It would be fair to say that the protocols Nalbandian recently signed in Zurich contains absolutely nothing that benefits Armenia’s economic and political interests or its longterm security needs. The protocols are Turkish documents, under the guise of having been mediated by Switzerland. They are documents that strengthen Turkey’s position within the region and essentially reduce Armenia to a vassal state, whose president is no better than a satrap.
No one will argue that Yerevan is on par with Ankara in terms of raw power and influence. However, President Sarkisian had taken a sacred oath to protect the interests of Armenia (and the Armenian nation). Signing the protocols as a basis for continued negotiations not only represents a complete denial of that solemn oath, but a repudiation of everything that Hai Tahd represents.
Paradoxically, it may be the Turkish Parliament that may save Armenia from the protocols. Ankara will not abandon Azeri President Ilhem Aliyev and he, in turn, will not voluntarily relinquish Azerbaijan’s claim to Karabagh (Artsakh). Azerbaijan is Turkey’s link to Central Asia and its vast energy resources. The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is a major supplier of oil to the West. That pipeline, supplemented by the projected Nabucco gas pipeline from Baku through Turkey to its terminus in Baumgarten, Austria, will rival Gazprom in its capacity to deliver energy resources to Europe. With that in mind, it’s questionable if the protocols will be ratified by the Turkish Parliament without the Karabagh issue being part of the negotiations leading to the normalization of diplomatic relations and the opening of the border. This is possibly more wishful thinking than a rational assessment as to what the Turkish Parliament will do. As it is, the protocols essentially prevent Armenia from supporting any defensive effort by the Karabaghtsis against future Azeri aggression. Any hope of de jure independence that our brothers and sisters in Artsakh had, has been effectively eliminated.
Any benefits that Armenia believes it will receive with opening the border are illusory at best. Obviously marginal gains will be made. That fact is not being ignored. However, any palpable gains associated with an open border will come at an exorbitant price for Armenia. It is incredulous that the government has not commissioned a study whose findings would support its determination to have an open border with Turkey. Could it be because none exist?
First and foremost, normalization based on the protocols will yield Turkish gains that will far exceed anything that Armenia may hope to achieve under the most favorable of circumstances. Ankara will become the dominant power in the south Caucasus, able to challenge Russia and Iran in a region both these countries consider important to their national interests. In addition, normalization will revitalize the dormant Pan-Turanian movement that would expand Turkish influence through Azerbaijan into Central Asia and possibly further east to include the Chinese province of Xinjiang (Sinkiang), home of the Muslim Uighurs. (Only recently, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan chastised Chinese officials for engaging in genocide in putting down nationalist demonstrations by the Uighurs.) And finally, it will burnish Turkey’s image as a conciliator as its candidacy for ascension to the European Union is considered.
If these are not sufficient benefits for Armenia to bestow upon Turkey, consider that Turkey will not have to acknowledge the murder of 1.5 million Armenians as genocide, nor will any attempt be made by Yerevan to lay claim to the Turkish-occupied western provinces of Armenia (eastern provinces of Turkey) promised in the Treaty of Sevres (Wilsonian Armenia). In return for all this, Turkey will allow its border with Armenia to be reopened (and subject to closure on the slightest pretext based on Ankara’s interpretation of the protocols). What political message does this send to the Kurdish nationalists who continue to confront Turkey for their independence? What confidence does this inspire on the part of Armenians, especially those in the diaspora, in Yerevan’s continued leadership?
Since there is no definitive study available, let’s consider what might logically be expected with the opening of the border. It will not be a panacea for what ails the Armenian economy, as its proponents claim. On one side of the open border is Armenia, with a population less than five percent of Turkey’s population (75 million). In terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), there can be no comparability between Armenia and Turkey in the value of their respective GDPs, range of goods produced, or per unit costs of specific products. The volume of cross-border trade that will take place will obviously favor Turkey. The Armenian market would soon be saturated with goods marked “Made in Turkey” that will compete with domestically produced goods to the detriment of their local producers. A possible benefit to the Armenian consumer might be a greater quantity and variety of goods at possibly lower prices. Before long, however, the Armenian consumer would become more dependent on Turkish imports than locally produced
goods, and prices may not remain as low as initially experienced. In return, what is it that Armenia can export in sufficient quantities to pay for this invasion of Turkish products? Given this very plausible scenario, how does one envision that the Armenian economy can benefit from an open border? On what premise would it be based?
In a relatively short span of time, Turkish entrepreneurs guided by Turkish government regulations would become the significant players, as compared to their Armenian counterparts, in determining the rate and direction of Armenia’s economic development. Given the anticipated imbalance in the value of trade between the two countries, Armenia would eventually become a debtor nation to Turkey. This situation could lead to greater financial control by Turkish interests of Armenian industry and whatever improved or newly developed infrastructure that may result. Profits generated by Turkish-controlled interests might be used for further economic expansion in Armenia or just as easily flow to Turkey. This transference of funds would further exacerbate Armenia’s balance of payment situation. Not a very encouraging situation to contemplate.
