Antalya Diplomatic Forum highlights key challenges in South Caucasus peace process

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Hakan Fidan on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomatic Forum, March 1, 2024 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia)

YEREVAN—A panel discussion titled “Peace, Development and Connectivity in the South Caucasus” held at the Antalya Diplomatic Forum brought together key representatives from Armenia, Turkey, Azerbaijan and the European Union. The discussion shed light on the diverse perspectives and challenges surrounding peace efforts in the region. 

The Antalya Diplomatic Forum, an international conference on diplomacy hosted by Turkey, was held from March 1-3. Among the participants in the panel discussion were Ruben Rubinyan, the Deputy Speaker of the Armenian National Assembly; Serdar Kilic, Turkey’s representative for Armenian-Turkish normalization; Hikmet Hajiyev, foreign policy advisor to the president of Azerbaijan; and Toivo Klaar, the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia.

Rubinyan, the special representative for Armenian-Turkish normalization, emphasized Armenia’s commitment to peace and constructive dialogue. He highlighted Armenia’s sovereignty regarding its constitution and legislation and expressed concerns about Azerbaijan’s willingness to uphold agreed principles. He stressed the importance of operating infrastructure under sovereign conditions and Armenia’s readiness to implement agreements, including reopening the Armenia-Turkey border.

Kilic acknowledged the sensitivity and complexity of regional negotiations. He emphasized the need to build mutual trust and take the lead on regional solutions rather than rely on external impositions. He expressed readiness to engage in dialogue with Armenia, even suggesting holding future meetings in Yerevan.

Hajiyev asserted Azerbaijan’s position following what he called the resolution of the Artsakh conflict. He accused Armenia of perpetuating a confrontational approach along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. Hajiyev also rejected external intervention in the process from global actors. He highlighted Azerbaijan’s expectation that Armenia address concerns regarding Azerbaijani enclaves in Armenia. 

Klaar underscored the EU’s expectation for Turkey’s involvement as a regional leader to facilitate communication channels in the South Caucasus. He emphasized the EU’s commitment to achieving peace in the region and the importance of de-blocking borders, including the connection between Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhichevan. He reiterated the EU’s long-term engagement in promoting stability and security in the South Caucasus.

Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ararat Mirzoyan provided updates on Armenia’s ongoing normalization efforts with Azerbaijan, reaffirming Armenia’s commitment to mutual recognition of territorial integrity and transparency in the delimitation process. He also presented Armenia’s “Crossroads of Peace” proposal, which would unlock regional transport routes and infrastructure, highlighting its economic benefits and investment opportunities for regional cooperation.

Mirzoyan met with Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan to discuss comprehensive normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey and explore practical measures for this process.

Turkologist Gevorg Galtakyan argued that the meeting yielded significant statements. Galtakyan highlighted Hajiyev’s remarks, focusing on Turkey’s perception of Mount Ararat as a territorial claim. Kilic also made noteworthy comments, suggesting that Armenia is responsible for the stalemate in Armenian-Turkish border negotiations. Galtakyan speculated that this deadlock might be linked to the recent controversy surrounding the installation of the Nemesis statue.

However, Galtakyan noted some diplomatic missteps, particularly from the Armenian side. He pointed out Rubinyan’s lack of diplomatic finesse during discussions, citing an instance in which Rubinyan seemingly oversimplified the complex process of border opening between Armenia and Turkey.

Galtakyan also underscored Klaar’s statements, indicating the collective Western and Turkish efforts to enhance Turkey’s role in the South Caucasus while minimizing Russian influence. He suggested that Armenia should adopt a more introspective approach, prioritizing its own interests over those of external powers.

Despite Armenia’s presence at the diplomatic forum, Galtakyan lamented the absence of Armenian-centric discussions on the agenda. The forum, attended by over 20 heads of states, 90 ministers and numerous representatives of international organizations, provided a platform for crucial diplomatic exchanges, with Armenia’s delegation, led by Mirzoyan, also participating in the discussions.

Efforts begun in 2023 towards signing a treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as indicated by various official statements from Yerevan, Baku and international leaders, have yet to materialize. The failure to reach an agreement has shed light on the entrenched divisions and unresolved conflicts in the region. Particularly, the latter half of last year illustrated that the Aliyev administration remains committed to its policy of extracting concessions from Armenia and imposing its will, rather than seeking genuine reconciliation.

According to the chairman of Voskanapat Center for Strategic Research, Hrant Melik-Shahnazaryan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev appears in no rush to expedite negotiations, having already asserted control over Artsakh and displaced its Armenian population. With minimal obstacles standing in his way, Aliyev perceives the situation as largely favorable for Azerbaijan, confident that time is on his side.

