Mensoian: Assessing Azerbaijan’s Military Threat to Retake Karabagh (Part II)

Part I considered the rationale for Azerbaijan deciding that a renewal of hostilities was the only viable option to regain control of Karabagh. The usual problematic areas inherent in any nation’s rapid expansion of its military establishment were identified, as were the strategic objectives that Azerbaijan might seek to achieve in attacking Karabagh.

Karabagh’s advantage of topography

Karabagh occupies the mountainous region west of the Kura River floodplain, a low-lying region crisscrossed by numerous tributaries and canals. Generally, the present Line of Contact (LoC) between Azerbaijan and Karabagh follows the crest of the higher mountains that lie primarily along its northern border and the lower crests in the northeast and east. Forward of this eastern LoC lies a triangular area whose base extends for about 100 miles from Horadiz on the Arax River north to Mingacevir, the site of a major Azeri hydroelectric generating facility. From either Horadiz or Mingacevir to Baku (the apex of the triangle) is approximately 135 miles. Within this region encompassing about 6,000 square miles lies the floodplain of the Kura River and the likely location of the Azeri base of operation for any action along this eastern front.

Since the 1994 ceasefire, in anticipation of a possible renewal of hostilities, Karabagh would have strengthened and expanded its defensive positions. Occupying the high ground and in control of the mountain passes, Karabagh would have developed a system of fortified positions and denial measures that would canalize the attacking Azeri forces into predetermined fields of fire. This would allow the smaller Karabagh defense force to lay down a sustained base of fire from their fortified positions, mobile missile units, mortars and tanks that could exact a heavy toll on the Azeri forces. Unlike the more fluid situations during the war to gain independence, it could be expected that the Azeri forces assaulting these heavily fortified positions would suffer a disproportionate ratio of five to eight casualties to one, possibly two Armenian casualties and an equally heavy loss of equipment. Under these conditions, maintaining combat effectiveness and evacuating casualties would present a difficult challenge. The extent to which this would contribute to a serious deterioration of morale would depend on the discipline of the individual Azeri soldier.

The Azeri options

While the Karabagh defense force must be prepared to engage Azeri forces along the entire front defined by the present LoC, the principal attack could be expected in the vicinity of Agdam with significant operations in the vicinity of Fizuli to the south and along the Kashatagh-Mardakert frontier to the north. This northern operation would most likely focus on a drive from the Shahumian district to put pressure on the Agdam-Askeran defenders to the south, where the principal attack would be launched. Depending on the number and type of units previously deployed in the vicinity of Ganca, additional men and equipment to support an operation along this northern LoC would have to be funneled through Yevlakh. This would facilitate the monitoring and immediate engagement of opportune and preselected targets by the Karabagh defense force once hostilities have commenced.

Why might Agdam be the initial objective? As the largest Azeri city closest to the de facto boundary, its occupation within the first few days of hostilities would provide a psychological boost to the military and to Azeri President Aliyev. Given this significance, Azerbaijan would consider the heavy losses of men and equipment as an acceptable price to pay to score a public relations victory. If Karabagh decided to defend the city (there are sufficient reasons why it would not) and succeed, it would be a decisive defeat for Azerbaijan. The occupation of Agdam would allow the Azeri forces to concentrate on their ultimate objective, the settlement of Askeran. However, if the Karabagh defense forces held Agdam or prevented Azerbaijan from exploiting their initial success, the Azeri military command would be forced to rethink its overall strategy.

The operation at Fizuli would seek to retake that city and push the Karabagh forces back toward the settlements of Hadrut and Martuni. If successful, it would put Karabagh’s core area (Stepanakert-Shushi) in a vulnerable position. The front, obviously fragmented, would then stretch from Mardakert to Askeran through Martuni to Hadrut. This would increase the pressure on the Karabagh forces, but it would also require Azerbaijan to commit more men, equipment, and logistical support, and to maintain the real-time evaluation and coordination of battlefield conditions. As the front expands, the Azeri losses in men and equipment should tend to increase significantly. Whether or not Azerbaijan could achieve this operational level is doubtful and it is questionable whether it could or would want to accept the heavy casualties that could result. Also, this is not a strategy that guarantees success.

