Azerbaijan’s new shopping list
Since the launch of the first Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) war in the 1990s, the region’s status has been at the core of the conflict. This issue was the primary focus of negotiations and different settlement options put forward by the OSCE Minsk Group—package solution, phased approach, Common State, Key West, Kazan document, Lavrov plan—which all tried to find a mutually acceptable solution for the status of Artsakh. At the end of the day, Azerbaijan decided to solve this issue by military force. Azerbaijan probably came to this decision in the early 2000s, hoping it could get more by deploying military force than by any negotiated solutions. Azerbaijan was cautiously waiting for the geopolitical window of opportunity, which appeared in 2020 as a combination of the COVID-19 pandemic, elections in the U.S. and growing misperceptions of Armenia-Russia relations after the 2018 Velvet Revolution.
The 2020 Artsakh War has significantly changed the balance of power in the region. It underscored Turkey’s growing role and influence and simultaneously resulted in the deployment of Russian peacekeepers to Artsakh. However, it did not solve the issue of status, as despite losing a significant part of its territory, the self-proclaimed Artsakh Republic continued its existence. Azerbaijan was clear that it would not tolerate the existence of the Artsakh Republic and would use force, if necessary, to finish with it. Baku was waiting for another window of opportunity, and it soon arrived, first in the form of the Russia-Ukraine war and then through Armenia’s recognition of Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan in October 2022, May and July 2023. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a new offensive against Artsakh and, within 10 days, forced the entire Armenian population to leave the area. The President of the Republic of Artsakh signed a decree on the dissolution of the republic by the end of 2023, albeit the legal aspects of that decree can be debated, and President Samvel Shahramanyan himself stated that no decree could dissolve the state established by the people.
Already a subscriber?Log in here
This story is FREE for you...
Create a free account to access this and four more articles, and get more sent to you with our e-newsletter.By submitting your email address you agree for Hairenik Association, Inc. to send you communication by email.
Yet how can Azerbaijan even use the excuse of territorial integrity to justify an attack on the enclaves, as it both occupies a nearby Armenian enclave and would be violating Armenia’s territorial integrity by sending its military through to capture the enclaves. Of course it will try to do both these things, but in these cases it has absolutely no way of appealing to “international law” and “territorial integrity” as it usually does. It just wants to have its cake and eat it too.
My impression is that if Azerbaijan gets anywhere near those eight enclaves, it will mean the end of Armenia as we know it. Armenia will then resemble the swiss cheese that is now the West Bank of Palestine. Therefore I think that Armenia should do two things a) shut down any talk about enclaves- it’s a redline for Armenia and off the table and b) accelerate the build up of Armenian defense forces and Armenian economy/society. It is also clear that Azerbaijan has no intention of signing a peace treaty, nor Turkey has any intention of opening the border anytime soon. As an aside, I am frustrated with Pashinyan’s “peace agenda” when he obviously has no peace partner. Everytime he talks about peace and recognizing Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, he is merely reinforcing the view that Armenia is weak. The movement of the scrap metal smelter plant from the border region of Yeraskh because Armenia could not ensure its security proves the point. It would be much better if he focused on rallying the people of Armenia and diaspora.