ARF Chair Antranig Kasbarian’s Comments on Presented Papers

Below is Antranig Kasbarian(chair, ARF Central Committee, Eastern U.S.) to the papers presented at the public forum titled “The ARF at 120: A Critical Appreciation,” held at the New York Hilton Hotel on Nov. 21, 2010. Click here to read the papers.

First of all, let me thank all of the panelists for their candor, their sincerity, and their insightfulness in their critiques. At the same time, I’d be remiss if I didn’t point out areas where we may debate or disagree. Let me try to capture several salient points raised in the respective presentations, which offer fruitful lines to pursue further.

Dennis, thank you for your comments, which I found broadly insightful and critical in ways that are helpful. One idea which, I think, deserves further discussion and clarification is this notion of nationalism on the one hand, and ‘nation-worship’ on the other. There are some important distinctions between the two, and I’m glad you’ve flagged this here for our attention. I think there may have been times in the ARF’s history when its nationalism may have moved toward reverence or “worship,” as you call it. But I think it’s not enough to flag it, but to look at it critically and understand why that may have been the case. For example, in the early post-Genocide era, I think it was entirely natural for folks to look at their culture, their nationhood, with reverence. This was a people in exile that had just been subjected to genocide; in way, all they had left was their dreams and aspirations. So especially in the Cold War years, when we were a generation or less removed from the Genocide, it’s entirely understandable that “holding the fort,” in preserving national identity was first and foremost on our agenda.

Dr. Sanjian, thank you as well. I do appreciate and understand the need for greater openness, so we can speak in a more knowledgeable way about what the ARF has and hasn’t done throughout its long history. I think that, yes, the ARF has been cautious—maybe overly cautious at times—about revealing “meaty information”—in the form of memoirs as well as other sources that may yield insight into the party, its thinking, and its activities. Yes, there was a time, particularly before independence, where with the ARF you were either in or you were out, and if you were in you were privy to significant knowledge, and if you were out, well, read the papers. I do think now those inside-outside distinctions are fading, and it is our hope and intention to increase that fade in a responsible manner over time, so we can have more discussions like this one, in fact.

One other thing that came to mind during your presentation, Dr. Sanjian, was the matter of party orientation. The ARF has meant many things to many people over time, and in different places. In some situations it has been a truly revolutionary party; at other times, a party of state; at times, it has acted as a social movement; for many years in diaspora, it was known as a community-builder, more recently, it has been known for its lobbying activity. Sometimes when you’re trying to juggle all of these different roles, orientation can become a tricky thing. One phase of ARF activity which has been particularly fascinating for me, especially pertaining to this community, has been the 1970s, when the party witnessed a rapid shift in orientation, accompanied by a rapid transition in the life of our communities. For those who can remember, we experienced massive immigration primarily from the Middle East, which changed the demographics of our communities, while the ARF’s own practicing ideology swung dramatically from the right toward the left—going from a pro-American, anti-Soviet stance to a more independent posture inflected in the ideology of national liberation movements across the globe. Within that context, the party’s rhetoric became much steeped in language of demands against Turkey –the modern-day ‘Hai Tahd’ movement –and challenged the status quo of international politics, often displaying sympathy toward the underdogs who engaged in acts of armed struggle. Such developments   are not simply interesting, they offer vital insights into the party’s own reflexes and its continuities and changes over time. While it may be too soon to delve into the archives of this period, certainly the party should be open to a critical examination of periods such as this, as a means toward greater (self)-awareness.

Greg Sarkissian’s presentation, I would say, is probably the most provocative—offering trenchant critiques that sometimes hit the mark, other times miss, and in some cases cross the line from criticism to antagonism. Space doesn’t permit me to respond comprehensively, so allow me to choose several points of particular importance:

With regard to Armenia’s independence and the Karabagh movement, I think it’s quite necessary to evaluate the ARF’s role in the process. No doubt, the ARF made some startling misjudgments as it sought to become a factor in Armenia’s political life. Its bid for the Presidency against Levon Ter-Petrosyan in 1991, in retrospect, must be viewed as premature at the least, folly at worst, as the party assumed that the historic, even mythic place it held in the hearts and minds of Armenians could be translated into results at the polling stations. This clearly was not the case—people voted based on numerous considerations, most of them tied to their daily lives, of which the ARF was not yet a part. And even if, as many claim, the elections were not entirely free or fair, here again the ARF was in no position to contest election rigging, because it was not a factor in the corridors of power where such decisions were being made. Clearly, the party had sought to jump-start its activity in Armenia, only later realizing that it hadn’t gone through the needed preparatory steps—building solid cadres, conducting propaganda work among the people, and much more—to become relevant in a day-to-day sense.