In anticipation of a major Azeri attack in the Agdam sector (or elsewhere along the LoC), Karabagh would have constructed parallel systems of heavily fortified positions extending in considerable depth utilizing the defensive advantages of topography. The limited availability of high-speed approaches that would allow the rapid deployment of tanks and mechanized infantry to any sector of the LoC extending from the Arax River north almost to Naftalan would prevent a full-scale surprise attack that, on its face, favors Karabagh. Those approaches that do exist can be effectively interdicted by tank, missile, mortar, and artillery fire, which could result in heavy Azeri losses as they attempt to advance to their predetermined line of engagement. A downside to Azerbaijan’s reliance on any extensive use of tank-supported infantry requires constant real-time coordination to prevent the faster moving tanks from outrunning their infantry support, which would leave both tanks and the infantry, whether on foot or in carriers, vulnerable to attack by Karabagh defense forces.

The Karabagh defense force

From a tactical standpoint, the smaller combat-ready Karabagh defense force, operating over shorter interior routes, would have the advantage of being able to regroup and with greater mobility rapidly deploy to any sector of the front as needed. North of the Kashatagh-Mardakert frontier the movement of Azeri troops, mechanized equipment, and supplies is limited by distance, the lack of roads, and the topography. Traversing this region is the major east to west highway and railroad connecting Baku via Yevlakh and Ganca to Tbilisi, Georgia. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline (terminal located at Sangachal south of Baku) also transits this region, which begins at Yevlakh and is sandwiched between Karabagh to the south and Georgia and Lake Mingacevir to the north. Preselected targets within this region could be immediately engaged by the Karabagh  defense force to impede or prevent any Azeri operation.

Given the advantage that topography and heavily fortified positions provide the Karabagh defense force, Azerbaijan would need to commit forces from two to three times greater than the Karabagh defense force—estimated at 25,000 to 30,000 officers and enlisted personnel. This would require Azerbaijan to deploy a minimum of 50,000 to 65,000 men, which possibly represents the most dependable and better trained units of their military force. Since Azerbaijan would not have the option of conducting a protracted war where attrition of the Karabagh defense force would be an objective, their strategy would rely on a full-scale infantry, tank-supported operation against Agdam with its obvious rewards should it succeed. Such a decision would have to accept the heavy casualties that would be sustained. An enforced ceasefire by the international community before any significant objective is achieved would have serious ramifications for Aliyev and the military. It might end any realistic hope Azerbaijan may have of regaining Artsakh (Karabagh and the liberated territories).

The Azerbaijan decision to resume hostilities would allow Karabagh to immediately engage pre-selected targets in support of its defense. Targets might include Azerbaijan’s system of natural gas transmission lines and the electric power grid. Disrupting the flow of gas or electric power would have an immediate far-reaching impact on a range of civilian and economic activities. Other options might include rapid strike operations to regain control of the eastern margins of the Mardakert and Martuni districts presently occupied by Azerbaijan, or possibly pushing the front north into Shahumian before an expected ceasefire is enforced. In protecting its independence, Karabagh has the right to conduct whatever operations are necessary to defend its independence, including the liberation of additional territory to meet its strategic requirements.

The intangibles of loyalty and dedication

The quality of the men and women, both enlisted and commissioned, is a vital component in assessing a nation’s military strength. The determination of the individual soldier to endure the hardship of combat; his willingness to sacrifice his life if need be; his devotion to the land and the values he is called upon to defend; and the mental and physical strength engendered by the bonds of unit camaraderie and a cohesive civilian population supporting the military, are the intangibles that determine a combatant’s effectiveness on the battlefield. The loyalty and trust the men and women have in the officers who lead them is equally important. Measured by these characteristics, the men and women of the Karabagh defense force are superior to their Azerbaijani counterparts. This was proven during the war that liberated Karabagh during the early 1990’s.

