The question of Nakhichevan’s autonomy

For decades, Nakhichevan has occupied a peculiar position. The exclave is an autonomous republic within Azerbaijan, a status established during the early Soviet period. According to 1916 Russian statistics cited by historian Richard Hovannisian in The Republic of Armenia, Volume 1: 1918-1919, Nakhichevan was inhabited by 81,000 “Muslims” — a category that included Tatars, Turks and Kurds — and 54,000 Armenians.

Between 1918 and 1921, Armenia and Azerbaijan fought over Nakhichevan. After Baku gained control of the region in 1921, the Armenian inhabitants faced persecution, including thousands of deaths and the burning of 45 villages. While a full account of this period is beyond the scope of this article, Moscow ultimately established the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Nakhichevan, recognizing it as part of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan (AzSSR).

Despite its autonomous status, the number of Nakhichevan Armenians rapidly dwindled during the Soviet period. The 1926 census counted 11,276 Armenians (roughly 11% of the population), while the 1979 statistics registered only 3,406 Armenians (1.6%). 

Researcher Argam Ayvazyan argued in Monuments and Identities in the Caucasus that policies of the AzSSR, which systematically displayed hostility toward Nakhichevan Armenians, contributed to the stark decline in their numbers. Official publications regarding the region systematically omitted any reference to its Armenian heritage, de facto presenting the exclave as a purely Azerbaijani territory, according to Victor Shnirelman in The Value of the Past: Myths, Identity and Politics in Transcaucasia. Authorities also settled Azerbaijani families in Armenian villages, assigning them political and economic positions. Azerbaijani and Russian dominated higher education, public administration and workplaces, forcing many young Armenians to leave for neighboring Armenia to attend university or seek employment after graduating from Armenian-language schools. Older generations remained, but with their passing, the Armenian community experienced a sharp contraction. 

The remaining minority was expelled during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, leaving Nakhichevan without Armenians. According to satellite investigations conducted by the Caucasus Heritage Watch, all signs of this historical presence — including the khachkars (cross-stones) of Julfa — were systematically destroyed under the Aliyev government.

Despite the erasure of its Armenian population, Nakhichevan retained its autonomous status. In January 1990, regional authorities proclaimed independence from the Soviet Union, becoming the first political entity to take such a measure. They also changed the official name from Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic to Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. 

When Azerbaijan became independent in 1991, some figures  associated with the Popular Front Party reportedly called for the abolition of Nakhichevan’s autonomy, according to a 2023 paper by Azerbaijani scholar Adalat Gasimov. Nevertheless, the proposal encountered fierce resistance from Heydar Aliyev and his patronage network.

Aliyev, former leader of Azerbaijan between 1969 and 1982, assumed control of the exclave in the early 1990s, acting with limited practical oversight from Baku. He saw any attempt to curtail or abolish regional autonomy as an attack on his power. Therefore, when Aliyev acceded to the presidency in 1993, his government drafted a new constitution that recognized the special status of Nakhichevan. Formally, the document recognized the right of the region to have its own constitutional charter, legislative assembly, executive power and judiciary system, thus allowing it to manage local affairs without external interference. 

In reality, the president imposed significant limits on the autonomy, according to a 2024 paper by Azerbaijani legal scholar Ismayil Garibli. Nakhichevan’s constitution and laws could not conflict with those of Azerbaijan, its constitutional charter had to be approved by the Azerbaijani president and by the national parliament, relations between Nakhichevan City and Baku had to be managed unilaterally by the central government, and the exclave shared the same flag, emblem and anthem as Azerbaijan.

In 1995, when Heydar Aliyev was president and the dominant figure of the republic, control of Nakhichevan passed to Vasif Talibov, a trusted associate with whom he was linked by familial ties. Over the following decades, the autonomous republic became what critics described as a “personal fiefdom” of the Talibov family. The family established a highly repressive regime grounded in violence, fear and censorship, leading the Norwegian Helsinki Committee to describe the region as “the dark island”. 

According to a 2007 RFE/RL report, some Azerbaijanis referred to Nakhichevan as “the North Korea of Azerbaijan.” In fact, the limited practical oversight from the national government allowed Talibov to operate with little interference, even allowing him to prevent high-ranking Azerbaijani officials and politicians from entering the exclave.

Any form of dissent was harshly repressed. A Feb. 20, 2022, report by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) found that security forces have been implicated in illegal arrests, beatings, torture, kidnappings, killings and extortion. The report also described a series of arbitrary regulations, including bans on hanging laundry on balconies prohibitions on women in the public sector dyeing their hair red or blonde or wearing colored tights; and requirements that state employees, such as teachers and doctors, clean streets or harvest crops on weekends under threat of dismissal.

One of the most absurd measures discussed was the prohibition of baking bread at home. Police reportedly entered the homes of those who violated this rule and destroyed their ovens. Observers say the Talibov family controls a large share of the region’s commercial outlets, and used the restriction to push residents to buy bread from their businesses. To further limit competition, authorities shut down or destroyed other local economic activities. These abuses are also detailed in a 2023 RFE/RL report. 

The combination of authoritarian governance and widespread poverty has driven many residents to relocate to other parts of Azerbaijan or to Turkey.

The situation changed drastically in December 2022, when Talibov resigned, officially citing health reasons. Just months earlier, an OCCRP investigation revealed that the Talibov family had amassed considerable wealth over decades, often through questionable means. Human Rights Defender Anar Mamadli suggests the resignation was the result of pressure by President Ilham Aliyev, who appeared keen to strengthen central control over the Nakhichevan exclave. 

Recent constitutional and administrative developments analyzed by OC Media indicate a further consolidation of central authority. While the region formally retains its autonomous status, a series of constitutional amendments approved in 2026 revised its internal legal framework. These included restructuring local governing bodies and the removal of references to historical international treaties such as the 1921 Moscow and Kars agreements, according to Azerbaijani news outlet Report.az. Instead, the constitutional narrative now emphasizes Nakhichevan as an integral part of Azerbaijan, reinforcing its subordination within the unitary state structure. 

A key institutional change introduced alongside these reforms is the establishment of a presidential representative in the region, appointed directly by the Azerbaijani president. This position creates a direct channel of oversight between Baku and Nakhichevan, effectively strengthening the central government’s influence. 

The president also has the right to dissolve the Supreme Assembly of Nakhichevan in certain situations. Moreover, the executive of Nakhichevan will no longer report to the region’s legislative body and instead coordinate directly with Baku. 

Following the amendments, President Aliyev published a decree on March 10, 2026, instructing the government to draft proposals within three months aimed at “harmonising laws and regulations” related to the autonomous republic. 

In practice, these developments reduce the administrative independence previously exercised by regional institutions, as key decisions are increasingly coordinated or influenced by central authorities.