With high rates of unemployment in both countries, does it seem reasonable that Turkish entrepreneurs, guided by their government’s regulations, will invest heavily in Armenia to create a robust economy generating a higher level of employment? Both nations are presently exporting labor in response to high levels of unemployment. If investments are made, some industries that immediately come to mind are the manufacturing of cement, copper mining, and the lumber industry (it doesn’t matter that Armenia is not heavily forested). These are mentioned because they tend to despoil the environment without effective mitigating controls in place. Who will rise in protest if people are employed? What a sad trade-off to envision for Armenia.
Whatever other economic activities are generated will be based on harnessing the low end of worker skills and wages, although it must be conceded that the Armenian labor force may, overall, experience a slight increase in its take-home pay. The better educated members of the workforce—engineers, research scientists, technicians, etc.—would be siphoned off to accept positions in Turkey rather than use their productive and creative capabilities within Armenia. This “brain drain” would benefit Turkey and weaken Armenia in the long term. This could lead to a demographic shift of the better educated families to Turkey.
The tourist trade, which is a principal growth industry in Armenia, could well be taken over by Turkish interests. Armenia has great potential as a destination for tourists especially from Europe and the diaspora (assuming there is a continuing desire to connect with Armenia). The return on investment in the tourist industry is high. The expansion of this industry has a high multiplier effect in terms of job creation. However, most tend to be at the lower end of the wage scale. The Turkish tourist industry has attracted international investment and is at a more sophisticated level of operation compared to Armenia’s. It would seem logical for the Turkish tourist industry to expand its operations to include Armenia.
It would not be surprising that within three to five years, Armenians would prefer the Turkish lira to the Armenian dram as the currency of choice. In time, it can be expected that the Armenian economy would become an integral part of the Turkish economic system with the lira as the only currency.
The oft-repeated benefit that Armenia would have another outlet to the world has no basis in fact. There are no Turkish Black Sea ports comparable to Batumi or Poti in Georgia, and those that do exist (from Trabzon eastward) are neither easily nor economically accessible. Armenia would still be dependent on Georgia as its principal transportation route. Given Armenia’s weakened political position, why would the Tbilisi government view her neighbor’s transit requirements in a more favorable light? Also, how would this “capitulation” affect the future of the Javakhk Armenians? As it is, they are under constant and pernicious pressure by the Georgian government to acculturate.
Another thought concerning the protocols is why the Ministry of Diaspora, created by the Sarkisian government as a liaison between Armenia and the diaspora, was never given a meaningful role as a sounding board with the diasporan communities and the leadership of the political and humanitarian relief organizations for their input. Here was an opportunity to utilize the diaspora beyond its value simply as a source of humanitarian and economic aid.
However, many in the diaspora have taken a “Let’s wait to see what happens” attitude. Unfortunately, this attitude can be interpreted as tacit approval of the dangerous path of conciliation that Sarkisian is traveling. These chezoks (neutrals), by failing to take a definite position, are welcomed by the proponents of the protocols because they provide no opposition to what is taking place. In essence, they are supporting Yerevan’s capitulation to Turkey.
There are no economic concessions that Turkey can offer Armenia—including the unlikely routing of a spur line connecting Armenia to the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline or having the projected Nabucco gas pipeline transit Armenia—that can justify Sarkisian’s signing of the protocols. He has not only failed in his sacred duty to protect Armenia from its enemies, but has committed mer Hairenik to a Faustian Bargain that must be annulled at all costs. These Turkish documents are contemptuous of Armenia’s sovereignty and undermine its future as a viable political entity.
Michael Mensoian
Latest posts by Michael Mensoian (see all)
- Facing the Reality that is Artsakh - August 6, 2020
- Tourism: An Economic Tide That Can Lift All “Boats” - January 29, 2020
- The Legacy of the Hairenik and the Armenian Weekly - January 7, 2020
Please don’t insult our intelligence with your nonsense. Yes, I agree with some of your points, however, don’t state that Armenia will begin to use Turkish currency in an attempt to bolster the emotions of your readers! You and I both know this will never happen.
Most of the predictions in Mensoian’s article are true and are based on common facts. But there are some assumptions that need verification and may be incorrect. Please don’t get me wrong, the real scenario is even worse than what Mensoian is imagining. For example, why every article about economic benefit assumes that the prices of goods from Turkey are cheaper? It may be that some products are cheaper because of the transport expenses, but I need a detailed listing to believe such claims. I believe even that aspect is wishful thinking brainwashed by the current Armenian media.
Cutting your finger and filling your stomach to avoid starvation will not make you survive in the long run.
Lav hodvats er (not). Turkere vor kardan ais hastat khastaten protokole. Ete uzum es haieri hamar grel gone hairen gri, vor urishnere chkardan.
Ete uzum es gtnel protokoli iskakan heghinaknerin, apa mtatsi te um e ain dzernatu. Es katsum em vor Sarkisyanin stipel en ais kailin gnal. Ete protokole hastatvi Nabucco i gaze Rusastanov kgna Turkiai pokharen. Dra masin Azrbaijane arden mi kani angam haitararel e. Dra hamar Turkian chi hastati ain.
Նաբուքօի Թուրքիո փոխառեն Ռուսաստանի միջով գնալու պրոտոկոլի հաստատման հետ ի՞նչ կապ ունի: Մանրամասն կարո՞ղ եք բացատրել:
Mr. Sarksyan is in the position of Jesus without Christ. He expects Mr. Putin to give him the Cross.