On the other hand, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who frequently speaks of an era of peace, also exhibits reluctance to sign a treaty hastily. Pashinyan’s hesitation stems from various concerns, including fears that an agreement may lead to diminished international support for Armenia and domestic backlash due to perceived unfavorable terms.

Melik-Shahnazaryan argued that both Aliyev and Pashinyan seem content to prolong the negotiation process, albeit for different reasons. They aim to garner the support of the international community and their respective societies, while avoiding initiatives that could jeopardize their political agendas.

The recent engagement in “letter negotiations,” wherein Azerbaijan forwarded recommendations and corrections regarding a potential treaty to Armenia, underscores the disparity in interests between the two sides. According to opposition MPs, Armenia’s interests are not adequately represented in these discussions.

However, the complexities of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict extend beyond the personal agendas of Aliyev and Pashinyan. Geopolitical considerations, particularly the involvement of Russia, the West and other regional powers, significantly influence the dynamics of the conflict.

For Russia and the West, the South Caucasus holds strategic importance in their respective geopolitical agendas. The region serves as a battleground for their competing interests, with each vying for influence and control. Russia aims to maintain and enhance its influence in the post-Soviet space, often at the expense of Armenia’s interests, while the West seeks to diminish Russia’s presence in the region.

Moreover, the issue of communication infrastructure further complicates the geopolitical landscape. Turkey, alongside Azerbaijan, has emerged as a key player in this arena, offering proposals that could potentially alter the balance of power in the region.

The Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiation process and the prospects for a peace treaty are intricately tied to broader geopolitical dynamics. Until the conclusion of ongoing geopolitical competitions, Armenia and Azerbaijan may remain beholden to the interests of larger powers. Nonetheless, the experiences of Aliyev and Pashinyan highlight the critical importance of national leadership and strategic vision in navigating complex negotiations. 

Hoory Minoyan

Hoory Minoyan

Hoory Minoyan was an active member of the Armenian community in Los Angeles until she moved to Armenia prior to the 44-day war. She graduated with a master's in International Affairs from Boston University, where she was also the recipient of the William R. Keylor Travel Grant. The research and interviews she conducted while in Armenia later became the foundation of her Master’s thesis, “Shaping Identity Through Conflict: The Armenian Experience.” Hoory continues to follow her passion for research and writing by contributing to the Armenian Weekly.
Hoory Minoyan

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4 Comments

  1. Armenia failure was not to offer meaningful settlement in the 1990s and stalled in the meantime the balance of power shifted to Azerbaijan who had been playing the long game.

    • The failure of the patriotic leadership of victorious Armenia in 1990s was not to force the enemy into capitulation and integrating liberated Artsakh, an ancient Armenian province, with Armenia which would then bring Artsakh under Russian protection by treaty as well. Not that we needed the Russian protection at the time because we had destroyed the enemy capabilities and had the upper hand but for the mere fact that sine Russia was obligated to protect Armenia’s borders, Artsakh would have been protected as well once it became an integral part of Armenia and found itself within the new borders of Armenia. In any event, Russia is there, supposedly that is, to act as a deterrent against our Turkish enemy to the west, a NATO member thus also a Russian enemy by association, and they are not there to do anything in regards to our enemy to the east, not to mention they helped create it in the first place, and I’m sure we could and still can take care of them on our own.

      Something else our short-sighted leaders failed to do was to populate liberated territories from all over the world. I would have brought at least half a million diaspora Armenians, from the Middle East in particular, into Artsakh and surrounding regions, give them free land to set roots and conduct business in return for each family giving one soldier to the Armenian armed forces. That would have doubled our fighting men and also send a message to the enemy we are here to stay!

  2. The should be a public inquiry into Armenian government conduct why did Armenia cite union with Arktash in its declaration of independence and constitutional text yet only ever recognised the inhabitants right of self determination, the bare minimum of political support? Why does Armenia only recognise Israel when Israel has shown itself to be consistently hostile perhaps there’s the Armenian community in Israel especially Jerusalem to factor in yet Israel buddy Azerbaijan recognises Palestine although this is probably a sop to the Muslim mob and it’s credentials with other Muslim countries even Georgia recognises Palestine. Also As the Soviet Union which Armenia was part of recognised Palestine in 1988 presumably Armenia choose not to continue? Also the church schism from the Soviet era why hadn’t the church in America been brought back into concordance with the church in Armenia even the Russian orthodox church in exile reunited three years after the end of the Soviet Union. It seems doing nothing is a national trait

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