By Talin Suciyan
The Armenian Weekly
January 2010 Magazine
This article is the third installment of a series. The first two have been published in Taraf Daily (“Who is Diaspora?” Oct. 20, 2009) and Agos (“Oh mirror tell me where am I from?” Nov. 6, 2009) weekly newspapers. The first article addressed the unacceptable attitude of Taraf in equating the Armenian Diaspora with an ultra-nationalist leader in Turkey. The second was about rethinking the identity of Armenians in Turkey (are they a part of the diaspora or not?). And this article attempts to discuss the relations between Armenia and the diaspora in light of this year’s developments.
It would not be wrong to say that we witnessed a series of unexpected political developments this year, which took place between Armenia and Turkey, and impacted all Armenians around the world, thus paving the way for unforeseen political and social developments.
When I was in Armenia in March, political analysts and journalists were already telling me that the border between Armenia and Turkey would soon be opened. To be honest, I was quite surprised by this assumption since there was no public debate in Turkey at the time regarding this issue. However, beginning in the second half of March, a series of unexpected developments took place throughout the process that led to the eventual signing of the protocols in October.
Barack Obama’s presidency in the U.S., his visit to Turkey in March, his statement regarding the Armenian Genocide (that his ideas were recorded and he had not changed them), the speech he held in the national assembly, all went down in Turkey’s history as important steps.
After 18 years of no communication with the neighboring independent Armenia, Turkey was probably forced to respond to Armenia’s initiatives to establish relations between the two countries. Yet, Turkey’s response seems to be a result of a regional change in power relations and not a result of sincere will. For, to this day, authorities in Turkey continue to start sentences with “But Karabagh…” winning time and bringing about nothing more than doubts. Despite the fact that the protocols are far from being satisfactory, they still have the potential to be the first steps in establishing neighborly relations, and thus creating a change in the paradigm.
It was last year that “the nasty assumption” about the Armenian roots of President Abdullah Gul’s mother were thrown about and Gul unfortunately felt himself obliged to prove his mother’s Turkish origins. This incident, one among many, shows that the signing of the protocols doesn’t mean anything other than, simply, a start. There is a long way to go and this process requires a lot of effort. Nonetheless, anyone who has been following the state of Armenian-Turkish relations has the right to have doubts over the sincerity of the process based on previous experiences.
To tell the truth, for me, the protocols are important if they lead to the opening of the border with Armenia and the establishment of diplomatic relations. Otherwise, the developments that occurred over the past year will remain nothing more than show-business. Of course, “founding a commission to discuss historical issues,” “not to undertake initiatives which would harm good neighborly relations,” and such other points included in the protocols, will be difficult to cope with for states and peoples that have an issue as complex as Turkey and Armenia have.
Nonetheless, these protocols do not belong to two states only; they are the protocols of all Armenians, too. The Armenian authorities should realize the fact that Armenians in the diaspora also have a say in these protocols. Therefore, when President Serge Sarkisian made his world tour of the diaspora just before the signing of the protocols, and said something like, “I came to persuade you about the importance of these protocols,” he was met with anger by the majority of diasporan communities. Sarkisian was accompanied by the minister of diaspora, Hranush Hakobyan (who seems to have rather limited knowledge and understanding of the diaspora) and Arkadi Ghukasyan, the former president of Karabagh (who is continuing his political career in Armenia, as one of Sarkisian’s advisers). Even these choices of Sarkisian’s reveal his vision of the diaspora. Sarkisian is presiding over Armenia under a heavy burden of distrust and flaws. But thanks to his pragmatic character, he has learned a lot during his presidency. A
fter an almost counterproductive world tour, which brought nothing but strong negative reactions, I wholeheartedly hope that Sarkisian has learned that this is not the way to establish relations with the diaspora, and I look forward to seeing some new methods offered.
Right after the demonstrations took place in Beirut, Paris, and the U.S., it was very interesting to read an article on Hetq.am, an online newsletter from Yerevan, entitled “Who is the diaspora?” Obviously there is an unaddressed issue here: Armenians in the diaspora and Armenians in Armenia do not know each other well enough, if at all.
Armenian governments have pursued an active policy based on genocide recognition, considering the issue good ground on which to develop relations with diasporan communities. By doing so, Armenia circumscribed diasporan communities on this very issue and left them outside the socio-political scene of Armenia. Most Armenians living in Armenia have been viewing diasporan Armenians as “people who speak that nice language, but do not know ‘us.’” The Armenian government, on the other hand, produces slogans such as “Meg azg, meg mshaguyt” (One Nation, One Culture) which aims to create “one type of Armenian” both within and outside of the country, to monetarily support campaigns, and to bring diasporan youth to Armenia for a couple of months to volunteer and do some charity work. But all this does not mean establishing relations with the diaspora. I do not know what it means to be “one Nation,” but I do know that since 1915, if not before, Armenians had quite different profiles.
