In its relatively short period of independence, the Republic of Armenia and its citizens have never lived in peace. Since 1993, its western border has been closed, while Ankara manipulates a variety of issues to appear as a civilized neighbor while doing everything in its power to weaken the Armenian state. For Armenians, the term “preconditions” reflects the duplicitous behavior of their Turkish neighbors, who dangle the promise of peace only to unilaterally launch new sets of demands.
For years, Turkey has kept the diplomatic dialogue on “normalization” with Armenia on life support, conditioning any progress on “peace” with Azerbaijan. Initially, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan demanded that the Artsakh conflict be resolved—in Azerbaijan’s favor—before any normalization agreements, such as diplomatic relations or an open border, could be implemented. When the Artsakh issue degenerated into international crimes and genocide committed by Azerbaijan, Turkey altered its requirements to include the signing of a peace treaty with Azerbaijan.
For its part, Azerbaijan has issued its own set of “preconditions,” despite public statements by both parties claiming that the text and content of a peace treaty have been agreed upon. The document in question is less a comprehensive peace treaty and more a general guideline that includes concessions by Armenia. It refers to mutual respect for each country’s territorial integrity—a phrase that has become the new buzzword in diplomatic circles. But these words ring hollow when the demarcation and delimitation process remains in its infancy, and Azerbaijan continues to illegally occupy 200 square kilometers of sovereign Armenian territory.
I am waiting for the genocidal Aliyev regime to announce that the occupied land falls within Azerbaijan’s definition of “territorial integrity.” What can be expected from an individual who pronounces the need for territorial integrity while refusing to commit to internationally recognized borders established in 1991?
The “peace treaty” also includes a clause to remove current and future international lawsuits. This disproportionately benefits Azerbaijan, since it is the clear aggressor in this conflict. Azerbaijan’s legal claims against Armenia have generally lacked merit, while Armenia has focused on violations of international law, such as human rights abuses, illegal blockades and military aggression.
Another provision speaks to the removal or prevention of third-party forces along the border. Under significant pressure, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has stated that as the demarcation process continues, third-party forces like the European Union monitoring mission will become unnecessary. In theory, that is correct—if both sides respect territorial integrity and agree to a mutually defined border. However, Armenia is not negotiating with a good faith diplomatic party in Azerbaijan. The actual agreed upon content is very modest, and for the amount of time spent on this process, there are but a few areas of agreement—kept intentionally vague by Azerbaijan.
What is territorial integrity? Azerbaijan has insisted that Artsakh was an integral part of its territory for decades, yet the truth suggests otherwise. All parties—including President Ilham Aliyev—regularly declared that military options were unacceptable. However, that commitment was betrayed, as Azerbaijan unilaterally resorted to military force, evolving its campaign into a genocidal policy: the murder of civilians, starvation, blockades and mass deportation.
Aliyev talks about territorial integrity while regularly referring to large portions of Armenia as “Western Azerbaijan.” He is not interested in peace, since the pretext of war enables his strategic intentions. Armenia, for its part, recognizes that the peace treaty is not balanced—but what else could be expected following military defeat and the international community’s indifference?
After the wars of 2020 and 2023—and the expressed ambivalence of Russia and Western democracies—Armenia had little choice but to find ways to prevent further military incursions. Armenia has been the consistent party promoting regional peace. Their campaign has caught the attention of regional and global powers, who have no interest in seeing another regional brush fire escalate. Pashinyan sees peace as the only option for Armenia. Aliyev plays along but sees peace as contrary to his needs. Western democracies, meanwhile, see regional conflict as a threat to economic development. Ultimately, instability is not good for business.
Recently, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio made strong public statements regarding the American position. Beyond the standard comments on supporting the peace process, he emphasized U.S. efforts to prevent an Azerbaijani invasion and to broker a deal that would avoid conflict. He also raised the release of Armenian prisoners as a critical condition for peace. Rubio made it clear that the United States expects both parties to sign the peace document.
The Armenian Foreign Ministry has secured similar positions from France, Germany, Great Britain and other EU nations. A recent thawing of Armenia-Russia relations has also resulted in a stronger pro-peace position from Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Iran, while maintaining a balanced position, has been steadfast in opposing any Azerbaijani “corridor” through sovereign Armenian territory in Syunik. The U.S. position articulated by Rubio is significant, given Washington’s enduring influence over Azerbaijan. France’s position is similar, but its relations with Azerbaijan are strained. The value of these statements lies in who Azerbaijan will listen to. As the stalemate on signing continues, U.S. influence with Turkey may prove to be important.
