is no singular way to talk about the Armenian diaspora. There is a colorful palette of general and field-specific daily activities, seminars, patriotic events, fundraisers, dance parties and other engagements in global Armenian communities. The Armenian Weekly, like other newspapers, has a dedicated section on diaspora affairs. Scholars author long academic articles and policy reports and attend conferences on related questions (for example, the March 2024 conference in Paris). New ideas are generated raising expectations of the diaspora’s potential and Armenia’s economic security.

Armenia and the diaspora traveling into the unknown together (Photo taken in Armenia by the author)

All of this likely adds to the impatience of our action-driven non-academic friends, who question the practicality of those efforts. Indeed, with so much productive input over the past 30 years, surely by now “we” — the global Armenian community — would have achieved the crown prize of diaspora engagement: unity within the diaspora with its unwavering link to today’s Republic of Armenia and the latter’s strong economic performance. Based on conversations with experts in the field, other diaspora-rich economies are carefully studying Armenia’s experience for a menu of do’s and don’ts.

Alas, as anyone reading this knows well, that crown prize is still more of a long-term goal than a tangible reality. The diaspora’s involvement with Armenia follows a complicated cyclical pattern, determined by the diversity of the three historically overlapping categories of identity and trust on the one side and engagement infrastructure on the other. The unity of these three categories is described as my diaspora-home conceptual model, citing some of my research. The dialectical blending of these high-level categories in turn shapes the dynamic interactions first within the diaspora and then with Armenia — evolving as the dominant theme in my Armenian Diaspora Online Survey 2024 (ADOS 2024). 

Between January and May 2024, I collected 505 fully anonymous responses from people who identified themselves as being of Armenian background. The survey was administered globally online without any financial support. In addition to demographic background, the survey asked about the individual’s involvement in their community and with Armenia. The survey also included questions on the diaspora’s economic participation in Armenia. Finally, the survey provided an opportunity for participants to express their thoughts on the current state of the diaspora as they see it and diaspora-Armenia relations.

This ADOS 2024 project is a follow-up to my previous similar survey from early 2018. The respondent groups in the two surveys are different. Reports on the first survey appeared in several academic and popular publications. One of the tangible proposals from that first survey was the idea for a diaspora digital portal, connecting the diaspora with Armenia. This is not a particularly unique proposal and would have seemed to be self-evident, yet there was an astoundingly clear missing link in diaspora-Armenia engagement infrastructure. Today, groups such as the Armenian Society of Fellows, HyeConnect, DiasporArm and others are putting their efforts into facilitating technical and human capabilities towards establishing such connections.

With his heavy New Yorker accent, my impatient practical friend would interrupt:

— So, what? Another diaspora survey? Do we not know it all already? 

Well I would argue, contrary to our strong convictions, when it comes to the Armenian diaspora, we do not really know it well enough. The specific results of my latest survey suggest that the Armenian diaspora is a diverse, often disconnected and dispersed enigma of overlapping intentions, concepts, thoughts, mentalities and migration waves spanning the entire globe. The “old” diaspora, formed in the pre-1990s, the post 1990s period “new” and now the “new-new” diaspora groups, all parts of one Armenian nation, are diverse in their socio-economic and political makeup, according to the ADOS 2024 results.

But what seems to be divided in the socio-economic profile is somewhat compensated by an individual’s choice of association with their Armenian identity. Identity is essential in determining the outcomes of engagement with a local community or Armenia (one should immerse in the works of the founder of diaspora studies Dr. Khachig Tölölyan to attempt to unveil this complexity). As far as the survey, the majority of the ADOS 2024 participants (81.8%) indicated having both parents of Armenian background (a dominant factor in their Armenian identity); the remainder had a diverse mix. 

Interestingly, 73.3% of the respondents were not born in Armenia. Yet, Armenia is the symbolic ancestral homeland despite an individual respondent’s background, as indicated in the survey. The majority of respondents can easily converse in either Western (37.4%) or Eastern Armenian (34.9%) or both (12.9%). Looking at the survey’s language proficiency (and the Western versus Eastern Armenian split) responses as well as comments throughout, there emerges a significant role of the individual’s family (and then community, as the majority enter social groups through family associations) in the identity category determination, even with several degrees of separation from the original migration waves (the old, new and the new-new diasporas). Notably, the majority of the survey participants do not have immediate family in Armenia (61.8%) but have been to Armenia at least once (82.4%) with the most common average stay of one to two weeks. This result is consistent with the 2018 ADOS survey. 

