Over the past few weeks, security events have dramatically accelerated Israel’s aggression on Lebanon. On October 8, 2023, Hezbollah, a paramilitary political party in Lebanon (also known as the Islamic Resistance) backed by Iran, opened a front against Israel to assist Hamas in its conflict with Israel following its “al-Aqsa Storm” operation. The Lebanese front remained “managed” as Israel and Hezbollah engaged in limited clashes.
This equation changed starting on September 17, 2024. Along with its fight against Hamas and the destruction of Gaza, Israel shifted its focus to Hezbollah and started bombing Lebanon, destroying the party’s infrastructure in southern Beirut, South Lebanon and Beqaa near the border with Syria. First Israel detonated Hezbollah’s communication means. Then it assassinated its military officials and later killed its leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah. In 10 days, Israel eliminated Hezbollah’s entire leadership pyramid and even targeted potential candidates who would have replaced the old leaders.
It is worth mentioning that although Western media focuses on the military and security dimensions of the war, which it describes as a war “against Hezbollah,” thus far more than 2,000 Lebanese civilians have been killed, including children, women, civil defense units and medical staff. In addition, villages and neighborhoods in the southern suburbs of Beirut and bordering areas have been entirely razed to the ground.
Israel has made clear that its military objectives go beyond liquidating Hezbollah’s leaders, as analysts and officials from Israel hint that this war may be expanded. It is unclear how its outcome will shape domestic politics in Lebanon and regional politics in the Middle East. I will shed light on the regional dimension of the conflict, the dynamics of the war between Israel and Hezbollah and possible scenarios as the escalation takes the form of a war of attrition.
Regional dimension of the escalation
When it comes to the Middle East, there is almost a total convergence of interests between the United States and Israel. Washington, as Israel’s main security ally, views Tel Aviv (along with allies such as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi) as a strategic foothold to maintain connectivity and dominance between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. Despite rhetoric that presents Washington as a credible mediator, the U.S. is deeply involved in the Israeli agenda. For example, Amos Hochstein, the U.S. envoy for the Lebanon-Israel dossier, served in the IDF at the time of Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon. The U.S. presidential elections won’t change this strategy; Washington will continue to back Israel in its conflict with Hezbollah, which is designated by the U.S. as a terrorist organization.
Following the October 7 attacks by Hamas, the EU expressed strong support for Israel, particularly concerning Iranian strikes in April and October 2024. However, with few exceptions — such as Germany’s arms export freeze to Israel — the EU has been unwilling to leverage its economic and political influence to pressure Israel to de-escalate in both Palestine and Lebanon. This has created frustration among many civil society groups, individuals and parties who used to oppose Hezbollah or Hamas’ policies in their countries. Notwithstanding European states’ involvement in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and consistent security and political engagement in Lebanon, the EU has not emerged as an effective diplomatic actor in the conflict with Israel.
Meanwhile, Russia has criticized Israel’s operations in Lebanon and considers them acts of terrorism. Moscow views Israel’s actions as aiming to expand the conflict and draw in the U.S. by provoking Hezbollah. Moscow regards Lebanon “as an extension of its regional policy towards Syria,” as instability in Lebanon may further destabilize the situation in Syria as Israel constantly bombs Iranian targets in the country. The Kremlin “sympathizes” with the “Axis of Resistance” groups, “not because they are against Israel, but because they are against the West,” according to political analyst Kamran Gasanov. While Russia maintains its alliance with Iran, it is unlikely to take direct action against Israel, given that there is no direct hostility between the two nations. In case of an all-out war between Hezbollah and Israel or the possibility of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf by Iran, rising oil prices will nonetheless benefit Russia. This scenario could also release pressure on Russia’s war in Ukraine, since Western arms would be redirected to Tel Aviv.
Despite strong financial and high-tech relations with Tel Aviv, China has adopted a critical stance against Israel in the intensification of the war with Hezbollah. The escalation threatens regional stability and Chinese interests, as the Persian Gulf and the Middle East supply about half of China’s oil imports. Due to China’s inadequate mediation capacity between Israel and Hezbollah, it hopes that U.S. popularity wanes post-conflict in the Middle East, so as to enable Beijing to enter the region’s markets more favorably.
