WikiLeaks: Azeri, Turkish Diasporas Attempt to Form ‘Single Organism’

At a forum held in Baku in March 2007, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said the Azerbaijani and Turkish diasporas must function “as a single organism.” The forum’s goal was to create “dialogue and cooperation” and an outputting of unified efforts and initiatives, in large part to counter the weight of the Armenian Diaspora. U.S. ambassadors in Ankara and Baku took interest in the event, drafting reports released by WikiLeaks in recent weeks, with one ambassador concluding: “They [the Turkish and Azerbaijani diasporas] have a long way to go.”

Azeri, Turkish Diasporas Attempt to Form ‘Single Organism’

The “Forum of World Azerbaijani and Turkish Diaspora Organizations” sought to establish “an organized counterbalance to the influence of the Armenian diaspora worldwide,” wrote U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Ross Wilson in a cable titled “Turk-Azeri Diaspora Takes Aim at Armenian Diaspora.” According to two embassy cables, the forum drew 513 participants, including businessmen, politicians, and leaders representing various diaspora organizations in 48 countries.

Aliyev, Turkish Prime Minister Reccep Tayyip Erdogan, and the leader of “The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” Mehmet Ali Talat, attended the forum’s opening ceremony.

In his speech, Aliyev said the Azeri diaspora must be active in its host countries both politically and in the business sphere, and highlighted the importance of disseminating the Azeri historical narrative. “All NGOs acting abroad must establish very serious cooperation,” he said. “I repeat, this must be coordinated with members of the government and parliament. We must necessarily do it if we want our voice to be heard and the problems worrying us to be settled rapidly.”

A “key part” of Aliyev’s speech “dealt with the challenges posed to Azerbaijan and Turkey by the ‘well-organized Armenian lobby’ and the Armenian diaspora’s ‘big financial resources,’” reported the Embassy in Baku. “Aliyev noted that Azerbaijan and Turkey have had to face the onslaught of Armenian propaganda, slander, and distortion of historical facts,” the embassy added.

U.S. Ambassador to Baku Anne Derse noted that “independent commentators” supported the forum’s goals and “emphasized the need to counter the Armenian diaspora’s influence.” Forum participants signed the “Baku Declaration,” which expressed the goal of unifying the efforts of both diasporas. According to the embassy in Ankara, participants adopted two other resolutions: a “Joint Strategy on the Activities of the Azerbaijani and Turkish diaspora organizations,” and an “Appeal to the Turkic-speaking Peoples.”

Despite Gokce’s assertions, Ambassador Wilson concluded that “the forum’s aim is clear: both the Turks and Azeris want to beat the powerful Armenian diaspora organizations at their own game. The evidence indicates they have a long way to go.”

One of the cables observed how most local commentators supported the forum’s aims, even the individuals with opposing viewpoints, approving efforts that counter the work of Armenian lobby groups.

An official from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Suleyman Gokce, said the forum was not aimed at isolating the Armenian government or wholly directed to offset the Armenian Diaspora’s influence. However, he expressed his concern at the increased level of “influence and power” that the Armenian Diaspora has in Armenia’s politics. Meanwhile, Ambassador Derse remarked that “The GOAJ [government of Azerbaijan], as well as broader Azerbaijani society, believe that the Armenia lobby has undermined Azerbaijan’s relations with other countries, including the United States.”

More than two years after the forum convened, a third cable—titled “Azerbaijan’s Diaspora Small, Not Politically Active”—shed light on developments in the Azeri diaspora. U.S. Embassy Charge d’Affaires Donald Lu, in answering a list of questions, noted that although the Azeri diaspora was not active in Azerbaijani or U.S. politics, two groups had recently formed: “one pro-government and one pro-democracy.”

Overall, Azerbaijan’s diaspora is “poorly organized” and “cannot truly be described as an identifiable community,” wrote Lu, remarking on the GOAJ’s recent efforts at outreach “as a way to counter the much larger Armenian diaspora in the United States and Europe.” Their efforts are “almost entirely” dedicated to lobbying host countries to change positions on Nagorno-Karabagh, he said.

