Beyond peace talks: The art of observing Azerbaijani strategies
Recently, a new and controversial topic was reopened after Dr. Arman Tatoyan posted about the return of so-called Western Azerbaijanis to Armenia and the active registration of Azerbaijanis with the Western Azerbaijan Committee to secure their return after many decades.
This announcement sparked criticism. Some accused Dr. Tatoyan of spreading misinformation, while others believed that the reports reflected genuine intentions, whether or not they were true. It is safe to say that these types of considerations should remain a valid concern to the sovereignty and security of Armenia, as long as the President of Azerbaijan echoes his intention to increase the number of Azerbaijanis in Armenia.
There are several interpretations of this matter. Supporters often claim that the return of Azerbaijanis, who call themselves Western Azerbaijanis, is not inherently political. But it would be naive to miscalculate the goal’s true aim or underestimate the capacity of the potential problem if such a return were implemented.
The will of the Armenian people seems uncertain, too. They once took to the streets to oust then-President Serzh Sargsyan. Today, they face a leader who behaves like a junior-tyrant, claiming not only to represent the government, but to embody it and insisting his actions shouldn’t be questioned.
This raises questions not about Armenia’s democratic process but about how the government would respond if the return of Western Azerbaijanis became a material reality beyond its control. If the return were implemented without security checks, then Armenia could find itself in a fragile position, incorporating unvetted individuals into its sovereign territory, regardless of ethnic background or intentions.
Another scenario is that, if the return of Azerbaijanis becomes reality and Armenian citizens oppose hosting large numbers of them, the Pashinyan government has indicated it would make no difference. The administration considers itself fully legitimate and has openly called for another round of revolution, should the Armenian people resist.
While the Zangezur Corridor project is promoted as an economic opportunity for all parties involved in the accords — and it was signed for the benefit of the region — one should hypothesize that this project will gradually embolden Azerbaijan’s legal and logistical capacity to move non-Armenian populations and therefore expand its influence.
It is difficult to argue that the Zangezur Corrıdor will fully respect Armenian sovereignty when Azerbaijani officials frame Armenia as the “native” land of so-called Western Azerbaijanis, who have categorized themselves as expelled people and must return without question.
This ideology is also echoed by commentators such as Aziz Alakbarli, who frequently calls for the return of Azerbaijanis to Armenia. But this raises a broader question: What about the expelled Armenians from Artsakh or, if we go all the way back in history, from the territories of the Ottoman Empire? Is this intended as a bilateral population exchange or a one-sided Azerbaijani demand?
“If any future government of Armenia, regardless of when it comes to power, questions what was signed in Washington, Armenia will face serious consequences because the balance of power in the region is in our favor in all respects,” President Ilham Aliyev has said. But his demand goes far beyond ensuring a balance of power; more specifically, it is essentially a restatement of concessions without question.
This is a unique case in which one state demands constitutional change from another while claiming it ensures regional balance. Azerbaijan has conquered territory, forcefully expelled its ethnic people and is now claiming to return its own people to Armenia. Aliyev’s statement is not only contradictory but also reflects hegemonic ambitions in the South Caucasus, gradually extending Azerbaijan’s power over Armenia.
Constitutional changes should not be treated as minor adjustments to appease Azerbaijan. They represent an attempt by Azerbaijan to assert control over Armenia’s basic fundamental authority and guiding principles, and any changes should serve only Armenia and its people, not the interests of another country.
The path between Azerbaijan and Armenia has reached a dangerous level of complexity, cloaked in the language of “peace” yet driven by coercion, authority and imperial ambition. Demands for constitutional change, the forced return of so-called “Western Azerbaijanis,” the opening of corridors and staged peace talks are not signs of reconciliation but instruments of pressure. Armenia may present itself as committed to peace, even restraining its own defense spending, but the reality is that insecurity lies within Armenia’s borders, where its people bear the brunt of material and human losses.
To accept the return of Western Azerbaijanis under these conditions would mean opening the door to demographic engineering, gradual territorial claims and eventually, the legal framing of Armenia as a land to be contested. This is not a peace process; it is the silent preparation for a new form of conquest.