Today, saying “One Nation, One Culture” might sound well for some diasporan Armenians who have never been to Armenia, or have only been on short touristy trips. This slogan may create a synthetic feeling of self-identification, but the effect of it cannot be more than that . . . And indeed this slogan is formulated in a way that ensures nothing more happens. Imagine what would have happened if today, all of a sudden, two million diasporans emigrated to Armenia? Armenia hasn’t even been able to find a way to deal with the social problems that arose after Armenians came to live in Armenia following independence. Looking at Anahit Mkhrtchyan’s survey results about the latent, middle-ranged conflict between locals and diasporans can explain the situation better (“Creating Democratic Armenia Together: The Problem of Adaptation for Diasporan Armenians in Armenian Society”). To make a long story short, what took place this year revealed the true depth of the cliff between Armenia and the diaspora.
By the same token, one should not forget to mention the apathy—with very little exception— of diasporan Armenians after the bloody post-election crackdown of March 1, 2008. CNN Armenia censored the images of the clashes between protestors and police, which were broadcast on CNN international. On that day, the first state of emergency in the history of Armenia was declared. The media was heavily censored, 10 people lost their lives, and more than 200 were injured. Had diasporans adequately shown their reaction, in the form of civil initiatives and institutions after that day, the current Armenian administration would have better understood the kind of “One Nation” they have to deal with. Therefore, individuals and organizations in the diaspora have to revise their attitudes, critically analyze what they react to and how they react, and understand what their silence means.
Disliking Levon Ter-Petrossian does not justify remaining silent in a March 1-like situation. If diasporans intend to have a say in Armenia’s destiny, they must react appropriately in every historical turning point the country faces. March 1 was definitely one of them, yet Armenians of the diaspora were conspicuously absent.
Coming back to the protocols, it can be assumed that most of the opposition groups in Armenia had the same reaction as the Armenian diaspora, and that therefore there is no difference between Armenians in Armenia and in the diaspora, at least in this regard. However, anyone who has been following the recent political developments in Armenia knows that these negative reactions had a lot to do with the internal politics of the country: The Heritage Party went through an internal crisis, the Armenian National Congress was unable to offer a real alternative as an opposition force, some of the parties that were united under the umbrella of the ANC were no longer eager to continue their political life under that roof, and in such an atmosphere, the Armenian National Federation returned to the opposition after being coalition partners during the last 10 years. In the given oppositional crisis in Armenia, the Dashnaktsutyun continues its well-known politics by using the same tools—a policy that was proven to be obsolete so long ago…
Undoubtedly, the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations is an important issue of Armenian foreign policy. But Karabagh and the Madrid criteria are even more important than that. Above all, the democratization of Armenia is much more important. Or whether Armenia will be able to offer an honorable life for its citizens—and for Armenians in the diaspora—is much more important…
One of the Yerevan-based radio stations, “Azatutyun,” broadcast an interview recently, during which the speaker referred to a survey result on the decline of birthrates. She said that declining birthrates may in the long run turn into a “national security” issue, since there would not be enough manpower for military service. Hranush Kharadyan, an ethnologist and a prominent figure in Armenian politics, said: “The decline in the birthrates is not a reason of ‘national security’ just because there would not be enough manpower for the military, but it is a crucial issue because here lies the key whether we as Armenians want to continue to live in this geography or not.” Kharadyan’s point was both a call and a strong criticism to all Armenians, I guess.
What kind of a country would Armenians like to live in? In which identity do Armenians feel the most comfortable? Do diasporan Armenians see themselves as part of Armenia’s destiny? If yes, what kind of mechanisms do they need to represent their views and voices? And what are the different ways of establishing relations with the people of Armenia? What are the steps that the Armenian government should take to develop effective relations with diasporan communities? Without finding answers to these and many other questions, no decision will make the majority of Armenians happy, including the ones regarding the relations with Turkey.
Talin Suciyan is an Istanbul Armenian journalist who lived in Armenia from 2007–09. She is currently based in Munich, Germany, where she is pursuing her graduate studies. She contributes regularly to Agos and other Turkish newspapers.
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I think the ill conceived secretly hatched protocols, which we all know only benefits the self appointed oligarchs, woke the diaspora up. I believe the diaspora must and will be more involved in the political and decision making process in Armenia from here on out. How absurd to give all the ruling power to one man. He is not a king and worse, doesn’t represent the interest of the whole. The diaspora understands that these ruling self serving thugs must go. The question is how?
What role has Russia played in pushing the protocols onto Armenia? Let us ask and answer the question.
Wow — this was brilliant.