Anecdotally, we may be aware of such diversity, but it is the empirical fieldwork that allows us to construct a relatively consistent profile of our variegated diaspora, gathering data in a systematic fashion, through the efforts of this survey or those supported by the Gulbenkian Foundation, diaspora mapping and other projects. 

— So, what? – that friend, again… — that’s great academic stuff, but we can just ask key people, get a general feel of things; it is all the same. All the Armenian economy needs is a few diaspora investors to start pouring money into Armenia…

Indeed, the role of private capital is fundamental for Armenia’s development. Since the early 1990s, diaspora investors have been the trailblazers sustaining Armenia’s economic growth and continuing to play an essential role in doing so, in spite of said diversity. And with time, I have come to believe that there is a trend of changing dynamics in the diversity of diaspora initiatives and development efforts. 

To the larger extent, my survey results indicate exceptionally strong emotional attachment to Armenia among the respondents, despite the diversity in Armenian historic identities and lack of direct connection with the country. This is where the identity category transforms into the other essential element, trust. 

It is that mix of a priori trust, enthusiasm and feeling of moral responsibility (43.6%) towards Armenia that may also explain an inclination by a tangible share of survey respondents to relocate to Armenia due to either patriotic or work reasons. Though the majority have never worked in Armenia (71%), the outlook is positive for this group with no preferred sector in terms of future occupation: technology, healthcare, tourism, academia, manufacturing, the wine industry, venture capital and beyond were listed as preferred examples of work for potential diaspora immigrants to Armenia.

This is of course not an exception to the trend of the past three decades but a confirmation of the yet untapped diaspora potential. Over time, as far as economic outcomes, there has been an impressive generation of new business successes, widely shared on the diaspora newswires. Similarly, there is no lack of ideas on how to effectively capitalize on the perceived diaspora potential to “improve Armenia’s economy,” from special investment funds, industry organizations and new sector growth models to strategic macroeconomic designs

But sustainable economic growth has been limited to export-oriented high-wage sectors with minimal labor market involvement and insufficient technological spillovers into broader stability. That, in turn, constrains domestic economy sectors that draw on a larger non-specialized labor pool. There is no need for long evidence on the economy’s structural fragility exacerbated by geopolitical pressures and geo-economic remoteness. Armenia’s scenario is similar to other small post-socialist economies but with a local context. 

For the more than 100,000 Artsakh refugees, there is an urgent need for broadly scaled consistent economic and social adaptation, including any sustainable initiatives led by the diaspora. The amalgamation of macroeconomic challenges in Armenia happens in the background of persistent unemployment, especially in rural areas, low wages and growing social and economic inequalities. The latter is strikingly visible between Yerevan and the rest of the county and within Yerevan itself. It is this widening inequality that pushes emigration out of Armenia, among other outcomes. 

News sources from survey results (Generated by Google Surveys)

Trust is the most fragile component of the three categories in the diaspora-home model (identity and engagement infrastructure being the other two). The majority of ADOS 2024 survey participants have donated to at least one organization established in Armenia on average annually, as well as participated in diaspora-led fundraising activities for Armenia. Yet, it is also abundantly clear from the comments that it often takes just one unfortunate interaction, one brush with what respondents referred to as perceived corruption (either in the diaspora or in Armenia) or one miscommunication for the goodwill of trust to crumble, conditioning the diaspora’s economic withdrawal. 

It may be tempting to discount this as a reaction of a needy, attention-seeking diaspora. Yet, the past matters. Such experiences land on solid and fertile thick layers of rumors and stereotypes, often lacking personal experiences. Aside from diaspora or Armenia-based media, a substantial share of the ADOS 2024 respondents indicated word of mouth (news received from friends) as one of their preferred trustworthy news sources on Armenia. 

Towards the end of the survey, I asked a few specific questions on economic dealings with Armenia. This is where the third category of my diaspora economics model mentioned earlier, engagement infrastructure, comes forward. We know from international experience that despite the initial efforts of diaspora groups or individuals in the diaspora, there is a pivotal role played by the receiving country (e.g., see the case of Ireland or Scotland’s appeal to its diaspora — the choice of the countries is not accidental, as we need to move beyond trivial comparisons). 

Hence, these were the questions about participation in hypothetical diaspora investment funds, diaspora bonds or similar borrowing and large-scale joint Armenia-diaspora funding initiatives. Perhaps “reserved optimism” would be the best way to characterize responses to these questions. Across all categories of questions in this section, most common were the undecided groups. 

