The diaspora as asset and vector

Armenia’s adversaries view the diaspora not only as a potential asset for the homeland but also as a vector for influence operations. This dual reality — the diaspora as both a vital national strength and a channel for external pressure — is starkly illustrated in the Foreign Intelligence Service’s (FIS) recent public reports and defines one of the most complex challenges confronting Armenia and its global community today. In an era of hybrid warfare — where disinformation, cyber operations, recruitment and political cultivation often matter more than conventional battle lines — the Armenian diaspora finds itself on a contested front. The FIS Annual Report on External Security Risks of the Republic of Armenia for 2025 and the 2026 update provide a sobering yet constructive framework. They document a shift away from high-probability large-scale military confrontation toward multilayered hybrid pressures. While the likelihood of major escalation with Azerbaijan is assessed as low in the near term (FIS 2025 Report), persistent risks remain from certain narratives promoted from Baku — such as references to “Western Azerbaijan” — and from intensified influence activities, especially in the lead-up to elections (FIS 2026 Report). Cyber threats to critical infrastructure, malign information campaigns, and efforts to activate networks or cultivate seemingly “homegrown” political activity are highlighted as growing concerns. For the diaspora, the reports and related FIS statements are particularly salient. Foreign actors — often linked to regional adversaries or great-power competition — are described as pressuring Armenians abroad, including business communities in certain countries, to provide financial or organizational support to specific political forces. These operations treat diaspora networks as channels to shape opinion, sow division, or indirectly influence developments inside Armenia. Russia-linked disinformation efforts and Azerbaijani-aligned social media and recruitment tactics have been noted in broader reporting as examples of this pattern. The diaspora’s advocacy strength, financial ties and emotional connections to the homeland make it both a vital support system and a tempting target. Government responses and the need for balance Yerevan has responded with public warnings, investigations into alleged foreign-backed activities and practical measures such as updated voter eligibility rules emphasizing recent physical presence in Armenia. For instance, FIS alerts about foreign pressure on Armenians abroad to support particular political forces ahead of elections have prompted investigations and public debate — actions that underscore genuine security needs while prompting questions about scope and transparency. Officials have spoken of compiling information on individuals operating near the line of foreign agendas, with clear warnings about crossing into espionage. These steps reflect legitimate security imperatives for a small state operating in an asymmetric environment. Countering real external interference is not optional; it is essential for sovereignty and stability. At the same time, the framing of certain opposition voices or diaspora critics as potentially aligned with foreign interests raises important questions about proportionality and long-term cohesion. When broad concerns about hybrid threats intersect with domestic political debates — on territorial issues, institutional relations or foreign policy direction — the risk emerges of blurring the line between legitimate security measures and the marginalization of honest disagreement. Entry restrictions or selective engagement, even when rooted in verified concerns, can inadvertently strain the very homeland-diaspora bonds that have sustained Armenia through difficult decades. The FIS reports themselves model a degree of transparency by bringing these risks into public view. Extending that transparency to how intelligence informs policy decisions, combined with consistent legal safeguards and opportunities for judicial review where appropriate, would help maintain public confidence both inside Armenia and across the diaspora. Conclusion The phrase “asset and vector” is more than an observation — it is a strategic warning. Armenia must defend against genuine foreign interference without allowing security measures to become a tool for silencing legitimate voices or alienating parts of its global community. True resilience requires vigilance against adversaries and vigilance against overreach at home. As the FIS warns of more sophisticated influence operations around election periods, the choice is clear: treat the diaspora as a full partner whose diversity strengthens the nation, or risk handing adversaries a self-inflicted victory. In the long arc of Armenian survival and renewal, getting this balance right may prove as decisive as any battlefield or diplomatic breakthrough. Our homeland and its diaspora deserve nothing less. The views expressed by the author are his own and not those of the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office or the California Military Department.

The diaspora as asset and vector

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William Paparian

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William Paparian

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