Their main recruitment route has been the U.S. Azeris Network (www.usazeris.org), “which also works closely with the Turkish Coalition of America,” Lu said. “While not exactly ‘peace-building,’ the organization does call for the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict within the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. The organization also campaigns against any recognition on a state or federal level of the Armenian ‘genocide.’”

Below are the three U.S. Embassy cables.

US embassy cable – 07ANKARA641

TURK-AZERI DIASPORA TAKES AIM AT ARMENIAN DIASPORA

Identifier:

07ANKARA641

Origin:

Embassy Ankara

Created:

2007-03-21 12:05:00

Classification:

CONFIDENTIAL

Tags:

PREL PGOV AM AJ TU

Redacted:

This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2022

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, AM, AJ, TU

SUBJECT: TURK-AZERI DIASPORA TAKES AIM AT ARMENIAN DIASPORA

 

REF: A. ANKARA 468

B. ANKARA 159

C. YEREVAN 149

Classified by Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

1. (C) Summary: A recent Turkish-Azeri diasporas forum in Baku is seeking to develop an organized counterbalance to the influence of the Armenian diaspora worldwide. Possible Turkish-Armenian rapprochement looks bleak, although MFA sources tell us FM Gul plans to approach Secretary Rice with a positive move after Turkish parliamentary elections currently scheduled for November. End Summary.

2. (U) According to Turkish MFA and press reports, 513 businessmen and prominent political and civil society leaders representing Turkish and Azeri diasporas from 48 countries participated in the inaugural Forum of World Azerbaijani and Turkish Diaspora Organizations on March 9 in Baku. Azeri President Aliyev and Turkish PM Erdogan gave opening speeches. Along with participants from Central Asia, Europe, North America, Russia and Iran, “TRNC President” Mehmet Ali Talat also attended.

3. (C) Participants adopted three major resolutions: a “Joint Strategy on the Activities of the Azerbaijani and Turkish diaspora organizations,” an “Appeal to the Turkic-speaking Peoples,” and a broader “Baku Declaration.” MFA Acting DDG for Caucasus and Central Asia Suleyman Gokce called the statements generic in nature and said organizers did not decide upon the timing and location of a second meeting.

4. (C) Gokce told us that Turkey and Azerbaijan jointly came up with the Turk-Azeri diaspora idea one year ago. The Azeris then took the initiative to establish this forum for “dialogue and cooperation.” Gokce asserted that the forum is not solely targeted at countering the Armenian diaspora’s influence and is not intended to push the Armenian government into a corner. Gokce noted that it would also look at improving joint lobbying, holding common cultural events and establishing stronger business ties.

5. (C) On prospects for Turkey-Armenia rapprochement in the near future, Gokce opined that even a symbolic gesture by Turkey towards Armenia at this point would not be enough for Armenian diaspora hardliners. He said FM Gul will approach Secretary Rice with a positive move, but not until after the Turkish parliamentary elections currently scheduled for November 4. He called Armenian FM Oskanian “intransigent and unhelpful” vis–vis Turkey, particularly as Armenia’s May 12 elections approach and Oskanian must position himself accordingly. Gokce raised concerns about recent changes in Armenian law that he said increased the influence and power of the Armenian diaspora in GOAM politics.

6. (C) While in Baku, PM Erdogan also visited Sangachal terminal (the starting point of the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline), inaugurated the new Turkish Embassy with President Aliyev and visited two Turkish schools. The Turkish Ambassador also organized a 300-person working lunch between the Turkish and Azeri delegations. Gokce said Erdogan and Aliyev met one-on-one but he had no details on what was discussed.

7. (C) Comment: The timing of this forum comes ahead of the April 24 Armenian Remembrance Day and the possibility Congress could pass an Armenian genocide resolution soon. Although Gokce took pains to emphasize that the forum was not only targeted at countering the Armenian diaspora’s influence, the forum’s aim is clear: both the Turks and Azeris want to beat the powerful Armenian diaspora organizations at their own game. The evidence indicates they have a long way to go. End Comment.