Those with positive reactions to either idea indicated a healthy range of sector development priorities, including agriculture, infrastructure, education and healthcare, in addition to the more popular high-tech sector. Strengthening the defense sector was a strongly preferred outlier. Respondents expressing support for an investment fund are willing to provide annual contributions (50%). Separately, 44.8% of all are ready to lend $100 to Armenia if the country launched a borrowing program from the diaspora for general needs. 

The impediments? Again, lack of clear engagement infrastructure (how to connect), perceptions of corruption and mistrust of the existing formal channels (including within the diaspora) seem to be the major barriers for individual diaspora members to engage with Armenia on a larger financial scale, according to the survey. For a substantial number of respondents, difficult personal financial circumstances add another barrier to active involvement with Armenian communities or Armenia (here, we should talk about inequality within the diaspora, a separate topic of my research).

There is also a somewhat mixed bag of responses on non-monetary engagement with Armenia through professional engagements, delivering lectures, teaching opportunities, work with Artsakh refugees and local NGOs, but also simply visiting Armenia in the summers and engaging with local professionals. An online portal (echoing the 2018 survey) would be a welcome medium to build trust and grow engagement, according to 60.4% of respondents.

 A substantial majority of respondents offered extensive commentary on their connection with their diaspora community and with Armenia.

The intellectual wealth of shared insights suggests with all urgency a need for continued analysis of the Armenian diaspora from various viewpoints. There can be no place for stereotypes or easy shortcuts.

The research should not just be on topics of historical backgrounds and cultural absorptions but must focus on practical subjects and diaspora economics as well. In our materialistic world, it all boils down to access to financial support for researchers. 

More bluntly, we — the community — must be several times more supportive of and increase the funding of Armenian scholars across all disciplines, prioritizing social sciences. The payoff may not be immediately visible, but over time it becomes tangible. It is this type of work that shapes our views and knowledge on vast topics regarding the Armenian diaspora, impacting the survival of the diaspora communities and sustainability of their connection with Armenia, and by extension, Armenia’s economic development. It is out of the diversity of intellectual efforts that there may evolve a robust and pragmatic diaspora-Armenia model. Until then, we must keep the conversation open, and dialogue is needed to keep moving forward. 

Lastly, acknowledging some of the critics’ (and yes, my friend’s) skepticism over such surveys, it is important to note the following. Indeed, self-reported surveys should receive our careful treatment. At the same time, until we have a proper diaspora census, generalizing across an exceptionally heterogeneous Armenian diaspora of multiple transnational identities is no simple task, yet it is necessary. The structured pattern of empirical analysis then allows for some generalizations in policymaking and research in a country development process. 

And then there is a need for honest self-reflection and self-assessment of the diaspora and diaspora groups, their missions and effectiveness, but also those groups’ connection with the tapestry we call the global Armenian diaspora. That is perhaps one of the most immediate and difficult to accept lessons from the diaspora survey discussed in this article.

Aleksandr V. Gevorkyan, Ph.D.

Aleksandr V. Gevorkyan, Ph.D.

Aleksandr V. Gevorkyan, Ph.D. is Henry George Chair in Economics and Associate Professor of Economics at the Department of Economics and Finance of St. John’s University’s Peter J. Tobin College of Business. Dr. Gevorkyan is the author of Transition Economies: Transformation, Development, and Society in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Routledge, 2018).

1 Comment

  1. I moved to Armenia. Let the ones who bla bla do half of what me or my family did within years for the people of this country. Those who talk escaped from their Soviet Paradise several years ago. It is even questionable If they visit Armenia as a tourist from time to time. There is nothing they can do against Turkey either. Turkey will beat them with wet sticks will open a pit, throw them inside and would even pee on them after. I know what I am saying. Turkey is a professional murderer country when it wants with Hundred Thousands of Hitmen with NATO expertise accumulated in 72 Years. I don’t even add the Ottoman and Seljuk Periods in that. Turkey became member of NATO in 1952. This is a not a joke. They know to fight and destroy. 44 Days War was the work of the Turkish Command not Azeri. They have NATO Trained Generals. 18 Million Kurds within Turkey can not beat them and Kurds learn to shoot at the age of 10. Kurds are a tribal society armed to the teeth. Only a superpower like America or something like Britain can destroy Turkey. Not the Russias or the Irans or any type of 3rd World Country. Russia would be afraid to have any type of clash with Turks today and Russia will collapse in the future.. It is crystal clear. I told that 3 years ago. Russia is an archaic country with gang wars. Wildberries Case is a small example on that. Russia is on the course of going down. That’s why the best choice for Armenia’s Defense is to collaborate with the West like Turks did in the past so they will learn and also develop in military affairs. What they learned from Soviets doesn’t fit for the 21st Century. That time is over. New age, new rules.

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