Co-organized by the State Committee on Work with Diaspora of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Heydar Aliyev Foundation, the 5th Summer Camp of Diaspora Youth took place in Berdzor, or Lachin, (the press release calls this “an ancient Azerbaijani land”) from August 1 to 7, 2024. This year’s theme was “Youth for Green World,” in line with the 2024 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29) being held in Baku, Azerbaijan, this November.
The press release goes on to state that “more than 100 young people,” including diasporan Azerbaijanis and “young members of the peoples having friendly attitude towards [Azerbaijan],” were expected to take part in the summer camp. Participants were between the ages of 18-29 and have “good communication skills” in Azerbaijani. They were selected by application and video interviews.
Azerbaijani Youth Development Strategy for 2015-2025
This camp falls in line with the Azerbaijani Youth Development Strategy for 2015-2025, which aims to ensure the “intellectual, physical and spiritual development of youth and their participation in the socio-economic, public-political and cultural life of the country.” This initiative targets a wide variety of youth, such as “students in higher grades of general education schools and primary specialty education institutions,” “youth studying and working abroad” and “creative and talented youth.”
In practice, the Azerbaijani government’s diaspora engagement initiatives are focused on organizing events that are tailored to members of the diaspora, particularly for “preserving cultural heritage.” The summer camp is a notable example of this. According to the State Committee on Work with Diaspora, the summer camps cover a variety of topics, including “youth policy, conveying Azerbaijan’s realities to the global community, intercultural dialogue, diaspora development, cultural enlightenment, sports and media representation.”
The youth development strategy aims to achieve several goals: “increased education level and number of those studying at vocational schools among youth,” “increased spirit of patriotism of youth,” “enhanced level of employment of young alumni with jobs corresponding to their specialties” and “developing international relations of youth and their relations with youth from countries of priority importance for Azerbaijan.”
On the surface, there is nothing wrong with these goals. The document cites the Commonwealth of Independent States countries, Youth in Action, Erasmus+, the Youth Department of the Council of Europe and EU4Youth (particularly through the EU-Eastern Partnership, which involves youth from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in “policy dialogue and decision-making process”), as examples of international youth cooperation efforts.
However, these goals — that are actualized in this case through a summer camp — are problematic when state-organized events are used in an underhanded manner to promote revisionist history and spread irredentist propaganda. Instead of pursuing “cultural development,” the camp indoctrinates Azerbaijani youth with expansionist ideologies that undermine the purpose of these efforts. Ongoing incursions into Armenia proper prove this to be a common theme.
“By violating Armenia’s sovereignty, Baku has demonstrated that this conflict was never truly about the principle of territorial integrity for Azerbaijan,” wrote Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) Program Director Alex Galitsky in Foreign Policy. “After all, if Azerbaijan’s objectives were limited to territorial control, there would not have been systematic destruction of Armenian cultural heritage sites, the deliberate targeting of civilians and exceedingly inflammatory rhetoric from the regime in Baku seeking to erase the very existence of the Armenian people.”
The embedding of these ideas in state-sponsored youth programs is dangerous, as it disconnects an impressionable audience, the youth, from objective fact, unbiased education, historical evidence and intercultural dialogue. The potential of a Youth Development Strategy is recklessly jeopardized when state narratives take precedence over the truth.
5th Summer Camp of Diaspora Youth
When the 2024 participants arrived, they first visited the grave of Heydar Aliyev at the Alley of Honor in Baku and laid a wreath and flowers at his monument. Heydar Aliyev, the third president of Azerbaijan, was known for his authoritarian and repressive leadership. Elections were rigged and deemed fraudulent by international actors — including the election of his son and current President Ilham Aliyev in 2003, which was heavily manipulated and characterized by ballot stuffing.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) deemed that since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Azerbaijan has never had a “free and fair election.” HRW also stated that Azerbaijani authorities have wholly mobilized in support of current President Aliyev, “waging a campaign of bureaucratic interference and political intimidation against the opposition, making a free and fair pre-election campaign environment impossible.”