If Rubio made these strong statements publicly, we can only imagine what has been stated privately to Azerbaijan through diplomatic channels. This process has been challenging for Armenia, but has produced credibility—“diplomatic capital”—with important parties. Most democracies have viewed Armenia as the weaker party in this conflict but respect them for taking the high road to Azerbaijan’s rhetoric. For major powers like the U.S., this conflict is viewed through global dynamics. For Armenians, it is a personal matter, but we must understand the language of international diplomacy.
Two emerging global developments may impact Armenia’s position. First, the war in Ukraine continues, but it is reasonable to assume that an end to the conflict is on the horizon. Anticipating that direction, Russia has begun the process of re-establishing its influence in the region. With the end of the war, the Trump administration may ease the devastating sanctions against Russia in order to sway them against a China coalition. Trump sees China as the greater threat and views Russia as more of a European problem. The question remains: will renewed U.S.-Russia engagement benefit Armenia or entrench the East-West divide?
The second global dynamic is the nuclear negotiations with Iran. Armenia enjoys a respectful relationship with its southern neighbor, but those relations are constrained by Western sanctions. If the current U.S. administration succeeds in curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, then we could expect the lifting of some sanctions in return. With the tensions between Iran and the West reduced, will Armenia establish a stronger alliance with Iran? With the nuclear threat diminished and proxy groups reduced in capability, how will the Israeli-Azerbaijani alliance be altered? Israel uses the relationship to trade military weapons and intelligence for energy, but in a changing world, new sources could emerge.
Despite its energy blackmail, Azerbaijan has isolated itself from the West. Relations with Europe are poor, and Russia is in no rush to help Turkey expand its influence in the South Caucasus. These global and regional dynamics may have created an opportunity for Armenia to spend some of its earned diplomatic capital and balance the dialogue with Azerbaijan. It is clear to France, the United States and even Russia that Azerbaijan is the obstacle to peace.
These global and regional dynamics may have created an opportunity for Armenia to spend some of its earned diplomatic capital and balance the dialogue with Azerbaijan. It is clear to France, the United States and even Russia that Azerbaijan is the obstacle to peace.
Armenia has declared its willingness to sign the treaty immediately—despite the terms. Azerbaijan, with its insatiable appetite for destroying Armenia, has responded with preconditions, such as changes to Armenia’s Constitution. Aliyev understands that in a democracy, changes like this require multiple layers of approval and a public referendum. He is banking on the process being slow or even rejected, so he can portray Armenia as uncooperative.
The international community understands Aliyev’s games. The United States, through Secretary Rubio, stated clearly that the release of prisoners held by Baku is critical to a peace agreement. Perhaps this is the time for Armenia to insist on that release—not only as a moral imperative, but as a confidence-building measure supported by key global powers. It follows the logic that countries with diplomatic relations should not hold each other’s political prisoners.
Finally, such a move would boost morale in Armenia and perhaps offer more support for the peace process at home. The only possible reason to not offer this request would be if it destroyed the peace process, but there is little reason to believe that. Azerbaijan is on the defensive. Armenia has painfully gained credibility with important players, and the timing may be right to exchange some of that “diplomatic capital” for issues of critical importance.
Stepan Piligian
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I believe the only thing that might cause Azerbaijan to cease its attacks against Armenia and to withdraw from Armenian territory it occupies, are punitive sanctions or even the threat of such sanctions by the United States.
(With the EU, this is even less likely, because of the veto power of Turkophile Hungary, and that the EU is dependent on Central Asian oil and gas via Azerbaijan, which it fully exploits to its advantage, while it also routes sanctioned Russian oil and gas through its territory to Europe, thus busting EU sanctions against Russia, and generating billions of US Dollars and Euros of illegal revenue for both Russia and itself.)
For example, when Trump, during his first Presidency, threatened to destroy Turkey’s economy for holding the US Protestant pastor Andrew Brunson in prison on spurious charges of spying, having links to the Gülen movement and the PKK, and of supporting the failed coup attempt against Erdogan by the Gülenists, Erdogan quickly caved in and released him. Trump, of course, also had the very large Evangelical Protestant electorate in mind, who are his biggest supporters. It is wishful thinking perhaps, but such threats might work against Azerbaijan and reign it in. It worked against Turkey. Why shouldn’t it work against Azerbaijan?
Nearly all Azerbaijan’s gas pipelines go WEST thru Georgia and Turkey and then beyond.
If Azerbaijan were to cut gas flows, it would be in serious trouble in terms of revenue and, therefore, its regime’s stability.
Therefore, Azerbaijan is STUCK with sending its gas to Europe.
Here is what AI says about Azeri energy:
“More specifically, oil and gas revenue contributes 51% to the country’s total public revenues, and they account for 90% of export revenues.”