Response of the international community

In the world of realpolitik, how any nation with geostrategic interests in the region would respond to a renewal of hostilities is difficult to predict. How Russia, Iran, Turkey, the United States, and western Europe would determine that their interests are enhanced or weakened by a renewal of hostilities depends on the interplay of too many variables to predict. However limited the geographic area may be initially, the war has the potential to impact the entire Caucasus-Kurdish Anatolian-Iranian Azeri region in ways that cannot be anticipated. Given this uncertainty, the preference of the interested nations would be to maintain the status quo. This would be the basis for an immediate call for a ceasefire. Maintaining the status quo benefits Karabagh. However, with the constant monitoring of the situation by the Minsk Group, Azerbaijan may not have the opportunity to go from strident rhetoric to conflict renewal.

Conclusion         

The Azerbaijan leadership will conclude that a military option is the only viable course of action if they believe that Artsakh is on the verge of being irretrievably lost. The public utterances by Aliyev and his subordinates to take Karabagh by military force if necessary should be accepted as a vacuous attempt to intimidate Karabagh (and Armenia) to accept a negotiated settlement as the safer alternative. A negotiated settlement ends any hope that Karabagh can ever become independent. It means the end of historic Armenian Artsakh. And it means that the sacrifices of some 7,000 azatamartiks were in vain. Are these men and women no less martyrs? The Nagorno-Karabagh Republic has a legal and human rights claim to its independence. That fact should never be forgotten. If for a moment Azerbaijan believed that it could defeat Karabagh, military operations would have replaced rhetoric. Karabagh not only represents the key to Armenia’s future political and economic viability, but its defense is an affirmation of Hai Tahd.

Michael Mensoian

Michael Mensoian

Michael Mensoian, J.D./Ph.D, is professor emeritus in Middle East and political geography at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, and a retired major in the U.S. army. He writes regularly for the Armenian Weekly.

7 Comments

  1. Mr. Mensoian has written two extremely informative and fine articles in this series and should be commended, as should the Armenian Weekly for publishing them.

    One must wonder about possibly unforeseen or unusual factors in an Azeri attack, especially in view of the huge amounts of oil and gas revenue that Azerbaijan is investing in its military.

    Possibilities:  Air superiority (attack jets and bombers; drones bought from Israel).   Ground-to-ground medium range missiles.   Long range artillery. Electronic warfare.   Outlawed weapons.   Mercenaries.   An attack on Armenia proper’s northeast borders to divert Armenian men and equipment from Artsakh.  Military intelligence and advisors provided to Azerbaijan from the US, Turkey, Israel, and possibly other countries to the east and south, and even, possibly, depending on whether a deal has been struck between it and Azerbaijan, Russia.

  2. To: Michael, M.

    Excellent write up Michael. I am a bit concerned that perhaps your writing may help the Azeris to gain intelligence? On the othe hand maybe I should have more confidence in the descendents of the Tribes of Nairi. After all we have never been afraid and in the 21 century we should be braver and more determined than ever? You are right…people who believe in truth and justice have more reasons to be braver. Mercenaries are just that. Thay have no real reason to fight & die.

    Thanks for taking the time explaining strategy!

    G

  3. Hi Michael,    you are not a military expert, are you?  It looks like you are a journalist, and a good one!   Because this kind of analysis require  years in military academy and experience of Army General:-)

  4. Michael is a retired Major in the US army.
    I have said this before and I will say this again. We need a program where Armenians, 18 years of age and over, from all corners of the world, can enlist and serve a minimum of two years in the Armenian/Karabagh army.
    This would enlarge the army. Make available a reserve of future military fighters in case of future wars who would be ready to go. They would already have the training and understanding of the situation and terrain and current system of the Armenian defense army. Less training time and more combat ready troops. Deter the Azeri’s further from fighting a futile war. In return it would also instill the Armenian heritage, culture and language in all who serve. Some will continue to invest and get directly involved in the betterment of Armenia’s affairs after serving. Some will stay and marry local Armenians and further populate the region etc. It would be a win win for everyone.
    If anyone has any idea on how to start this program especially Michel please do so as it is a no brainer. And if we can be of help please let us know.

  5. This is very good idea!  I can send my boys for 2-3 mos time over the summer, so that they can continue their education in the US.  What’s the age limit to serve the army in Armenia?

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