In stark contrast, Azerbaijan’s National Assembly (Milli Mejlis) calls the third president “a living legend” and a “rare historic figure occupying a special place in the national history of Azerbaijan.” He has “won the boundless love of the Azerbaijanis all over the world thanks to his unprecedented contribution to the Azerbaijani people’s struggle for independence.”
Following the visit to the Alley of Honor, camp participants visited the first and second Alley of Martyrs, which “honored the memory of the children of the Motherland who were martyred for the independence and territorial integrity of [the] country.”
On the First Lady of Azerbaijan Mehriban Aliyeva’s web page designated for children, an informational page on the Alley of Martyrs states that “here have been buried Azerbaijani and Turkish soldiers who have lost their lives in the battles for the liberation of Baku from Bolshevik-Dashnak occupation in 1918, as well as those Azerbaijanis who have died heroically during the January events of 1990, and in the Garabagh War.”
The website adds that the area is also a “burial place for the victims of the genocide committed by Armenians in 1918 in Baku.” There is no recognized “Azerbaijani genocide,” as the events that occurred post-World War I are generally seen as mutual massacres between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. There is a large-scale Azerbaijani effort to create an equivalency between these events and the Armenian Genocide that began in 1915. In Turkish historian Taner Akçam’s book A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility, he wrote that death figures were “freely invented by the authors,” and the exaggerations of destruction and havoc in the villages in reality referred to a few inhabitants.
The official opening ceremony of the camp began with Azerbaijan’s national anthem, followed by a moment of silence in honor of the martyrs “who sacrificed their lives for the protection, restoration and liberation of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and historical lands.”
Speeches were delivered by special representative of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic in Lachin district Masim Mammadov, Chairman of the State Committee on Work with Diaspora Fuad Muradov, head of the Department of Humanitarian Policy, Diaspora, Multiculturalism and Religious Affairs of the Administration of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic Farah Aliyeva, representative of the Heydar Aliyev Foundation Elvin Aslanov and Deputy Minister of Culture Farid Jafarov.
Committee Chairman Muradov emphasized the importance of holding such a significant gathering in one of Azerbaijan’s “beautiful regions” and praised the Azerbaijani army’s efforts under “victorious” Supreme Commander-in-Chief Ilham Aliyev. He highlighted the swift reconstruction work being carried out in the area following the blockade Azerbaijan imposed on the Berdzor (Lachin) Corridor. He pointed to the critical role of youth in raising international awareness about the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.
Muradov also provided an overview of the State Committee on Work with Diaspora’s projects. He stated that these initiatives are designed to help Azerbaijanis maintain their native language and promote Azerbaijan’s history and culture. He concluded by stating that Azerbaijan’s youth policy is focused on ensuring the development of young people and their “successful fulfillment” of their civic responsibilities, regardless of where they live.
The participants visited various places as part of their excursions, including Gilabi Ceramics center, Hakari Fish Farm and Hochazfilm creative studio — sites that were constructed after Azerbaijan captured the region — as well as Zabukh (Aghavno) village. The press release on this day mentions that the village was “liberated from Armenian occupation on August 26, 2022,” the day after its Armenian inhabitants were forcibly evacuated.
They also visited Khojaly (Ivanyan), Askeran and Shusha (Shushi), “which have been liberated from occupation.” The participants received detailed information about “the atrocities committed by Armenian aggressors against the civilian population 32 years ago, the destruction of historical and architectural monuments, as well as the work done in Khojaly since its liberation.”
In Shushi, they visited the central square of the city, the “Bullet-riddled Statues” monument and the Ganja gate, among others. Shushi was described as an “Armenian stronghold” in a 1725 report by Kehva Chelebi, an early Armenian national activist.
Participants also visited the city of Khankedi, or Stepanakert. In 2023, the Azerbaijani authorities took control of the city by military force, expelling its Armenian population. It is now considered a ghost city. The area was initially an Armenian settlement called Varakan that was renamed Khankedi by Russian authorities. From the 10th-16th centuries, the settlement was a part of the medieval Armenian Principality of Khachen.