Having said as much, I think Greg has left out some of the ARF’s real accomplishments during this phase –most prominently with respect to Karabagh. Having been there during the war years, I can say with confidence that here the ARF did mesh with local activists, often winning over the best and brightest cadres—the Artur Mkrtchyans, Emil Abrahamyans, Georgi Petrosyans and others—who went on to lead a movement and eventually assumed the reins of power in the fledgling NKR. Proof of the ARF’s influence may be found not only on the battlefield, where the party gave nearly 30 commanders to the war effort, but in the prolonged and at times violent effort of Ter-Petrosyan to unseat it from power, using Robert Kocharian and Serge Sarkisian as his tools.

I also question the comments concerning Armenia’s independence, and the ARF’s stance regarding it. Yes, the ARF had long been the champion of an independent Armenia, and thus should have been mindful of the signals it was sending when it signed the 1988 joint communiqué. But it is wrong to characterize this move as heresy, or as completely incomprehensible. On the contrary, the move was quite comprehensible, when viewed within the political choices available at the time. Specifically, the ARF was following the orientation laid out by Igor Muradyan—early leader of the Karabagh Committee before being ousted by Ter-Petrosyan and Vazgen Manukyan—who warned that in the larger scheme of things, independence would come sooner or later, whereas the Karabagh struggle would prove to be the most intractable of all problems, and the one requiring greatest focus and sacrifice. In the view of Muradyan, the ARF, and quite a few others, Armenia’s political maneuvers had to prioritize Karabagh above all else, meaning that a confrontational posture with Moscow—which still held the strings to Karabagh’s resolution—should be avoided, if at all possible. In this light, the downplaying of Armenia’s cause-as-independence struggle made good sense. In retrospect, of course, it appears that Moscow really had no intention of solving our problem in the manner we had hoped; but at the time, the option sought by the ARF certainly was plausible, if not persuasive, to many.

Finally, with regard to the Zoryan Institute, I’m not sure how much to say, other than that Greg’s opinions differ fundamentally from ours. Suffice it to say that the ARF’s “boycott,” such as it was, was grounded in objections that were real and based on our working experience. Specifically, there were many of us during the late ‘80s/early ‘90s who felt that the Institute had strayed from its mission of academic research and documentation, and instead became a vehicle for the political aspirations of its Director, Jirair Libaridian, a high-ranking party member who resigned from the ARF, then left the Institute to become a policy advisor to Ter-Petrosyan. I can say that eventually, after the Institute and Libaridian parted company, there has been a gradual rapprochement leading to normalization of our relationship with the Institute.

I also wish to thank David Grigoryan for a rugged, unflinching assessment that places genuine challenges before the ARF moving forward. Many of his critiques are true enough; for example, the view that remaining in a coalition with the Kocharian and Sarkisian regimes caused its reputation to suffer among the people. This, I believe, was recognized by the party’s own leadership as we sought, and eventually found, cause to leave the coalition. To be sure, the ARF’s departure was mainly over the Protocols issue, but I can say with some certainty that the party leadership had become increasingly frustrated over our inability to effect real change of the political system from the inside.

One area I would dispute, however, is David’s assessment of the ARF’s role in the Armeno-Turkish Protocols. I do not agree that the ARF’s reaction was “too little, too late”; on the contrary, the party’s strident opposition, especially in diaspora, made an imprint on Armenia’s policymakers, and may have prevented further damage than what was actually done. Moreover, I must say from the inside that the ARF was, in fact, not in the loop on some crucial developments (a fact that also led to our departure from the ruling coalition in Armenia). One example concerns the fateful “roadmap” jointly announced by Armenia and Turkey on April 22, 2009, which offered cover for U.S. President Obama to avoid using the term ‘Genocide’ in his annual April 24 statement. In all frankness, the ARF was blindsided by this announcement—all the more after having received repeated assurances from President Sarkisian that no compromises would be entertained, if at all, until after April 24, in order to allow Obama to meet his campaign promise.

Above all, I’d like to commend David for his call to arms, as he exhorts the ARF to “dust off the revolutionary” and put it to use. Fair enough. But a word of caution is in order here: In Armenia today, those who contest power through confrontation are usually dealt with in kind; in fact, if you really want to change things fundamentally, you’d better be prepared to have your teeth kicked in. That is just the way it is in Armenia and throughout much of the CIS. So I would hope that those who prod the ARF toward such action will, in fact, be there for us during the moment of truth, standing side by side with us, and not behind us, as it were. The party has gone through this phase once before—during the fateful mid-‘90s when it underwent banning, imprisonment, and worse under Ter-Petrosyan, so we know what we are talking about here. In any event, I commend David once again, for having the courage to speak out so boldly, so fundamentally, on our ills and the possible cures for them.

I look forward to many more such exchanges.