Visit Ankara’s Classified Web Site at

http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

 

WILSON

 

US embassy cable – 07BAKU386

BAKU HOSTS FIRST AZERBAIJANI AND TURKISH DIASPORA CONFERENCE

Identifier:

07BAKU386

Origin:

Embassy Baku

Created:

2007-04-06 13:43:00

Classification:

CONFIDENTIAL

Tags:

PGOV PREL TU AJ

Redacted:

This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2017

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TU, AJ

SUBJECT: BAKU HOSTS FIRST AZERBAIJANI AND TURKISH DIASPORA CONFERENCE

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

1. (C) Summary. In an effort to galvanize enhanced cooperation among Azerbaijani and Turkish diaspora organizations, Azerbaijan hosted the first conference of World Azerbaijani and Turkish Diaspora organizations from March 9-10. Reflecting the importance assigned to the event, President Ilham Aliyev, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyib Erdogan, and the leader of the Turkish Republic of Northern

Cyprus Mehmet Ali Talat, in his capacity as head of the diaspora association of Cyprus, attended the conference’s opening session. Aliyev’s speech at this session called upon diaspora organizations to be more active and identified the conference’s “historical achievement” as ensuring that Turkish and Azerbaijani diaspora organizations function “as a single organism.” Ramil Hasanov, Director General of the State Committee on Work with Azerbaijanis Living Abroad, told us the GOAJ’s goal for the conference was to energize and give direction (unspecified) to diaspora organizations’ efforts. Most independent commentators we spoke with support the conference’s goals and emphasized the need to counter the Armenian diaspora’s influence. At Greek urging, local EU embassies — except the UK — boycotted the Conference’s opening out of fear that the Conference would adopt statements in support of Northern Cyprus. End Summary.

Background

———-

2. (U) Azerbaijan hosted the first conference of World Azerbaijani and Turkish Diaspora organizations from March 9-10. According to local press, the conference included 513 participants from forty-eight countries. President Ilham Aliyev, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyib Erdogan, and the leader of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Mehmet Ali Talat attended the opening session on March 9. Participants signed the “Baku Declaration” during the conference, which expressed Azerbaijani and Turkish diaspora organizations’ intent to unify their efforts, according to local press.

Aliyev’s Speech

—————

3. (SBU) President Aliyev gave a speech to the opening session of the conference. Aliyev’s speech reaffirmed the traditional close links between Azerbaijan and Turkey, while calling upon diaspora organizations to be more active and collaborative in promoting both countries’ interests. Aliyev noted that the Azerbaijan State Committee on Work with Azerbaijanis Living Abroad, which played a key role in organizing the conference, was the focal point for organizing and mobilizing the Azerbaijani diaspora. Aliyev identified the conference’s “historical achievement” as “consolidating our activity” and ensuring that Turkish and Azerbaijani diaspora organizations function “as a single organism.” Aliyev later noted that more united efforts should be directed toward strengthening the political and economic influence of the Azerbaijani and Turkish diasporas in different countries.

4. (SBU) Several quotations from Aliyev’s speech — taken from Aliyev’s official website — reflect the GOAJ’s attempt to energize diaspora activities. Speaking about his goals for the Azerbaijani diaspora, Aliyev said, “it needs to be active, partake in political processes, possess high positions in the business world, and to benefit our opportunities” in this area. Aliyev continued, “…we must support them (diaspora organizations), strengthen their policy in countries they live in. Different events are and must be held. Conferences, publication of books, distribution of realities on our history — past and present — this process must be permanent. All NGOs acting abroad must establish very serious cooperation. I repeat, this must be coordinated with members of the government and parliament. We must necessarily do it if we want our voice to be heard and the problems worrying us to be settled rapidly.”

