Mensoian: Assessing Azerbaijan’s Military Threat to Retake Karabagh (Part I)

The United States director of intelligence, Dennis Blair, in written testimony to a Senate committee has said that “[A]lthough there has been progress in the past year toward Turkey-Armenian rapprochement, this has affected the delicate relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and increases the risk of a renewed conflict over Nagorno-Karabagh.”

This may not be as dire an assessment as suggested. The ability of Karabagh to maintain its independence and “prosper” has vexed and embarrassed the political and military leadership of Azerbaijan for the past 15 years. For all of his public posturing, Azeri President Aliyev’s strident rhetoric only reminds the Azerbaijanis of his ineffectiveness in retaking Karabagh. Karabagh is a fait accompli and the de facto boundary is reorienting the activities and thinking of the people on either side. Frustration and an unwarranted reliance on the numeric superiority of their military arsenal encourages the Azeri leadership’s predilection for a military solution. For obvious reasons, conventional wisdom does not support their publicly expressed confidence that the number of tanks, artillery pieces, or aircrafts determine a nation’s military capability.

The combined military budgets of Karabagh and Armenia cannot come close to achieving parity with Azerbaijan’s expenditures. However, topography, fortifications, and the combat readiness and devotion of its personnel to the cause being defended are the great equalizers for Karabagh. As for the Azerbaijani military, there are problematic areas associated with the rapid expansion of its military forces.

Azerbaijan’s rational for renewing hostilities

A decision by Azerbaijan to seek a military solution would border more on political desperation than on an objective evaluation of its likely success. To have any chance of victory, Azerbaijan would have to mount an operation able to maintain sufficient momentum and willing to accept heavy losses of men and equipment in order to achieve its objectives within a limited window of opportunity measured in days. This would be a political and tactical necessity simply because a protracted conflict would not be in the interests of the international community. Within hours of the first shot being fired, there would be a call for a ceasefire. Given this highly likely possibility, any Azeri operation would have to be well planned with respect to objectives, deployment of troops, real-time coordination on the battlefield, and with sufficient forces in reserve to rapidly exploit any weaknesses in Karabagh’s defenses. These requirements would place a heavy burden on Azerbaijan gaining a military victory.

Problematic areas for Azerbaijan

The likelihood of success under any conceivable scenario would be influenced by several interrelated factors inherent in any rapid expansion of a nation’s military force. Azerbaijan’s rapid expansion would be no exception. Expanding the military establishment requires more than purchasing hardware and increasing the number of men in uniform. Accordingly, problematic areas that would commonly exist include, but are not limited to:

1) The personnel strength, training, and the level of integration of units considered combat-ready on paper that can be reliably deployed;
2) The cadre of officers and noncommissioned officers properly trained to lead these units under combat conditions;
3) creating an operational structure, tested during appropriate field exercises, that integrates and can effectively control and coordinate operations under simulated battlefield conditions;
4) The existence of an effective command structure that has been rigorously “tested” by appropriate field exercises;
5) The capability of the command staff to plan, deploy, support, and maintain real-time evaluation and coordination of battlefield conditions. Turkish officers have been stationed in Azerbaijan as advisors to the Azerbaijani command staff to assist in achieving competence in these vital areas;             5) the decision to absorb, if necessary, heavy losses in 
6) The instilling of loyalty and dedication in its enlisted personnel and junior officers that would sustain them on the battlefield under a range of combat conditions. Within the civilian population there is a palpable disconnect between the small ruling elite/upper class and the remainder of society. It is to be expected that with a rapid military build-up, newly enlisted personnel and junior grade officers would mirror this disconnect lessening their sustained loyalty and reliability in combat situations;
7) The capability of the command staff to effectively respond to a wide range of operations by the Karabagh defense force.

