Avoiding the emotional gap between justice and geopolitical realities

The ink is hardly dry on the documents signed at the trilateral meetings hosted by the United States, yet a sense of despair hangs over the diaspora. If social media and public statements are any indication, reactions have been quite negative. This is not surprising, given that political events inevitably encourage wildly diverse perspectives. 

In many cases, the public understands these developments only through what they read—which are the personal views of the players and not the issues themselves. In our deeply polarized American society, pre-judgment has become the norm and partisan perspectives on issues reflect our deep divisions. 

Among Armenians in the diaspora, much of the political engagement is limited to a surface-level reading of events. This shows up in three ways.

First is that most of the diaspora—at least those with a visible opinion—has a negative opinion of the Pashinyan government. For many, any action taken by his administration is automatically dismissed as either not in Armenia’s interest or lacking credibility.

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Another dimension is the role of President Trump. If someone opposes Trump or his style, that sentiment colors their opinion of the trilateral deal, regardless of its content. I am not advocating support for either Pashinyan or Trump, but to point out how such reactions limit our productive political engagement.

A final element is what I call the “victim mentality.” We, as Armenians, carry a deep psychological scar from the injustices of the past and present. This often leads to hypersensitivity when we are ignored or issues remain unresolved. As a result, discussions about the trilateral summit, for example, focus primarily on what was not agreed to—Artsakh, the right of return for its Armenians, war crimes and our illegally detained prisoners. While these are all honorable missions, they must be viewed within the context of our current realities. 

What does that mean? Armenia is a defeated nation and continues to pay dearly for that reality. The lack of leverage in today’s “negotiations” is driven by the military losses in 2020 and 2023. We can blame former presidents Serzh Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan for not building our military capability or Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan for his controversial policies on peace, but the fact remains: Armenia’s position is defined by these defeats.

It is equally clear that no one in the American power structure cares about the atrocities that were committed by Azerbaijan in Artsakh. Congress does not set foreign policy and hearings are non-binding. Perhaps a stronger Armenian government response to Artsakh might have enabled military involvement, but Armenia’s priority has been survival. Could it survive another Turkic war? With Russia’s abandonment during the 2020 war and its aftermath, Armenia was left wounded and exposed to an unchecked, genocidal Aliyev. Neither the United States, Europe nor Iran was prepared to provide the type of security measures needed to prevent another Azerbaijani attack.

From a moral standpoint, the world’s ambivalence is appalling. But from a political standpoint, it is unsurprising: nations act in self-interest. In this regard, Armenia has been presented with a diplomatic opening shaped by regional power shifts—particularly efforts to box out Russia and reshape regional economies. Does it resolve the injustices that weigh on Armenians everywhere? No, but it does allow a wounded nation with limited leverage to avoid another catastrophic war, survive and recover. 

No one should be pleased with the lifting of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which rewards a genocidal and criminal nation—but it is the price of U.S. engagement. That engagement remains the strongest deterrent to a unilateral Azerbaijani attack. The public theatrics of the trilateral meeting, including Pashinyan and Aliyev’s competing gestures toward Trump’s Nobel Peace Prize nomination, are distractions. What matters are the practical terms of the framework agreement and how they are implemented. 

This framework leaves many details unresolved—such as the road construction, security arrangements and the scope of “territorial integrity.” These will require further negotiation. We can always count on Azerbaijan to cloud the picture with obstacles. Soon after the trilateral meeting, Aliyev stated that the final agreement would require constitutional changes in Armenia. Turkey, always lurking in the shadows, is likely to echo this same demand and delay “normalization” in order to meddle in Armenia’s internal affairs. 

We must also consider the interests of the stakeholders who were not present at the table. Many analysts view the transport road as another mechanism to reduce Russia’s influence in the region. This, of course, is welcomed by Turkey. But Trump’s actions can be unpredictable. If Putin warms up to Trump’s peace plan for Ukraine at their upcoming meeting in Alaska, then concessions in the Caucasus could be offered to Russia to “sweeten” the deal, much as lifting Section 907 served to maintain Aliyev’s attention. 

Armenia will soon conduct high-level talks with Iran, which has expressed cautious public optimism about the agreement but will work privately to prevent a negative impact. One critical test of the sovereignty dimension will be the continued north-south traffic flow across the Syunik road, which is critical for both Iran and Armenia. 

During a private sidebar, Pashinyan discussed the issue of Artsakh political prisoners with Trump. The president’s positive response and his willingness to frame them as “Christian” Armenians reflect his personal style and awareness of narrative politics. This is how diplomacy works: substantive progress often happens outside the spotlight. As the briefings continue and obstacles emerge with more detail, Armenia must continue to be fully engaged. 

Our focus must be on uniting in the eyes of those with whom we seek alliances. If we expect every grievance or injustice to be addressed now, then we set ourselves up for disappointment. The world works on political self-interest, not moral absolutes. Rejecting politically viable steps because they are not perfect only narrows Armenia’s options. We must hold onto what we can secure now and use it as leverage for future gains.

The United States is not engaged in this transit link project because it has an affinity for Armenia or Azerbaijan—it is based on self-interest. Small nations must always align their needs with the interests of powerful countries to gain security and economic benefits. A joint venture with the U.S. that respects Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity offers a far better future than the risk of another Turkic invasion. 

In this agreement and ongoing negotiations, we, as Armenians, must focus on three achievable goals: securing sovereignty and territorial integrity for the transit road, ensuring the withdrawal of Azerbaijani troops from roughly 200 square kilometers of occupied territory and securing the release of our political hostages held illegally in Baku. 

The diaspora could play an important role in helping the homeland meet these shared goals of sovereignty and territorial integrity, but it will not happen with the push of a button. It is a mission that every nation defends every day. While our distrust of Turkey is justified, at times, a powerful third party can serve as an equalizer. Russia once played that role before abandoning it. This is a different model, but it can still serve as an effective deterrent—if we focus on shaping its implementation rather than tearing it apart from the sidelines.