5. (SBU) Aliyev’s speech was not solely focused on Armenia, but it was a key part of the address. In the final section of the speech, Aliyev dealt with the challenges posed to Azerbaijan and Turkey by the “well-organized Armenian lobby” and the Armenian diaspora’s “big financial resources.” Aliyev noted that Azerbaijan and Turkey have had to face the onslaught of Armenian propaganda, slander, and distortion of historical facts.

State Committee Hails Conference as Success

——————————————-

6. (C) Ramil Hasanov, Director General of the State Committee on Work with Azerbaijanis Living Abroad, told us the GOAJ regards the conference as a success. Hasanov said the GOAJ’s goal for the conference was to energize and give direction to the efforts of all the various diaspora organizations. He emphasized that independent organizations had played a role in organizing the conference and that the State Committee primarily provided logistical support. (Comment: From our perspective, the governments of Azerbaijan and/or Turkey appear to have been central in organizing the conference. The conference does not appear to have been a grass-roots or “bottom-up” initiative.) Hasanov said the “Coordination Council of World Azerbaijani and Turkish Diaspora” had helped to organize the conference and that the March 9-10 event was the “founding conference” for this organization. Hasanov told us that a central point of contact for this organization has not yet been identified because it includes many diaspora organizations. Hasanov also sought to deflect attention to the conference’s focus on countering the Armenian lobby, stating that the conference “was not aimed at any country.”

Other Perspectives

——————

7. (C) Most local commentators — even those with opposition leanings — we spoke with supported the broad goals of the conference, while some had questions about the level of the GOAJ’s involvement in organizing diaspora activities. A common thread from local commentators was that the Azerbaijani diaspora needed to be more unified to counter the strength of the Armenian lobby.

8. (C) Nasib Nasibli — an opposition MP — said the conference’s key goal was to strengthen the Azerbaijani diaspora vis-a-vis the Armenia diaspora. Nasibli said that while he was a member of the opposition, as an Azerbaijani patriot, he agreed that the Azerbaijani diaspora needs to be more active. Nasibli cautioned, however, that the GOAJ also may be using the conference to better control the diaspora. Leyla Aliyeva — a prominent Western-educated academic — said that the common Turkish and Azerbaijani interest in countering the Armenia lobby was a key driver behind the conference. She also claimed that the conference reflected Turkey’s growing regional influence. Natig Mammadov, who teaches the history of Turkic peoples at Baku State University and edits the webpage for Radio Free Europe, characterized the conference as “an official demonstration” of a union of interests between Azerbaijani and Turkish diaspora organizations that already exists. Mammadov observed that the diaspora does not act as a cohesive whole, while lamenting the lack of patriotism among some diaspora organizations. Mammadov expressed some cynicism about the efficacy of the conference in energizing the diaspora, saying that it contained an element of “political propaganda.”

The Cyprus Angle

—————-

9. (C) At Greek urging, local EU embassies — except the UK — boycotted the high-profile opening session of the conference. According to both Greek and UK diplomats, the EU embassies feared that the Conference would adopt statements in support of Northern Cyprus. The Greek Ambassador privately speculated to us that Greece’s role in leading the EU boycott of this high-profile event may have played some role in Minister of Economic Development Heydar Babayev’s last-minute decision to cancel his planned March 12 visit to Athens for energy discussions. (Babayev’s visit subsequently was rescheduled for May 23-24.)

Comment

——-

10. (C) The conference reflects the GOAJ’s desire for the Azerbaijani diaspora to play a more active role in countering the perceived strength of the Armenia diaspora in other countries. The GOAJ, as well as broader Azerbaijani society, believe that the Armenia lobby has undermined Azerbaijan’s relations with other countries, including with the United States.

 

DERSE

 

US embassy cable – 09BAKU743

AZERBAIJAN’S DIASPORA SMALL, NOT POLITCALLY ACTIVE

Identifier:

09BAKU743

Origin:

Embassy Baku

Created:

2009-09-18 06:05:00

Classification:

CONFIDENTIAL

Tags:

PGOV KDEM PHUM PREL SMIG AJ

Redacted:

This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019

TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, PHUM, PREL, SMIG, AJ

SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN’S DIASPORA SMALL, NOT POLITCALLY ACTIVE

 

REF: STATE 86401

Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Robert Garverick, Reasons 1.4 b and d.