It is obvious that each of these problematic areas, if objectively analyzed, could mitigate against the renewal of hostilities. However, Aliyev is facing considerable popular pressure as well as pressure from the military to regain control of Karabagh. The thought that Artsakh (Karabagh and the liberated territories) could be irretrievably lost if nothing is done is more than sufficient motivation for him to accept the military alternative. However, Azerbaijan and its enabler Turkey must consider that once conflict is renewed, it could easily have unintended consequences affecting the greater Caucasus/Kurdish Anatolian region. Is this a situation that Russia, Iran, the United States, or, for that fact, Turkey would want?

The Azeri command staff officers

Karabagh would have complete dossiers on the general and field grade officers who will plan and execute any military action, as well as detailed information on the order of battle, which includes the strength, command structure, and disposition of personnel, units, and equipment of the Azeri military. This is basic intelligence that all nations compile on potential adversaries. In addition, the topography and the strategic objectives that may be selected limit the operational options available to Azerbaijan and, as expected, Karabagh would be aware of these options as well. The crucial factor for Azerbaijan would be in planning the operation, and the capability of the deployed units to successfully carry out the required tactical maneuvers on the battlefield.

Within the command group, the most senior (and “older”) officers would have served in the Soviet military. Many of the “younger” officers in this group would possibly lack the breadth of training and combat experience that would normally be commensurate with their rank and position. Some would have participated in the Karabagh war of the early 1990’s. It’s to be expected that since the ceasefire, a considerable number of these officers have trained in Turkey and participated in field exercises there. During this same period, Turkish officers have been stationed in Azerbaijan to advise on matters relating to planning, tactical operations, unit deployment, identifying strategic objectives and targets in Karabagh, and logistical operations. The command staff plays a vital role in the conduct of the war and its ultimate outcome. It’s a key component of any military operation. Their competence is part of the intelligence that Karabagh and Armenia would have gathered and evaluated in anticipation of renewed hostilities.

Of equal and possibly greater importance are the company grade officers and the non-commissioned officers (NCO’s) who are the “field generals” in combat and who must quickly respond to rapidly changing conditions on the battlefield. The organizational structure and the combat effectiveness of any military is based on the interrelated concepts of integration and coordination where the smallest unit (squad) supports the next higher unit (platoon) on up to company, battle group, etc. The failure of any unit to advance, seize a specific objective, or hold its assigned position can have serious consequences to the units on its flank or in a rearward position. These units (squad, platoon, company) are the backbone of any military operation on the ground. Their effectiveness is directly related to the training and reliability of their officers and NCO’s, and the loyalty and trust the men have in the competence of these officers and NCO’s to lead and effectively respond to the ever-changing conditions on the battlefield. This is a definite problematic area for the Azerbaijani military.

Azerbaijan’s objectives

With the limited window of opportunity Azerbaijan may expect to have before a ceasefire is demanded by the international community, a full-scale operation in the central sector of the Line of Contact (LoC) at Agdam could be expected. The occupation of Agdam would overshadow the heavy loss of men and equipment that might result, and allow Azerbaijan to claim a public relations victory. From Agdam, their forces would attempt to push toward the settlement of Askeran. At the same time a secondary operation to the south would have Fizuli as its immediate objective. If successful, this operation would attempt to reach the settlements of Hadrut and Martuni. The objective would be to “stretch” the front from Askeran in the north through Martuni to Hadrut. This would put Karabagh’s core area (Stepanakert-Shushi) in a vulnerable position. Obviously, this is an overly optimistic assessment of Azerbaijan’s capability to achieve these objectives against a well-prepared and determined Karabagh defense force.

Part two of “Assessing Azerbaijan’s Military Threat to Retake Karabagh” will consider key factors such as the importance of topography and control of the high ground and mountain passes, and the intangibles of loyalty and dedication that contribute to the superiority of the Karabagh defense force and its ability to protect its independence. How the principal nations with interests in the region will respond to a renewal of hostilities is difficult to determine, but an early call for a ceasefire to prevent a protracted war that could destabilize the region is almost assured.

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Michael Mensoian

Michael Mensoian, J.D./Ph.D, is professor emeritus in Middle East and political geography at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, and a retired major in the U.S. army. He writes regularly for the Armenian Weekly.

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