Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is pursuing a course of gradually loosening Armenia’s ties with Russia as the country aims to eventually become a member of the European Union. While the Kremlin continues to pressure Yerevan to hold a referendum on potential EU accession, Armenian leaders signaled Aug. 24 that the South Caucasus state is moving toward applying to join the 27-nation bloc. But how realistic are Yerevan’s ambitions, especially given the experiences of other countries seeking EU membership?
According to Pashinyan, “in the near future” Armenia will “perhaps begin the process of submitting an official application to join the EU.” His statement came after the leaders of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) urged Yerevan to hold a nationwide referendum “as soon as possible” on whether to join the EU or remain in the EAEU.
On Aug. 24, just hours after Pashinyan’s announcement, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov warned that Yerevan’s EU application could create “significant contradictions within the Eurasian Economic Union.” Previously, in June, Russia imposed import bans on a wide range of Armenian agricultural, dairy, seafood and beverage products, effectively forcing Pashinyan to choose between the EU and the EAEU. Such a Russian strategy, however, could backfire.
Following the 44-day war with Azerbaijan in 2020, Armenia began to fundamentally change its foreign policy course. While Yerevan had previously viewed Moscow as its major ally, the Kremlin’s ambivalence toward the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh led to Armenia’s gradual political and military shift away from Russia.
In late 2023, Pashinyan skipped two major Russia-led events: the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summit in Bishkek in October and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) meeting in Minsk in November. Later, in February 2024, he announced that Yerevan had suspended its participation in the CSTO. But the Kremlin never seemed particularly upset by Pashinyan’s moves.
“If Yerevan no longer needs to be a member of such an important organization for ensuring regional security to serve its national interests, then it is free to take the appropriate decision and leave this organization,” Peskov said Aug. 24.
By imposing import bans on Armenian products and pressuring Pashinyan to choose between the EU and the EAEU, Moscow is driving Armenia further out of Russia’s orbit. At the same time, it is showing no signs of being ready to fight for influence in the South Caucasus nation, which seems to be firmly on the path toward the EU.
On March 26, 2025, Armenia’s parliament approved a law to launch the process of the country’s accession to the European Union. A formal EU application should be a logical next step in Armenia’s integration with the bloc. The problem, however, is that there is no guarantee Brussels is willing to admit the South Caucasus nation anytime soon.
On March 12, 2024, the European Parliament passed a resolution noting that Armenia “could apply for membership if it meets the Copenhagen criteria and respects democratic principles, fundamental freedoms, human and minority rights and the rule of law.” Given that the EU has largely ignored Pashinyan’s crackdown on the opposition, it is entirely possible that — if Brussels is genuinely committed to bringing Armenia into the bloc — it will be willing to set aside concerns about the government’s democratic record. After all, the EU has already taken a similar approach in Serbia, a candidate country since 2012.
For Brussels, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, who, according to reports, controls 90% of Serbian media outlets, remains its “favorite autocrat.” The EU does not seem to be worried that democracy continues to lose ground in the Southeast European nation or that the country faces deep-seated, systemic corruption. All that seems to be irrelevant to the EU, as well as to the United States, as long as Vucic continues pursuing his policy of de facto recognition of Kosovo, selling weapons to Ukraine and gradually breaking ties with Moscow.
But despite tolerating Vucic’s moves at home, the EU does not seem interested in allowing Serbia to join the bloc in the foreseeable future. The Balkan nation has officially opened only two of six thematic clusters in its European Union accession negotiations. It is neighboring Montenegro, rather than Serbia, that is widely seen as the EU’s 28th member, while other candidate states from the Balkans — North Macedonia, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which have been waiting to join the bloc since 2005, 2014 and 2022, respectively — are unlikely to secure membership anytime soon.
Thus, even if Armenia submits an official application to join the EU in 2026, it could take years before it is granted formal candidate status, which, as the experience of most Balkan countries shows, is no guarantee of eventual EU membership. More importantly, unlike the Balkan states, all of which border the European Union and have a form of free trade arrangement with the bloc, Armenia does not share a border with a single EU member state. It is also still far from securing a visa-free regime with the EU, which is usually a key step in the EU integration process.
Therefore, for the time being, Brussels is likely to continue strengthening ties with Armenia through the Eastern Partnership mechanism, encouraging Yerevan to further distance itself from Russia. Meanwhile, it will almost certainly continue to support Pashinyan — in much the same way it supports Serbia’s Vucic — even if democratic backsliding in the country continues.