1. (C) Summary: Azerbaijan’s diaspora of permanent migrs [migrants] is small, although there are possibly 2 million labor migrants in Russia and Turkey. The diaspora has not been active in affairs in Azerbaijan or in the United States, but two new groups have recently formed: one pro-government and one pro-democracy. End Summary.

2. (C) In response to reftel, post provides the following answers.

A) To what extent are diasporans from your host country an identifiable community? Are there existing diaspora networks, organizations or online communities available as platforms for outreach?

— Azerbaijanis living abroad are poorly organized and cannot truly be described as an identifiable community. The largest group, estimated at about two million, lives in Russia, but these are largely temporary labor migrants rather than permanent migrs. There are also large numbers of labor migrants in Turkey. There are few Azerbaijanis in the U.S., largely students or other temporary workers. There are, however, a larger number of ethnic Azeris from Iran in America, although anecdotal evidence indicates that they identify more as Iranians than Azerbaijanis. There are two Azerbaijani-American organizations that have formed recently: U.S. Azeri Network (USAN) is pro-government and Azerbaijani-Americans for Democracy (AZAD) has begun lobbying for more USG attention to the Azerbaijani government’s failings on democracy and human rights.

B) What is the nature of the connection of the diaspora community to the host country? Examples include kinship networks; educational or other institutional ties; financial support as from remittances; and direct participation in community or country affairs and civil society.

— Remittances from family members in Russia and Turkey play a large role in supporting families in Azerbaijan, particularly families outside Baku where there are fewer economic opportunities. There seem to be few educational or other institutional ties.

C) To what extent has your host country or government activated its diaspora communities for humanitarian relief? How would you characterize the level of response? If outreach is relatively recent, do you foresee opportunities to maintain diaspora community involvement in country over the long term?

— The government has just begun to reach out to its small diaspora, largely as a way to counter the much larger Armenian diaspora in the United States and Europe. This work is almost entirely centered on lobbying foreign governments to change their positions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. While some of its messaging may have humanitarian rhetoric, it is not trying to raise money for humanitarian assistance.

D) To what extent is the diaspora community engaged in long-term investment in country, for example micro enterprise development, job creation, entrepreneurship, and institutional capacity building? What is post’s assessment of the future potential for long-term and sustained engagement of the diaspora community in such efforts?

— Post sees no evidence of diaspora long-term investment in the country. Given the small size of the diaspora, there is not a large potential for this type of work.

E) To what extent is the diaspora community working toward scientific, engineering, medical and educational institution building? How might diasporans with backgrounds in these fields or otherwise affiliated with the Academy, or professional and technical societies, become engaged in science diplomacy programs?

— Post sees no evidence that the diaspora is involved in science diplomacy.

F) To what extent is the diaspora community engaged in conflict resolution and peace building? Do you see future potential to translate diaspora community participation in these processes into other priorities governing the bilateral (and/or regional) relationship?

— As explained above in sections A and C, the government has just begun to reach out to its American diaspora community through the U.S. Azeris Network (www.usazeris.org), which also works closely with the Turkish Coalition of America. This organization periodically calls on its members to email their government representatives to change U.S. policies regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, or

Armenia/Azerbaijan balance in general. While not exactly “peace-building,” the organization does call for the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. The organization also campaigns against any recognition on a state or federal level of the Armenian “genocide.”

G) To what extent is the diaspora community engaged in meeting the health, education and welfare needs of indigenous peoples?

— Post is not aware of any such activity.

H) To what extent is the diaspora community engaged in democracy promotion, electoral reform and civil society development? Are there key milestones in your host country or host government’s development that would create opportunities for such engagement in the future?

