The future of minorities in post-Assad Syria: Steering a fragile path

As Syria struggles to recover from the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the status of minorities and their future is among the most crucial questions. Although many people have celebrated the downfall of Assad’s dictatorship, this has also led to new and complicated challenges vis-à-vis various ethnic and religious groups within the state. For a long time, minorities such as Christians, Druze, Kurds and Alawites in Syria have been caught between two fires — oppression by Assad policies on the one hand and growing radical ideologies from opposition factions on the other. Consequently, their survival and place in an emerging political order will hinge upon careful negotiations for their rights’ protection and inclusion into the post-war political agenda. 

Syria’s minorities in the immediate post-Assad landscape 

The post-Assad Syria presents a precarious environment characterized by mixed emotions of hope and fear amongst the country’s minority groups. For many, this marks the end of decades of systematic oppression and discrimination, leaving the possibility of a future rooted in equality and self-determination. Nonetheless, divergent interests among those who gave rise to the fall of Assad introduced immense uncertainty, especially to communities that depended on his regime for stability and protection. 

Catholicos Aram I in Der Zor on April 24, 2005 (Photo: Alexandra Avakian)

One powerful force within these is the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), led by Kurds, which has taken control over large parts of northeastern Syria. The result is that Kurds have gained political and cultural rights that were previously denied under Assad. However, they face threats from Turkey, which perceives Kurdish autonomy as a direct threat and a changing of alliances among regional and global powers. Moreover, Turkey views Kurdish militias as terrorists. The Kurdish struggle to retain their autonomy reveals how minorities’ strides are fragile, with no strong, inclusive governance on the horizon. 

For Syria’s Christians and Druze, things are even more hazardous after Assad’s fall. These groups have traditionally supported the regime, which they considered a protector against Sunni extremism and violent shifts. Since the fall of Assad has created a power vacuum, there are more fears about sectarian violence, especially as the influence of Sunni jihadist groups grows. The existence of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which targets minority populations, has increased people’s concerns. Under an Islamist-dominated political system, these minorities could be marginalized, discriminated against, or maybe worse. 

The rise of Islamist factions points to a broader problem: Would a political structure accommodate Syria’s religious and ethnic diversity? The involvement of some regional powers — namely Turkey and Qatar — in supporting such factions further complicates this process, escalating sectarian divisions and consolidating conflicting interests. Furthermore, deep-seated mistrust among the opposition factions also undermines chances for an inclusive government, making it difficult to unite around one shared vision for the future of Syria. 

Also unclear is the future of the Alawite community, whose fates are closely linked to those of the Assad regime. The Alawite community appears to be particularly at risk, as some individuals fear reprisals from opposition groups who are believed to be planning revenge through sectarian violence. To reintegrate this society into post-Assad Syria will require careful work to separate them from the regime’s legacy. 

Christians in Syria have deep historical roots that go back centuries and have been an essential part of the nation’s cultural, social and economic fabric. As one of the oldest Christian communities globally, they safeguard Syria’s rich cultural heritage through their arts, literature and education contributions. Their places of worship, learning institutions and organizations have fostered knowledge and community life, uniting diverse ethnic and religious groups in Syria. Moreover, different Christians are involved in many sectors, such as trade, business, medicine and education. They act as intermediaries within the country’s pluralistic society, enabling harmonious coexistence with other community members. 

However, the war made many Christians relocate, either to other countries or to safer regions of Syria. This exodus has disrupted their traditional way of life and led to a loss of their vital cultural and economic contributions to the country. The future of Syria’s Christian communities will depend on whether a post-Assad political system can respect their historical significance and ensure their inclusion.  

The future of Syria’s minorities: A fragile hope 

While the future of Syria’s minorities depends on the country’s political transition, they remain precariously tied to it. After Assad, Syrians hope for relief from long-term dictatorship, but this has some ambiguity as it may either enhance unity or widen rifts. Christian, Druze and Kurdish communities, among other minority groups such as Alawites, are at an intersection point in their history where they can survive and prosper if Syria’s reconstruction process stabilizes. 

Many minority groups have hopes for a more inclusive and representative system but live in fear of being marginalized, retaliated against, or even persecuted. Among religious and ethnic minorities who reject pluralism on ideological grounds, the growth of radical Islamist factions is seen as life-threatening. With some concerns over the potential institutionalization of discriminatory policies by non-Sunni hostile groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), there are signs that these fears might be realized. 