The regional dynamics escalated rapidly on October 1 when Iran launched ballistic missiles at Israel. Although this attack was more decisive than the one in April, the way it was carried out reveals that Tehran intends to reestablish a certain level of deterrence against Israel without completely closing off its exits from escalation. The Iranian attack emphasized the earthquake that Tehran’s involvement in a conflict could cause in the region. At the same time, Iran is trying to eschew further open conflict with Israel by leveraging diplomatic channels to exert pressure and revive nuclear negotiations to address its ailing economy.
All these positions hint that a ceasefire is not on the horizon, and the war may be prolonged, thus further damaging Lebanon’s infrastructure and killing more civilians.
Another war of attrition
Israel’s war on Lebanon may turn into another war of attrition in the region. A war between a conventional force and a guerilla organization usually takes a longer and bloodier path. A regular army engages in combined arms units including infantry, armor, artillery and air force. In this case, Israel has air and technological superiority compared to Hezbollah. The latter as a guerilla organization engages in small unit tactics, involving ambush and sabotage tactics and the launching of missiles and drones. After the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah and other top military leaders, Hezbollah continued launching rocket attacks deep into Israel and even launched an Iranian-made ballistic missile at Tel Aviv near Mossad’s headquarters. It is worth mentioning that after the 2006 war, Hezbollah created a form of deterrence called “balance of fear” against Israel. Henceforth, whenever Israel violated the 1701 UNSC resolution calling for a ceasefire and bombed a Lebanese border village, Hezbollah would retaliate and launch a missile at an Israeli border village. Both sides would manage the conflict with measured responses.
This deterrence was successfully or even partially maintained from August 2006 until the recent attacks in mid-September 2024, as Israel targeted top Hezbollah military officials and engaged in cyber terror attacks critically damaging the party’s communication means. After inflicting partial damage to Hezbollah’s infrastructure and eliminating its top leadership, Israel now aims to force the party to accept a new equation on the ground. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s cabinet is well aware that it cannot destroy the popular resistance group by air raids. Therefore, Israel aims to launch a full-scale ground invasion to force Hezbollah to accept new terms. For now, Hezbollah is preventing further incursions and inflicting damage on Israeli forces attempting to cross the border.
Israel’s military and political objectives amid its war with Hezbollah are the following: return Israeli settlers back to the north and create a buffer zone in south Lebanon below the Litani River. Israelis are aware that air raids are not enough to impose these objectives. Still, a ground invasion is a costly scenario, as the 2006 invasion showed that, unlike Gaza, south Lebanon is mountainous, and guerrilla fighters prefer to battle in caves, mountains and villages to inflict material and psychological damage. Hence, even if the Israeli army pushes deep into south Lebanon, it will be difficult to maintain its supply lines as Hezbollah fighters will sabotage these lines and create panic and losses for the Israeli side. Hence, Hezbollah will push Israel for a ground battle to inflict as much damage as possible and force the Israeli side to start ceasefire negotiations.
However, Israel’s land invasion of Lebanon will not be a “tourist walk.” In a military brief published by the Financial Times, Andrew England and John Paul Rathbone raised key arguments on why a land invasion is a costly and risky scenario for the Israeli side. First, Israel’s invasion of South Lebanon could trigger regional conflict. Second, Israel’s military and political objectives are unclear, with some officials aiming to destroy Hezbollah, others to secure a buffer zone, and extremists calling for occupation and settlements in south Lebanon. Third, it could negate Israel’s air superiority, as Hezbollah will push Israel to cross the border and inflict damage to recreate the balance of power lost after the recent assassinations. Fourth, enforcing a buffer zone in the south will be challenging, as Hezbollah over the past two decades has built extensive tunnels and will engage in guerilla warfare against Israeli infantry, thus inflicting material and psychological damage. Fifth, Hezbollah will continue launching missiles, some with a 250 km range, thus continuing to target Israeli cities.
Different scenarios on the table
Israel may have many options on the table to enforce its will on Lebanon.
The main ambitious objective is to disarm Hezbollah and create a buffer zone below the Litani River, just like in 1982 when the Israeli army invaded the south and pushed towards Beirut. Israel may revise the UNSC 1701 resolution, which was adopted in the 2006 war and called for the deployment of the Lebanese army and U.N. peacekeeping forces in the south.