— As mentioned in section A, a group called Azerbaijani-Americans for Democracy (AZAD) has begun lobbying for more USG attention to the Azerbaijani government’s failings on democracy and human rights. This group has recently been active in lobbying for the freedom of jailed youth bloggers Emin Milli and Adnan Hajizade, including organizing a protest in front of Azerbaijan’s Embassy in Washington. The group previously sponsored protests against changes to Azerbaijan’s constitution.

I) How would you characterize the level of concern and attention given to diaspora communities by your host government? If applicable, please describe the host government’s organization and strategy dedicated to relationship-building with its diaspora communities. For example, host governments may have established promotion offices to encourage diasporans’ return, bringing with them know-how and financial resources.

— There is an Azerbaijani government State Committee on Work with the Diaspora, but this Committee is not very prominent or active. Azerbaijan recently opened a Consulate in Los Angeles, and its first Consul Elin Suleymanov has been highly active in organizing Azerbaijani-Americans into a community.

It also supports the U.S.-Azeri Network. None of these organizations seem to be involved in encouraging diasporans to return to the country, but rather to advocate for Azerbaijan’s interests with their host government.

J) If post has undertaken programs to reach out proactively to diaspora community members, please share the circumstances that prompted the outreach effort, how outreach was conducted or programmed, personal impressions from the experience, and benefits from the outreach effort.

— Given the small size of the diaspora community, post had not conducted any programmatic outreach to them.

K) If post has received unsolicited requests from the diaspora community, please share the nature the requests, the considerations post took into account in formulating respective responses, and the outcomes of interaction.

— Post has not received any unsolicited requests from the diaspora community.

L) To what extent has post designed or participated in public diplomacy programs customized to diaspora community needs and interests? Does post anticipate taking advantage of such opportunities in the future?

— Post has not participated in any public diplomacy programs for the diaspora community. Post does not anticipate any such programs in the near future.

M) In planning future programs and anticipating requests for assistance from diaspora community actors, what types of knowledge management tools and information materials would be most helpful to action officers at post? If the Department were to develop a reach-back program to academics in the field of diaspora community engagement, what are post’s preferences for accessing such a mechanism?

— Post does not have any such requests.

Finally, posts are asked to include a point of contact for their respective submissions for S/GPI and S/P’s future reference and follow-up.

— The point of contact for diaspora questions is Political Officer Joanna Ganson who can be reached at gansonjh@state.gov

LU

Nanore Barsoumian

Nanore Barsoumian

Nanore Barsoumian was the editor of the Armenian Weekly from 2014 to 2016. She served as assistant editor of the Armenian Weekly from 2010 to 2014. Her writings focus on human rights, politics, poverty, and environmental and gender issues. She has reported from Armenia, Nagorno-Karabagh, Javakhk and Turkey. She earned her B.A. degree in Political Science and English and her M.A. in Conflict Resolution from the University of Massachusetts (Boston).
Nanore Barsoumian

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11 Comments

  1. Meanwhile, Armenia makes the mistake of ignoring political cooperation with the Diaspora. 

    Really, how stupid can one get?

  2. Dave–  It is the ruling regime that ignores political cooperation with the Diaspora, not Armenia. The ruling thugs are afraid that the Diasporan Armenians could their over their power. But eventually political cooperation will happen.

  3. Dave,
    That  is the core  ,the raison D’etre  ,reason of my being there at the forefront trumpeting -also  headline title of  my web  page ,now in reconstruction, always encouraging..
    HAYASTAN  SPYURK  GABERI  AVELI SERDECMAN  OUGHIN>
    THE PATH TO ENHANCE ARMENIA-DIASPORA RELATIONS>>>>
    It will  come to pass..it is a question  of time  now…
    They,as  usual take  suggestions  very slowly and in changed-by them  formats-that also is apparent  in our  own  Diaspora  back  yard.Armenians  neve condescend  to each  other coopderate  very very seldom…
    We are  to get rid  of  two stains/traits  rather  in our characters
    A.Over jealousy  Syndrom
    B. non cooperativeness
    A  third  one  has lately  occured  to me. That  of each aspiring to  an ISHKHAN  ISHKHANOUHI>>>

  4. “All NGOs acting abroad must establish very serious cooperation. I repeat, this must be coordinated with members of the government and parliament.”
     