In Stepanakert, now-Khankedi, participants visited Karabagh University, meeting the rector, Shahin Bayramov, who said the participants were the first guests of the university. It will be fully operational in the coming academic year, with “more than 1,000 students” expected to be admitted in “6 faculties and 27 majors.” Bayramov expressed hope that the university will become “one of the most modern educational institutions representing Azerbaijani higher education worldwide.” He also announced “his expectations from the diaspora youth, expressing hope that they will support the recognition of Karabakh University in the world and the involvement of foreign students in the coming years.”
After the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive and the mass displacement of Armenians (which have been described by various international law experts as a war crime and/or a crime against humanity), Karabakh University was appropriated by the Azerbaijan Ministry of Education. The building was the former Artsakh State University, which was the “main and the biggest university” in the area which “[prepared] specialists in 28 categories” and had “established close ties with higher educational establishments in Armenia and other countries,” according to the State Building: Progress Toward Freedom, Democracy, and Economic Development document from the Office of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic.
At the camp, a meeting surrounding the irredentist idea of “Western Azerbaijan” also took place. The meeting was attended by Galib Gasimov, head of the Office of the Western Azerbaijan Community, along with Community members Sanan Ahmed and Anar Irzaguliyev. Also present was Dr. Afshan Shafiyeva, a researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of ANAS and an associate professor with a doctorate in history. The session was moderated by Esmira Khalilova, a representative from the State Committee on Work with Diaspora.
Gasimov discussed “the Return Concept.” According to the Western Azerbaijani Community, Azerbaijani historical and cultural heritage were “destroyed on a large scale, toponyms were changed and systematic racial discrimination was carried out against Azerbaijanis.” According to an official report, because “the Armenian government has committed large-scale and systematic violence against the Azerbaijani population due to their ethnicity, the Community does not trust this country in security matters, and therefore, considers the deployment of an international security mission with an appropriate mandate and comprised of the forces of countries trusted by Western Azerbaijanis in the areas to be returned to as an essential condition.” Therefore, to ensure security, they would rely on a threat assessment provided by the government of Azerbaijan.
Western Azerbaijan — or Qərbi Azərbaycan — is an irredentist and revisionist concept frequently referenced by the Azerbaijani government. President Aliyev has gone on the record multiple times claiming that modern Armenian lands, including capital city Yerevan, are historically Azerbaijani, such as in 2015, when he stated, “I have repeatedly said that present-day Armenia, the territory called the Republic of Armenia on the map, is an ancient Azerbaijani land. This is true. Certainly, Zangezur, Irevan khanate are our lands!” These expansionist claims, debunked by historians, have been pushed by the government — increasingly so since the end of the 2020 war.
Generally speaking, the purpose of propaganda is to sow distrust amongst people and make it difficult to see the truth. In Azerbaijan, a core tenant of propaganda begins with the youth. According to Freedom House, Azerbaijan is ranked a 7/100 (“not free” designation) in global freedom, 37/100 (“not free” designation) in internet freedom, and 1/100 (“consolidated authoritarian regime” designation) in nations in transit.
In 2018, when the inaugural First Summer Camp of the Diaspora Youth took place in honor of the centenary of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, a declaration was written by the “140 young representatives of 50 million Azerbaijanis” that participated in the camp. One of the points in the declaration urged “the Armenian youth of the world to influence the return of the occupied Azerbaijani lands by the Armenian state in order to ensure peace and prosperity in the Caucasus region and not to let the youth fall victims to the war.”
This irredentist propaganda — as well as revisionist and expansionist concepts — are rooted in pan-Turkic territorial ambitions. Both the European Parliament and Council of Europe have condemned these claims.