In a “message” to the Lebanese people, PM Netanyahu made clear his war strategy for Lebanon by giving them two choices: either to start a civil war and disarm Hezbollah by force themselves or to face the scenario of Gaza and be destroyed. However, disarming Hezbollah is beyond Lebanese capabilities. The war on Lebanon now has been linked to the fronts in Gaza, Yemen and the escalation between Tehran and Tel Aviv. Any possible conflict resolution in Lebanon (from the Israeli and Iranian perspectives) is linked to de-escalation in the region. Lebanon can be one of the details of a major regional crisis. Hence, the war may take longer than expected and become a war of attrition.
The second option would be to implement UNSC 1701 and for the Lebanese army to increase its deployment near the border with Israel. International pressure would increase on Israel to withdraw from Lebanon and agree to a ceasefire. It is worth mentioning that 1701 calls for the “disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so there will be no weapons or authority in the country other than that of the Lebanese state.” It also calls for “no foreign forces in Lebanon” to be deployed without the consent of the Lebanese government. The question is, can Lebanon enforce this resolution peacefully and through internal dialogue?
Amid these two difficult scenarios, we can conclude the following. As Hezbollah is avoiding expanding the geographical scope of the war and engaging in limited retaliation, Israeli leadership may sense this as a sign of weakness and announce a full-scale invasion. The asymmetry on the ground in the short-term and the failure (or even reluctance) of the Western powers to impose a ceasefire will only make things worse and lead to a long war of attrition. The outcome of this war will depend on the regional arrangements and backchannel negotiations between Iran and the U.S. (although on October 15, Iran halted its indirect talks with the U.S.), most probably after the U.S. presidential elections. As regional and international actors negotiate and the political map of the Middle East is redrawn, Lebanon will once again become a victim of the region’s chessboard.
Yeghia Tashjian
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Lebanon, like Armenia, surrounded by predatorial powers, is a victim of its geography and is practically cursed. Both countries are in a worse predicament than Poland, which was in the same situation for centuries, but recovered, when most of its neighbors became civilized and its neighborhood peaceful, and is protected as a NATO member and is prospering as a EU member. With Lebanon and Armenia, such a happy outcome looks at this stage like a fantasy. And Lebanon used to be a prosperous, relatively stable and safe country, until its denominational conflicts and powerful aggressive neighbors caused the Lebanese Civil War, reducing that country to ruins.
The Lebanese Armenians, as well as the Syrian and Iraqi Armenians, must be the unluckiest in the Armenian Diaspora, having survived and fled the Armenian Genocide, ending up in these three countries, only to flee again, when they turned into war zones and hellholes.
I know its difficult for the Lebanese Armenians but if I was there I would immediately move to Armenia .
If Israel moves in lebanon on a full scale war they will not hesitate to bomb all of Beyrouth , and they could care less if they bomb the Armenian section under the pretext that they were arab terrorists there. Remember Israel send their drones to the Azeri to kick out the armenians from Artsakh.
Yes, indeed. Israel is bombing central Beirut and its Christian districts, and even Christian towns and villages north of Beirut, on the pretext that Hezbollah militants escaped to hide there, stash their weapons and entrench themselves. Since Israel is bombing these areas indiscriminately, hundreds of Lebanese civilians have been killed, including Christians in predominantly Christian districts of Beirut and in Christian towns and villages. Since 95% of the 150,000 Lebanese Armenians live in the extremely densely populated 2.5 sqkm Bourj Hammoud district in northeastern Beirut, they are in serious danger of becoming victims of Israeli bombardments and also of a potential Second Lebanon Civil War, because Lebanon is on the brink of collapse. It is very hard for Lebanese Armenians to leave everything behind and also because of poverty, but having astonishingly barely survived the Lebanese Civil War thanks to maintaining strict neutrality, the second time they may not be so “lucky”, and should escape Lebanon when they can find the opportunity.
Sometimes war comes to ones home regardless of whether one personality agitated for conflict. Indeed there were some Syrian Armenians displaced by the war there who had gone to Armenia and were granted land in NK and surrounding parts of Azerbaijan under Armenian control rendered refugees once again. Israel being no friend of Armenia and currently on the warpath isn’t going to be sentimental towards the Armenian population in Lebanon either even if not focusing on them.