YEREVAN — Early this morning, reports emerged that an Azerbaijani aircraft had landed at Zvartnots International Airport in Yerevan, marking the first public indication of an unannounced visit by an Azerbaijani delegation to Armenia.
The presence of the aircraft was first reported by Armenian media outlets, prompting immediate scrutiny and speculation before being clarified by official sources. Armenia’s civil aviation authorities confirmed to Sputnik Armenia that a delegation from Azerbaijan had arrived in the country, although no further details were initially disclosed.
The visit was subsequently confirmed by Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which stated that Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev was in Yerevan, heading the delegation. Mustafayev also serves as the chairman of Azerbaijan’s state commission on border delimitation, a role closely tied to ongoing and sensitive negotiations between the two countries.
Later, Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also acknowledged the visit, confirming the presence of an Azerbaijani delegation in Yerevan and indicating that an official statement would follow.
Separately, Armenian outlet SHAMSHYAN.com reported, citing its sources, that Mustafayev had expressed a desire to visit his birthplace, the village of Jujevan in Armenia’s Tavush region. In response, NEWS.am contacted the head of the Jujevan administrative district, Hambardzum Petrosyan, to verify whether such a visit was planned.
“I don’t see any activity in the village at the moment. It was only journalists who called and said there was such information,” Petrosyan said, adding that he had no knowledge of any planned visit.
In a separate report aired by Armenia’s Channel 5, an interview with individuals who knew Shahin Mustafayev during his school years in Noyemberyan presented sharply contrasting personal recollections.
One former classmate, who spoke on condition of anonymity, described Mustafayev as a highly capable student. At the same time, she expressed strong emotional opposition toward him in light of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, stating that she would prefer to “erase him from memory.”
She also recalled that he studied Armenian language and literature at a high level during his schooling, while alleging that his mother had at times objected to the volume of Armenian-language materials assigned to him.
The same source further claimed that Mustafayev’s sister held markedly critical views toward Armenians, including an incident in which she allegedly refused to capitalize the word “Armenia” in written work. These claims could not be independently verified.
Separately, Channel 5 also featured testimony from Samvel Beglaryan, a writer and resident of Noyemberyan, who said he knew Mustafayev’s family — locally referred to by the Armenian form of his name, “Shahen.” Beglaryan stated that Mustafayev’s grandfather was among the first members of the family to settle in the area, arriving while engaged in cattle herding.
According to Beglaryan, members of the family were fluent in Armenian in public interactions but reportedly used Azerbaijani within the household. He further expressed deeply critical views shaped by personal and historical grievances related to the conflict between the two countries, making broader generalizations about trust between communities.
Beglaryan also suggested that Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev had deliberately selected Mustafayev for his current role, citing his familiarity with Armenian society and what he described as an understanding of its “vulnerabilities and weaknesses.”
Later in the day, the developments were formally confirmed in an official statement regarding the 13th meeting of the Armenia–Azerbaijan state border delimitation commissions, held in Aghveran, Armenia, on April 29, 2026.
According to the announcement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the meeting was co-chaired by Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan and Azerbaijani Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev, in their respective capacities as heads of the two countries’ border delimitation and border security commissions.
The statement noted with satisfaction that the 13th meeting had once again taken place on the territory of one of the parties, specifically in Aghveran, Armenia.
During the discussions, the sides exchanged detailed views on organizational and technical issues related to the delimitation process. They also agreed on and exchanged draft texts of several key methodological guidelines governing the practical implementation of delimitation work.
These included procedures for the work of expert groups involved in the delimitation process, guidelines for the creation of border delimitation maps, and procedures for the formalization and publication of delimitation-related documents.
Both sides agreed to submit the drafts to their respective governments for approval. In addition, Grigoryan and Mustafayev held separate discussions on matters of mutual interest.
The statement highlighted that the transit of cargo to Armenia via Azerbaijani territory has been carried out successfully and continues to proceed, while also noting the delivery of petroleum products from Azerbaijan to Armenia as an indication of emerging economic links between the two countries.
The meeting also included a session with the participation of representatives from business communities on issues related to trade and economic cooperation, the mutual supply of goods and services, and transit transportation.
The statement emphasized that the progress achieved was made possible by what it described as the political will of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.
At the conclusion of the meeting, the sides signed a protocol and agreed to coordinate the date of the next meeting in Azerbaijan through working-level channels.
The timing of Azerbaijani Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev’s visit to Armenia has been interpreted by opposition figures not as routine diplomacy, but as a politically consequential signal embedded in a broader struggle over narrative control and domestic legitimacy.
Armenian Revolutionary Federation member and MP Artur Khachatryan advances a critique that situates the visit within an interplay of internal political vulnerability and external strategic calculation.
At the center of this critique is the assertion that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government has constructed a communicative framework in which the notion of “peace” functions as both a political asset and a stabilizing narrative. As Khachatryan formulates it, “The main propaganda line of the authorities is that peace has supposedly already been established, and if Pashinyan is no longer in power, war will begin.” In this reading, such framing narrows the perceived range of political alternatives by linking any transfer of power to heightened security risks.
Within this analytical lens, Mustafayev’s visit acquires significance less for its formal diplomatic content than for its signaling function. Khachatryan suggests that external validation — particularly from Baku — reinforces the government’s narrative, noting that “in this situation, the Armenian government needs Azerbaijan to confirm this claim as well.” The visit thus operates as a performative mechanism, reinforcing the image of stability at a moment when its durability remains contested.
The critique further posits a reciprocal logic underpinning this interaction. According to Khachatryan, Baku’s current posture cannot be understood independently of Armenia’s internal political dynamics. He argues that Azerbaijani policymakers are acutely aware that “once Pashinyan leaves and a new government is formed in Armenia, it will — unlike the current one — defend national interests and will not carry out Azerbaijan’s instructions.” In this interpretation, Azerbaijan’s engagement is conditional and strategically calibrated. As Khachatryan puts it, “Baku is not doing this for free; in return for its support, it will extract something from the Armenian authorities.”
This line of argument converges most clearly around the issue of border delimitation. Given Mustafayev’s institutional role as co-chair of the bilateral commission, the visit is interpreted as potentially instrumental in advancing specific territorial configurations. Khachatryan contends that “Mustafayev will insist that delimitation be carried out along the route of the so-called pan-Turkic corridor,” while cautioning that expectations of alternative starting points — “for example, from Jermuk or the northwest, as outlined in the regulations of the bilateral working group” — may prove misplaced. Whether or not such projections materialize, they reflect a deeper distrust toward the process and its underlying strategic direction.
An additional dimension of the critique concerns the economic signaling embedded in Mustafayev’s meetings with business representatives. Khachatryan interprets these engagements as an attempt to construct a forward-looking narrative in which normalization is equated with economic opportunity. Yet he challenges this premise, arguing that such messaging risks obscuring asymmetry in expectations: “the illusion that the establishment of normal relations … will open up new business opportunities,” he suggests, masks a reality in which “by ‘normal relations,’ Azerbaijan understands the unconditional acceptance of its terms by Armenia.”