Should Syria’s post-conflict recovery consider including minorities in the political process as a key goal? To ensure that this happens, their participation in political and social life is vital to building a unified nation-state. 

Efforts to assure the political participation of minority communities should start with a strong legislative framework that ensures equal rights, irrespective of race or religion. Such measures must not stop at words but provide enforceable safeguards against discrimination, eviction and violence. There could also be transitional justice mechanisms like truth commissions and reconciliation committees, which could go a long way towards addressing past injustices while promoting trust among communities across Syria. 

The process relies heavily on the international community. Foreign governments, multilateral organizations and NGOs must advocate for an inclusive political settlement that respects the rights of minorities. More specifically, through diplomacy leverage, they should strive to see that any agreement reached during negotiations includes safeguards for vulnerable groups. Also, focused economic and humanitarian assistance is needed in regions with minority populations to assist in reconstructing their lives and integrating into the overarching national recovery. 

Moreover, regional actors who have perpetuated sectarian divisions in Syria through competing interests must also be held accountable for their actions. Turkey, Iran and the Gulf states should be encouraged to support inclusive governance instead of sectarian factions. International mediators could play a significant role in stopping external intervention that threatens minority rights and national unity. 

All negotiations about how governance is structured after the conflict should involve Syria’s minorities. Achieving a secular, democratic and pluralistic state necessitates unprecedented collaboration between various ethnicities and religious groups. Protection of minority rights should be essential to any future constitution. There can be long-term peace and stability only if all groups are given equal voice and do not face persecution or suffering in Syria. 

The transition’s success in Syria ultimately depends on its readiness to treat diversity as a plus rather than a means of division. Such a society would not only respect the suffering endured during the war but also demonstrate how coexistence can be achieved in a region characterized by sectarian clashes. Although there is uncertainty about the future of minority groups in Syria, if they are included and protected well enough, it may still be possible to shape a prosperous and peaceful Syria in a post-Assad landscape.

Syria’s ethnic and religious characteristics

The main languages are Arabic (official), Kurdish (Kirmanji dialect), Armenian, Aramaic, Circassian and Turkish.

The main religions are Sunni Islam (75 percent), Alawite Islam (12 percent), other Muslims (including Isma’ili and Ithna-Asheri or Twelver Shi’a) (2 percent), Christianity (including Greek Orthodox, Syriac Orthodox, Maronite, Syrian Catholic, Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic) (10 percent), Druze (3-4 percent) and Yezidis (1 percent).

Category Group Details
Religious Groups Sunni Islam 75% of the population.
Alawite Islam 12%, concentrated in the Nusayri Mountains (northwest Syria) and plains near Homs and Hama
Other Muslims (Isma’ili, Twelver Shi’a) 2%, primarily in mountain regions south of Alawi areas and near Homs, Aleppo
Christianity 10%, including Greek Orthodox, Syriac Orthodox, Maronite, Syrian Catholic, Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic denominations, concentrated in Damascus, Aleppo and Jazira
Druze 3-4%, primarily in Jabal Druze (southern Syria near Jordan)
Yazidis 1%, ethnic Kurds practicing a 4,000-year-old religion; populations declined due to assimilation and displacement
Jews Once 40,000, 100-200 remain, mostly in Damascus and Aleppo
Ethnic Minorities Kurds 2-2.5 million; most significant ethnic minority, concentrated in Jazira, Taurus foothills and northeast Aleppo
Armenians Various Christian denominations are located in Aleppo, Damascus and Jazira
Circassians Descendants of North Caucasus refugees, primarily in Damascus and southwestern Syria (Hawran Province)
Turkomans Sunni Muslims, many assimilated into Arab culture

 

Vera Yacoubian

Vera Yacoubian

Vera Yacoubian is a part-time instructor in Political Science and History at both the American University of Beirut and Haigazian University. She holds a Master’s degree in International Affairs from the Lebanese-American University in Beirut and is currently pursuing her PhD at Ruhr University Bochum in Germany. Yacoubian's academic journey began with a degree in Journalism from the Lebanese University. In addition to her academic roles, she serves as the Executive Director of the Armenian National Committee of the Middle East, where she plays a pivotal role in advocating for the Armenian Genocide and regional issues.
Vera Yacoubian

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1 Comment

  1. Do you have any insights into the future of the Martyrs church and memorial at Der El Zor? To me that looks like a solid test of alleged tolerance for Christian minorities in post Assad Syria.

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