    It’s time for IRS to take away the 501c3 tax free status from all these pseudo-NGOs and force them to register as Azeri Sultanate’s official foreign agents.  They are funded by Mekhriban-hanum’s stolen oil revenues that THE FAMILY parks at Heydar-baba Aliyev Foundation. 
     
    Look at these clowns for example: http://www.karabakhfoundation.org/pages/about/board-and-staff/staff/ – this is a clear money-laundering operation – they “issue” US postal stamps celebrating Azerbaijani “1000s years old history” in Karabakh, publish books on Azeri Karabakh cuisine, organize “academic” presentations on Armenian Genocide denial and Khojaly scam (see http://www.xocali.net) at US universities, pollute Wikipedia with organized gang-attacks on Armenian pages and creation of trash Azeri-propaganda pages, and even throw expensive Christmas (sic!) parties to celebrate the “rich” Muslim culture of Altai-to-Karabakh nomads… All of that on donations from former Peace Corps volunteers who spent two years brainwashed in Bazaarbaijan?  
     
    So, when is IRS going to take action?  Not until the fat lady sings, I guess…
     

  5. Dave jan.. you hit the bulls eye my friend.. if The Armenian leadership was smart then they would have done everything to work with Diaspora… Turkey knows that Armenian Diaspora is strong and big .. why do you think they spend millions to block us, Azerbajian knows that Armenian Diaspora is strong and big that is why they are trying to create their own  diaspora with Turks which i doubt it will happen (because Azeris and Turks are not really savvy in the political arena.. why would they? their countries are doing everything but to educate their own citizens and now they want them to be more involved in politics??? now that is hilliarious…)…

    in any case, both of our enemies are afraid of us, the Diasporans.. i just don’t get what is keeping our dumb leaders to work and build even stronger relationship with the Diaspora…i believe Paul hasmade a good pointt.. our leadership is afraid of us as well because them thungs know if Diaspora is involved, their ugly butts will be thrown out of the country…  

    Gayane

  6. These cables are over four years old. Much has changed since then, and is continuing to change. The ARF Dashnaks started this…we’re going to finish it! Stay tuned.

  7. Regardless of how organized the Azeris/Turks may or may not be today (their lobby is essentially supported by oil, weapons, lobbies, AIPAC/JINSA, US State Dept- this is where they get their real power- though AIPAC/JINSA is falling away from this role- more than the Turks themselves) they recently burned some serious bridges and the neo-cons have now abandoned them along with many of their chief apologists.

    Turkey is now trying to punch above its weight and the Azeris will suffer by association. As somewhat of an insider to the goings on in DC, I can say that many of the actions of Erdogan have caused permanent damage to the cause of genocide denial and incessant US defense of Turkey’s regional bullying. Well, now that is gone and things have changed and the Turks/Azeris can only blame themselves. Couldn’t happen to nicer guys. The die has been cast. 

    Besides Erdogan, the Gulen Movement is starting to tarnish Turkey further. Eyes that were once ignorant, either by accident or willfully, are now opening to the reality of Turkey and to a lesser extent Azerbaijan. Its just a matter of time before Aliyev the younger makes a tragic mistake and falls by the wayside like other oligarchs and dictators in the region.

  8. I must also admit that while we live in diaspora, we tend to complain too much about corruption in the government of the homeland. Even while that may be the case, I think we are at fault too for not approaching Armenia and at least establishing a wide open dialogue to present to one another our vision for the future. Too much division in our people. I hope that changes soon.
     
    And Robert, your ‘gray mice’ had a chance against the ARF in the NK war, and you proved to be lame and clownish and returned home with your tails up you know where. It’s over, we don’t need to tune in any more.

  9. Halo jan– True that and you are absolutely right.. excellent post.

    Joseph jan– brilliant…

    Robert the Turk– well.. no need to continue.. Halo said it perfectly..

    Gayane      

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