A documentary called “A Close Look at Western Azerbaijan” was then screened at the camp showcasing the “historical-architectural monuments, geography and natural beauty of Western Azerbaijan.” A presentation was conducted regarding the “history and altered toponyms of Western Azerbaijan.”
The speakers also stated that the destruction of the ethnic presence of Azerbaijanis “who lived for millennia in the historical Azerbaijani lands, current territory of Armenia, and the destruction of their cultural heritage was a state policy of Armenians.” They highlighted the importance of the Azerbaijani diaspora’s role in “conveying the history, culture and truths of Western Azerbaijan to the international community.”
The Azerbaijani government is preparing the foundation for a future generation that sees claims to Armenian territory as both a birthright and a moral obligation.
Historical Revisionism and “Western Azerbaijan”
On the surface, there is nothing wrong with a summer camp for Azerbaijani youth. Summer camps can play a significant role in helping adolescents establish a sense of identity and belonging — when used correctly. They offer young people an opportunity to become immersed in their traditions, language and history in an intimate setting, often for the first time. They can help foster relationships among peers who have similar life experiences and pride in one’s cultural background. Under the best circumstances, these camps promote diversity, inclusivity and an enhanced awareness of the challenges associated with maintaining a cultural identity in an increasingly interconnected world.
That being said, it is concerning that these events are being employed to advance a nationalist and revisionist agenda. While cultural education runs the risk of losing its intended purpose when combined with a contentious political narrative, it is very difficult to do so. Political narratives are printed in history books around the world, as sometimes the two are intertwined and can prove to be factually correct. These Azerbaijani youth camps could evolve into hotbeds of ideological indoctrination rather than foster a positive attitude toward cultural heritage. These camps provide children with a distorted view of history by presenting them with biased narratives that paint neighboring nations as historical adversaries.
Considering that children and teenagers are particularly vulnerable to receiving and internalizing the ideologies taught by those in authority, the indoctrination of youth through such camps can have enduring consequences. Adolescents are still forming their values and views in this formative period of life, and educators, community leaders and state-sponsored programs can have a significant impact. In Azerbaijan, summer camp is more than just a cultural getaway; it is a tool used by the government to shape the next generation of leaders under a political agenda. The immersive environment of camp, where kids are shielded from outside influences and submerged in a meticulously constructed narrative, could accelerate the indoctrination process. This presents moral questions regarding the political manipulation of youth — in Azerbaijan, for the purpose of creating advocates of territorial expansionism masquerading as cultural preservation.
Similar techniques are employed in more visibly dramatic cases, such as by cults, who cut off members from the outside world to create a dependency relationship. Isolation creates a steady, greater level of control.
The camp’s promotion of the “Western Azerbaijan” narrative is not only perilous on a strategic level, but also historically contentious. It is part of an overall strategy to shape young Azerbaijanis’ historical memory, instilling in them a sense of historical animosity and a conviction in the validity of territorial claims to historically Armenian lands. The Azerbaijani government is preparing the foundation for a future generation that sees claims to Armenian territory as both a birthright and a moral obligation. This idea — which has its roots in an inaccurate portrayal of history — can result in an uncompromising position under which any attempt to educate oneself or agree with the “other” side is seen as a betrayal of the interests of the nation at large. The ideologies entrenched in adolescents follow them as they mature and assume responsibilities in society.
For example, Shirin Huseynzade, a participant from Montenegro in the 5th Summer Camp of Diaspora Youth, said she had always dreamed of “seeing the occupied lands since childhood.” She showed a picture she drew of Shushi at age 7, expressing her “joy” and “[congratulating] everyone on the occasion of the return of [their] native Karabakh and Shusha, has wished mercy to [Azerbaijan’s] martyrs and good health to […] veterans.”
There is a serious risk to the stability of the region as a whole as well as to the youth involved when cultural education is manipulated for political purposes. In order to prevent division and violence, the international community should acknowledge the risks associated with “youth development” measures like the camp and instead promote educational initiatives that advance historical truth, understanding and reliable political advocacy.
Melody Seraydarian
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